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How do the people with whom we talk about politics influence our voting
behavior? In this dissertation, I seek to answer that question within the particular context
of voters in a single Iowa county in the 2016 Republican presidential caucus. In doing so,
I seek to refine generalizations about the influence of political discussion networks on
voting behavior, mainly developed to explain behavior in general elections, to
nomination contests, a comparatively underdeveloped area of inquiry. This study also
contributes to a greater understanding of the behavior of Iowa caucus attendees, an
understudied area despite Iowa’s importance (along with New Hampshire) in our
sequential presidential nominating system. Through a series of panel interviews
supported by observations, I make several findings affirming theories on social influences
on voting behavior within the context of nomination contests. The first is that individuals
are reasonably accurate when predicting which candidate a political discussion partner
supports despite the multi-candidate nature of the nomination contest and not having
party ID as a frame of reference. Second, although there is some evidence for campaign
effects in the form of contacts from campaigns or supporters of candidates, political
discussion networks have a stronger influence on vote choice in nomination contests than
do campaign effects. I note a tendency towards increased homophily on candidate
preference over the course of a campaign. A unique finding of this study that homophily
within a group may trigger strategic voting behavior, in the form of supporting the main

rival of the leading candidate within a political discussion network, as well as
bandwagoning. Finally, an emergent study of local political elites finds variation between
local elected officials, party leaders, and party activists in terms of ideology and the size
of political discussion networks. Those findings suggest that local party leaders may play
a more important role than local elected officials in diffusing political information in their
communities during nomination contests. I conclude with recommendations for further
research.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
On a typically cold February evening in Farragut, Iowa, voters from two precincts
packed into the library of the (since closed) Nishnabotna High School to participate in the
first vote for the 2016 Republican presidential nomination. Some had to take time to
change their voter registration to Republican at a table in the hall outside the library
before entering. Down the hall from the library, the sounds of the basketball game the
Nishnabotna High School Blue Devils were hosting could be heard; not everything in
Iowa stopped for the presidential caucus. Early in the caucus meeting, several individuals
rose to speak on behalf of their preferred candidates. Those speeches and the side
conversations that took place just before and during the caucus meeting were the last
chances that friends and neighbors had to influence each other’s vote before ballots were
cast, a process that began months earlier with the first conversations about the thenemerging field of Republican candidates.
In the broadest sense, this study is about what causes people to vote the way they
do, although that question is expressed by examining a particular event (the 2016 Iowa
caucus) in a particular place (Fremont County, Iowa). By what processes do we evaluate
political information? More specifically, how do social influences, as acted out through
our political discussion networks, influence voting behavior? I use Ikeda and Boase’s
definition of political discussion network as “discussants (whom) respondents listed as
being those with whom they discuss political matters” (2010, p 12). This narrowing of
terms is meant to provide a more readily operationalized measure of that subset of social
networks that include discussion of politics while recognizing that most talk in political
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discussion networks is not directly political and that they are “constrained by other social
influences” (Hibbing et al., 2011, p 603).
The major parties’ nomination processes provided the American public with a pair
of historically unpopular nominees in 2016.1 Despite the importance of nomination
contests in limiting the candidates voters have to choose from in general elections, most
work on political discussion networks in the United States, such as Huckfeldt and
Sprague’s canonical studies of voters in the 1984 presidential election, focus on general
elections, when known party affiliation of discussion partners acts as a strong cue about
voting intentions. But what happens in nomination contests, when party affiliation offers
no clue about which candidate a family member, friend, or neighbor supports? This study
will also help address that question.
The General Relevance of this Study
The difficulties involved in figuring out how members of the public go about
forming their opinions has caused political scientists to caution that the will of the people
is “incredibly hard to put your finger on” (Noel, 2010, p. 4). Individuals seek to vote
correctly (that is, in accordance with their preferred policy outcomes) with the minimal
amount of effort in seeking out information on which to base that decision (Downs,
1957). To that end, voters seek out sources they believe to be reliable to act as shortcuts
in gathering and analyzing information. Those shortcuts can be based on trusted media
sources, groups one belongs to or identifies with, or people whose opinion one trusts
(Lupia, 1994; Mondak, 1995; Popkin, 1991). Researchers have also found that

“Trump and Clinton Finish With Historically Poor Images”, Gallup, NOVEMBER 8, 2016,
https://news.gallup.com/poll/197231/trump-clinton-finish-historically-poor-images.aspx
1
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individuals rely on those around them to form identities of themselves and help determine
how “one of us” would interpret political information in which people immersed in
common social contexts “suggest to each other and reinforce certain ways of interpreting
current events” (Walsh 2004, p. 22).
This research is a case study observing voters in rural Iowa. However, it is not just
about Iowa voters or rural voters, but is an “intensive study of a single unit for the
purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring, 2004, p. 342). This
case is bound in space (Fremont County, Iowa) and time (several months before and
during the 2016 Iowa presidential caucus). Although a single case study does not usually
form the basis for generating new generalizations, it can be a useful tool for refining
generalizations and forming “naturalistic generalizations” that can be applied to other
cases (Stake, 1995), in this instance the influence of social networks on candidate
support. An advantage of this method is its use of a wide variety of information to
provide an in-depth picture of the case.
The Intrinsic Importance of Iowa
In addition to the general applicability of this study, there is also an intrinsic value
in understanding the decision-making process of voters in the first contest to determine
who will win arguably the most important elected position in the world. Iowa, along with
New Hampshire, is an early make-or-break competition in the nominating process, giving
it an outsized importance in the presidential nominating process. Because “Small events
in Iowa can have big effects on the rest of the presidential campaign” (Bartels, 1989, p.
122), campaigns pour a great deal of resources into influencing voters in the Iowa
caucuses. However, rather than act as kingmaker, Iowa’s primary roll has more often
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been to reduce the size of the field and influence what happens in New Hampshire eight
days later (Mayer, 1996; Adkins and Dowdle, 2001), meaning that more candidates of
more ideological stripes are actively campaigning in the months leading up to the
caucuses than at any other time in the presidential nominating process.
Some scholars have downplayed the importance of Iowa, the first presidential
caucus state (and the first presidential primary state, New Hampshire), noting that the
winner of the so-called “invisible primary” was the most likely winner of the presidential
nomination. Between 1980 and 2008, all but two of the candidates who raised the most
money in the months before the Iowa caucus went on to win their party’s nomination
(Aldrich 2009). However, Iowa and New Hampshire influence the nomination contests
long before the first votes are cast. Poll numbers in the early nominating states have a
stronger influence on national media coverage and national polling numbers than the later
have on the former, justifying candidates’ early and intense focus on those early voting
states (Christenson and Smidt, 2012). The importance of Iowa in the nomination process
may even have become enhanced over the past decade due to what Hull (2008) calls “Ementum”, the ability of campaigns to more quickly capitalize on Iowa success through
Internet voter contact and fund raising, a finding demonstrated by the ability of the
Obama campaign to build quickly on its success in Iowa in 2008 (Redlawsk et al., 2011).
Although there is a rich supply of literature on the impact of Iowa on the
presidential nominating process and the impact of campaigns on the Iowa vote, it is
relatively weak on the specific processes by which individual caucus-goers decide for
whom to support and what influences those processes. In one of the most recent and
scientifically rigorous books on the Iowa caucuses, Redlawsk, Tolbert, and Donovan note
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that “few scientific studies of caucus attendees exist in the literature” (Redlawsk et al,
2011, p. 124). This case study aims to help fill that void in the literature by using
available data, observations, and interviews in a single Iowa county to explore how
political discussion networks influence vote choice among presidential caucus voters.
However, and as previously noted, this is not just a study of rural voters or Iowa voters
and will develop findings applicable to other contexts.
Dissertation Outline
In the remainder of this dissertation, I present the methodology and findings of
nine months of fieldwork and follow up surveys that produced a unique dataset and
supporting observations. In Chapter 2, I begin by detailing the theoretical and practical
considerations that eventually led to my decision to focus the study on Republican likely
caucus voters in Fremont County, Iowa. I also provide a description of Fremont County
to provide a context for the findings in order to help determine how relevant this case
study may be to other cases. I then detail the methods employed to gather the data
analyzed in the later chapters of this dissertation. Those methods were developed in a
pilot study in Nemaha County, Nebraska, in the summer of 2014 and further refined over
the next several months. Most of the information used in this dissertation is based on a
series of interviews conducted from the summer of 2015 through several weeks after the
Iowa presidential caucus of 2015. I close the chapters with a description of observational
data collection.
In Chapter 3, “Dyadic Network Analysis and the Correctness of Perceptions of
Discussion Partner Views”, I briefly review three levels of network analysis: egocentric,
dyadic, and complete, and note the limitations of each level of analysis. I then review
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relevant literature related to information exchange and perceptions of homophily in
political discussion networks. The resulting expectations are that people will be able to
accurately predict the candidate preferences of their discussion partners and that accuracy
will increase over time as the caucus date nears. I also expect that, when people
inaccurately predict the candidate preferences of their discussion partners, they will tend
to falsely believe that their discussion partners support the same candidates that they do. I
test those expectations using dyadic network analysis drawn from my dataset.
In Chapter 4, “Campaign Effects and Ideological Vote Share”, I review two of the
“usual suspects” thought to influence voting in nomination contests. I review the relevant
literature related to campaign effects that yield two expectations that can be tested with
my dataset. The first is that people who receive person-to-person contacts from a
candidate’s campaign (rather than, say, hear ads for that candidate on the radio) are more
likely to support that candidate than those who do not. The second is that people who
personally meet a candidate or hear a candidate speak in person are more likely to
support a candidate than those who do not. I test those expectations using panel data from
each of the five rounds of interviews conducted with study participants. I also have two
expectations based on the literature on ideology and voting. First, I expect that people are
more likely to vote for candidates that they perceive to be closer to themselves
ideologically. Second, as people receive information on the candidates during the course
of the campaign, variation in their perceptions of candidate ideology will become
narrower. Those expectations are tested using measures of self-perceived ideology taken
in the summer of 2015 and measures of perceived candidate ideology taken that summer
and again in January of 2016.
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In Chapter 5, “Political Discussion Networks and Vote Choice”, I use egocentric
network analysis to investigate the possible impact of individuals’ political discussion
networks on their candidate support and how political discussion networks may moderate
campaign effects. I start with a review of the literature on the influence of social identity
and political discussion on political behavior. My initial expectations are that there is
homophily within political discussion networks on candidate support and that the level of
homophily increases over the course of a political campaign. I also expect that having
supporters of a candidate within someone’s political discussion network will increase the
chance that messages from that candidate’s campaign will be effective in influencing that
person to support that candidate.
In Chapter 6, “Social Contexts and the Political Activism of Local Political Elites”,
I present emergent findings on three sets of local political activists: local elected officials,
active members of the county party’s central committee, and political activists who
participate in party activities during election periods, but who are otherwise inactive. I
investigate the relative sizes of political discussion networks of those three types of elites
and how they change in size over the course of the presidential campaign. I also
investigate the relative levels of political conservatism of the three types of elites. This
chapter includes qualitative analysis of the expressed belief in the efficacy of political
talk, the relative importance of ideological conservatism and political moderation, and the
willingness to engage in strategic voting.
In the aptly named final chapter, “Conclusion”, I review the main findings of
chapters three through six. I then discuss the major implications of this study, go over its
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strengths and limitations of this study, and point out possible avenues for further
research.
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CHAPTER 2: CASE STUDY SELECTION AND METHODS
This chapter is a review of the methods employed to collect the data analyzed in
the rest of this dissertation. This research is based on a case study of voters in rural Iowa.
It is a single case: Republican caucus voters in Fremont County, Iowa. It primarily
involved the collection of original data through participant interviews at five points in
time before and after the 2016 Iowa presidential caucus. It also involved observation of
participants and political events.
I begin this chapter with a brief overview of the case study approach and its
application to this research. I then go over the theoretical and practical considerations that
resulted in Fremont County being selected as the research site for this study. Next, I
explain reasons for limiting the study to members of one political party, the challenges
involved in creating a sample frame of likely 2016 caucus voters, and how those
challenges were overcome. It is important in case study research to understand the
context of the case to help determine how similar it may be with other cases, so I briefly
explain the history, geography, and politics of Fremont County.
Most of the chapter details the procedures used to gather the data analyzed in the
rest of this dissertation, especially the interview procedures that constitute the bulk of the
data in this study. I start with a brief explanation of a pilot study in Nemaha County,
Nebraska in 2014 during which I practiced and refine the interview techniques I
employed in Fremont County. I then detail how potential participants were recruited for
the study. There were five rounds of interviews: an initial in-person interview lasting an
average of about twenty-six minutes in the summer of 2015, three follow up phone
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interviews lasting about ten minutes each, and a final post-caucus phone interview lasting
about five minutes. I review the procedures and content of those interviews. I close the
chapter with an overview of observation data collection of Fremont County Republican
Party central committee meetings, local political events and caucus of four of Fremont
County’s five precincts, including a brief note on the difficulty of maintaining
confidentiality of participants when encountering multiple participants at public events.
The Case Study Approach
This research is a case study of Republican caucus voters in a rural western Iowa
county. A case study is an “exploration of a ‘bounded system”, the bounds being time
and space (Creswell 2007). The particular space in this study is a single county in
southwestern Iowa and the particular time is from June 2, 2015 to the Iowa presidential
caucus on February 1, 2016. Notwithstanding Van Evera’s (1997) arguments about the
potential for case studies to provide strong causal arguments, a single case study does not
usually form the basis for generating new generalizations, although it can be a useful tool
for refining generalizations and forming “naturalistic generalizations” that can be applied
to other cases (Stake, 1995), in this instance the influence of political discussion networks
on candidate support. So, at a minimum, the findings from this study can be used to test
theories and can also be used to develop theories to be tested in other contexts, something
greatly aided by the intense observation of the subject afforded by case study research
(Flyvbjerg 2006).
A single case study may miss an important variable if it is not present in a
measurable way within the case. For example, although rural America is widely and, for
the most part, accurately regarded as conservative, there is diversity within rural areas
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due to regional and demographic variation. Scala et al. (2015) also found that variation in
the foundation of the local economy is also correlated with political party support, with
farm-based rural counties generally supporting Republicans and “new rural” counties
with economies based on leisure and service leaning towards Democrats. Researchers
using a single case study in one type of county could potentially overstate the case for the
generalizability of their results, for example, by conducting their study in a county with
an emerging tourism economy and concluding that rural people are trending Democratic.
However, a variable of interest can be measured within a single case study. In
fact, a single case study can provide strong causal arguments through “congruence
procedures”, comparing the independent and dependent variables across observations
within a case (Van Evera, 1997). For example, using the example from Scala et al. above,
a case study in a “new rural” county can test hypotheses about why those counties are
trending Democratic by collecting data on individual voters within the country. Such data
could include how long they have lived in the county and their occupation, to test how
much, if any, of the observed phenomenon is due to in-migration and how much is due to
participation in service-based, rather than agricultural-related, work. Similarly, this case
study includes individual-level measurements of things such as campaign effects by
asking participants directly if they had received contacts from humans (as opposed to
mail and robo-calls) connected to a presidential campaign and if they have personally met
the candidate. This allows for more precision than more general measurements, such as
candidate visits to the area (although those are also measured for comparison purposes).
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Selecting the case
Although the generalizability of single case studies is the subject of much debate,
the “strategic choice of case may greatly add to the generalizability of a case study”
(Flyvbjerg 2006, p226). Practical considerations, such as accessibility, must also be taken
into account in case selection. After assessing theoretical and practical considerations I
explain below I chose, Fremont County, Iowa as the location for this study.
Iowa is an ideal site because it would provide an extreme case for testing the
impact of political discussion networks on two phenomena. The first is ideological vote
share, the portion of the vote each candidate would receive if every voter voted for the
candidate they believed to be closest to them ideologically. As the first electoral contest
in the nation, Iowa has more candidates than any other presidential contest, with
candidates dropping out if they face disappointing results there. This relative plethora of
candidates makes Iowa an ideal testing ground for hypotheses regarding ideological vote
share because it presents voters with a choice numerous candidates of various perceived
ideologies, and also explains why some candidates choose to skip Iowa if they face too
many similarly ideologically positioned candidates or if they are too distant from most
caucus voters ideologically (Hull 2005), as New Jersey Governor Chris Christie and Ohio
Governor John Kasich largely did in 2016.
Iowa is also an ideal location to study is campaign effects. Iowa, along with New
Hampshire and South Carolina, is visited by more presidential candidates than any other
state. That intensity of effort by the presidential campaigns means that, as with
ideological vote share, Iowa presents an extreme case for the study of campaign effects.
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Once Iowa was selected, the particular location of the case study had to be
selected. The selection process was based on three factors; accessibility, likelihood for a
large portion of political discussion networks to be located within the county, and the
target population being small enough that a single researcher could realistically recruit
and interview a large portion of the population. A final factor was the cooperation of
potential gatekeepers in helping to gain access to participants. Each of these factors will
be considered in the next few paragraphs.
To effectively conduct the research, I needed to regularly visit the counties
selected from June of 2015 to February of 2016. For that reason, the accessibility
criterion was that the county seat had to be within a four hour round-trip drive of Lincoln,
Nebraska. Drive times between Lincoln and the county seats were measured using the
“How Far Can I Travel” app at freemaptools.com. Eight counties in southwestern Iowa
met this criterion: Harrison, Shelby, Pottawattamie, Mills, Montgomery, Fremont, Page,
and Taylor.
The second consideration was that political discussion networks within the county
must be as self-contained as possible. In other words, as many members of the county as
possible should work, shop and worship within the community as that would aid in
mapping political discussion networks. This served two purposes. First, by working in a
more isolated location, I hoped to be able to interview a higher proportion of members of
participants’ political discussion networks. Second, by having a higher proportion of
political discussion networks within a county, I sought to gain “strong controls” of
omitted variables based on the “uniform character of the background conditions” being
studied (Van Evera, 1997, p. 52)
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The Omaha/Council Bluffs area is the most likely draw for people living in
southwestern Iowa, so the self-contained criterion was that the county seat must be at
least an hour-and-a-half round trip from Council Bluffs. Areas closer to the
Omaha/Council Bluffs area would have a higher proportion of their population work and
attend places of worship in the metro area, meaning that I would have less opportunity to
interview other members of their political discussion networks. That is not to say that I
was looking for a perfectly isolated community. Rather, I sought an area where a higher
proportion of people lived, worked, and worshiped in the same area in order to increase
the likelihood of interviewing other members of participants’ political discussion
networks. This choice allowed me to conduct the dyadic network analysis presented in
Chapter 3 in addition to egocentric network analysis presented in Chapter 5. An
advantage of dyadic network analysis is that the findings are at least somewhat less
dependent on the perception of network membership by individual participants (Borgatti
et al. 2013, also see Van Duijn & Vermunt, 2006). In an extreme example of that, one
participant participated in every round of the study but refuse to divulge the names of any
political discussion partners. I was still able to draw a partial network for that participant
based on that participant being listed in the political discussion networks of other
participants. Drive times between Council Bluffs and the county seats were measured
using the “How Far Can I Travel” app at freemaptools.com. That eliminated five
counties, leaving Fremont, Page and Taylor. During the first round of interviews, I
discovered that more of my participants in Fremont County than expected worked,
worshiped, or sought medical treatment in Nebraska City, which is just across the
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Missouri River. Despite that, there was enough self-containment to perform dyadic
analysis political discussion networks in Fremont County.
The third consideration was that the pool of likely caucus goers had to be
sufficiently small that a major portion of them could be interviewed before the caucuses
scheduled for January of 2016. The basis for this measurability consideration was
Republican Party caucus attendance in 2012 because that was the most recent competitive
party caucus. The measurability criterion was that attendance in the Republican caucus in
2012 was 250 or less in that county. Republican caucus attendance was taken from a
report by the Des Moines Register from that year. Of the three counties, only Page had
more than 250 Republican caucus attendees in 2012, so it was eliminated from
consideration.
Based on those criteria, Fremont Country was selected as the primary research
location with Taylor Country as the back-up location should I encounter difficulties
gaining access in Fremont County.
A final consideration was an assessment of how cooperative key individuals, such
as local party officials, would be with a multi-month study in their community.
Republican Party Chair Freddie Krewson proved to be generously cooperative and
became a “gatekeeper” providing “entrance to the research site” (Creswell 2007 p 60) by
introducing me to other members of the Fremont County Republican Party Executive
Committee. Most of those executive committee members, in turn, also proved to be
enormously helpful. They and Krewson provided introductions or let me drop their
names when introducing myself at the courthouse or to other key figures in the county.
Democratic Party chair Brian Kingsolver was also generous in offering information,
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although I decided to limit my research to Republicans for reasons detailed in the next
section.
Selecting the Participants
Once Fremont County was selected as the research area, the next step was
selecting the population within Fremont County to be studied. In this section I will
discuss the reasons for limiting my study to Republican likely caucus voters across the
county and go over the process of creating a sample frame of those voters.
I had initially planned on studying both Democrats and Republicans across the
entire county, but was advised by my committee members that the scale of my proposal
was overly ambitious. This left me with two options; limiting my study to a geographical
subset of Fremont County or limiting my study to members of one party.
Limiting the research to a geographic subset of Fremont County most likely
would have meant limiting it to two or three of the county’s five precincts. The most
likely choices would have been the Sidney and Green precincts. That selection would
have included about half of the population of the county, including the towns of Sidney
(the county seat in the middle of the county) and Tabor, the two largest towns in the
county. It would have also been geographically compact, with most participants located
within a thirty-minute drive of Sidney. Interviewing participants from both parties may
have also given more data on cross-party discussion networks.
However, there were limitations to that approach. First, many politically relevant
meetings, such as party central committee meetings or meetings of or with county
officials, take place with people from across Fremont County. Limiting the research to
just two or three precincts would have excluded some potentially important actors from
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the study. For example, two of the more prominent members of the central committee
live in Farragut precinct on the eastern edge of the county. It is also likely that, despite
the geographic compactness gained by limiting the research to two precincts, studying
participants from both parties in Green and Sidney precincts would have yielded fewer
political discussion network connections than researching members of one party in all
five precincts given the tendency towards homophily in social networks (McPherson, et
al., 2001, although see Eveland & Kleinman, 2013). For those reasons, I chose to limit
the research to members of a single party from across the county.
I elected to limit my study to Republicans for a couple of reasons. First, it
appeared that the Republican Party was better organized in the county with regularly-held
central committee meetings that I could attend. As it turned out, my sitting in on the
central committee meeting in June of 2015 paved the way for several interviews with
party activists. The county Democratic Party did not have such regular meetings. As I
continued to do my research, I heard from people in the county that the Democratic Party
in Fremont County had a change of leadership and that the party had to have the caucus
for the entire party held at a single location (Sidney Elementary School) because of
organizational difficulties that they were having.
Additionally, although the Republican field was wide open, I made the (mistaken,
as it turned out) assumption that Hillary Clinton would easily win in Iowa. Because my
dependent variable was vote choice in the 2016 presidential caucus, I believed it was
better to research the party that would exhibit more variation on that variable.
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An unanticipated advantage of researching Republicans is that it allowed me to
interview more local elected officials, most of whom are Republicans. That allowed me
to gather data that I used in chapter six of this dissertation.
Having decided to limit my study to Republicans, I needed to create a sample
frame that would reflect my population (attendees of the 2016 Republican caucuses) as
closely as possible. Because that population did not yet exist, I would have to select
participants on other criteria. There is variation in participation from caucus to caucus
because voters will come out for different candidates. However, because voting patterns
are most often habitual (Gerber, Green, & Shachar 2003; Dinas 2012), it was reasonable
to assume that most of the participants of the 2016 caucus could be found among the 244
people who voted in the 2012 caucus in the county. If getting a frame that matched the
population was not possible, using the list of 2012 caucus voters would be reasonably
close.
However, getting that list proved to be impossible. Unlike with primaries or
general elections, Iowa caucus voter lists are not maintained by government officials
because they are conducted by the parties. To further complicate matters, county party
chair Freddie Krewson informed me that they had not kept a copy of that list after
sending it to the state party. A member of the Fremont County Republican Central
Committee got me in touch with an Iowa Republican Party’s Regional Political Director
for the third congressional district. The official informed me that the state party does not
give their caucus lists away. When I expressed an interest in buying the list for Fremont
County, the official informed me that the party only makes the list available for purchase
by candidate committees.

19
I conducted a handful of interviews in early June, 2015 through snowball
sampling while I worked to develop a larger list. The snowball sample consisted of
names of members of the Fremont County Republican Party executive committee, who
were 2012 caucus attendees by definition (because those offices are filled at caucuses), so
all participants contacted through snowball sampling were on the contact list that I later
developed. I discovered in late June that, although there were no public records of all
caucus attendees, lists of those elected as delegates and alternates to the Republican Party
county convention and those elected as caucus officials or local party officials were filed
with the office of the Fremont County Auditor. I used those lists as the basis of my
sample. The staff at the auditor’s office proved to be accommodating and efficient; they
located the records and allowed me to enter the vault where the records are kept to see
them. The records were on the third or fourth layer of carbon copies and were too faded
to copy with a copying machine, so I hand-copied the names and locations of 102 people
from those lists and later matched them with a voter list I purchased from the auditor’s
office. I added an additional 35 unique names from the 2014 caucus record, reasoning
that those who attend midterm caucuses are also like to attend presidential caucuses.
The list of 137 names from 2012 and 2014 still left me 107 names short of the 244
people who attended the 2012 caucus. I supplemented the list by adding the names of
Republicans who voted both in a (December 30, 2014) special election for state senate
and a (February 10, 2015) special election for U.S. congress. A final supplemental list
included those on my initial snowball sample and those who were listed in participants’
political discussion networks and who voted in at least one of the previously mentioned
special elections. Combining all those lists yielded a working list of approximately 230
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names. Purging those who had moved, died, or never participated in caucuses (that final
measure acquired after initial contact with those on the list) yielded a final list of 199
likely 2016 Republican caucus voters.
Fremont County, Iowa
Some background on Fremont County may be useful in providing context for this
research. In addition to providing a better feel for the local environment, including
background on the community in which the study took place can help provide an
understanding of potential contextual effects, broadly defined by Huckfeldt and Sprague
as “any effect on individual behavior that arise due to social interaction within an
environment” (1995, p. 10). Although obviously not a variable, a deeper knowledge of
the context of this case study can be helpful given the “context-dependent” (Flyvbjerg
2006, p. 221) nature of case study research. This section provides a very brief overview
of the history, geography, demographics, and politics of Fremont County and may be
useful for readers of this study in determining its applicability to other research.
Fremont County was founded in 1847. Its location along a major north-south
transit route has shaped its history and economy. Due to its location next to the Missouri
River and on the border with Missouri, the county (especially the town of Tabor) became
a hub on the Underground Railroad as well as a staging ground from which John Brown
and other “free soilers” launched attacks into Missouri and Kansas.
It is located in the far southwestern corner of Iowa. It borders Page County to the
East, Montgomery County to the northeast, Mills County to the North, Nebraska and the
Missouri River to the West and Missouri to the South. The western quarter of Fremont
County rests in the Missouri River flood plain. It is agriculturally rich but is the most
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sparsely populated part of the county. In addition to agricultural bounty, the flood plain
also provides flat land on which a railway and Interstate Highway 29 were built. Rising
above the flood plain to the east are a tall set of bluffs. They are the Loess Hills, a rare
geographic formation of glacial deposits formed during the last ice age. Waubonsie State
Park is located on a particularly large set of such hills in central Fremont County. The
remaining two-thirds of the county consists of the rolling hills characteristic of western
Iowa.
The three largest towns in the county are on a roughly north-south axis running
through the middle of the county. Tabor is on the northern border with Mills County; part
of the town is within Mills and the Fremont-Mills school district crosses the county line
as well. The county seat and largest town in Fremont County, Sidney, is in the middle of
the county. Hamburg, a few miles north of the border with Missouri at the southern end
of the county, is located where the Nishnabotna River has cut a gap in the Loess Hills.
The towns of Riverton, Farragut, Imogene, and Randolph are located in the eastern half
of the county while Thurman is in the west at the edge of the Missouri River flood plain.
The unincorporated communities of Bartlett and Percival are located further west on the
flood plain.
Fremont County is divided into five precincts, each centered on one of the five
largest towns in the county. Those towns also provide the restaurants, taverns, and drug
stores that provide centers of coffee drinking, socialization and discussion. The most
prominent of those coffee klatsch locations is Penn Drug in the county seat of Sidney.
Located directly across from the courthouse, it has traditionally been the site of most
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presidential candidate visits to the county, including three of the four visits to the county
in the 2016 election (the fourth visit being to the high school near Sidney).
The US Census Bureau estimated that Fremont County had a population of 7,441
in 2010, of which 95.6% was non-Hispanic white. Hispanics were 2.4% of the population
and all other ethnic or racial group were less than one percent of the population. The
median household income was $49,245, slightly higher than the national mean of
$46,326. That income was relatively evenly spread with only 9.1% of the county’s
population below the national poverty line, compared to 14.5% nationwide. Education
levels are somewhat below the national average with 18.6% of the population over
twenty-five years old having a bachelor's degree or higher compared to 29.8% for the
nation as a whole. Like much of the rural Midwest, Fremont County has seen decades of
decline population. The highest reported population of Fremont County was 18,546 in the
1900 census, but it has declined to an estimated 6,906 (according to the Census Bureau)
by 2015. That decline, due to increasing urbanization and greater efficiency in the
agricultural industry, is similar to that of other rural counties in western Iowa.
There are 1,958 Republicans among the county’s 4,826 registered voters. The last
two Republican presidential caucuses have been close affairs, reflecting an even division
of conservative and more moderate voters in the county. In 2008 Mike Huckabee carried
the county with 55 votes to Mitt Romney’s 53 out of a total of 191 votes cast. It was
Romney’s turn to win a close contest in the county in 2012 when he received 59 votes out
of 224, compared to Rick Santorum’s 58. The county tends to vote Republican, although
a review of election records revealed a few local Democratic victories in local elections
in the first decade of the 21st Century.
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Data Gathering Procedures
In this section, I will detail the data gathering procedures used in this study,
starting with a pilot study conducted in Nebraska in 2014 during which I developed many
of the techniques used in Fremont County. I will then review how potential participants
were initially contacted and recruited. The bulk of this section will deal with procedures
for the five rounds of interviews conducted with participants. It will close with a
discussion of observational research used to help better understand the context of the
information gathered in those interviews.
In the summer of 2014 I conducted a study under the direction of Dr. Alice Kang.
The goals of that study were to develop the skills and techniques that I would use during
my later research, and to craft strategies for conducting research in Iowa. The study
included a set of interviews with several local political elites in Nemaha County,
Nebraska. Nemaha County was chosen because of it similarities to the counties in Iowa
that were on the list of potential study sites, being small, rural and relatively far from
larger cities. Its county seat, Auburn, is about 45 minutes southwest of Sidney, the county
seat of Fremont County. Conducting those interviews was invaluable in preparing me for
the interviews I would later conduct in Fremont County. They helped me better prepare
my interview instruments, conduct interviews, and code and analyze interviews. To give
two practical examples, I abandoned the use of lapel mics (interviewees tended to
become overly formal after clipping the mics on themselves, as if the act of putting them
on put them in “interview mode”) and invested in a foot pedal (which allowed me to
rewind recordings with my foot, allowing me to keep my fingers on the keyboard) to
speed the transcription of interviews.
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To discover the impact of political discussion networks on the vote choice of
Iowa caucus goers, I engaged participants in a series of interviews. The interviews
consisted of an initial in-depth interview (with an average interview time of roughly 26
minutes) in the summer of 2015 followed by three follow up interviews of 5-10 minutes.
A final, brief, post-caucus interview was conducted to collect the dependent variable.
There were also some observations made of social settings and of politically relevant
events such as county party meetings, campaign events, and social events. Such in-depth
research can provide local context and meanings to improve understanding of data
gathered (Fenno, 1986; Schatz, 2009).
The initial phase of interviews began in early June with interviews of local
Republican Party leaders and others reached through snowball sampling. Interviews with
those on the contact list I developed were conducted from early July through mid-August.
The first contact most potential participants received from me was in the form of a
prenotification letter (see Appendix A). The individuals were addressed by name in the
opening salutation. This practice has been found to increase response rates (Dillman et
al. 2014). To further personalize the letter, I introduced myself as a “doctoral student
from the Political Science department at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln” and handwrote mailing addresses in blue ink on the envelopes. The rest of the first and second
paragraphs explained the study and emphasized how important the respondent’s
participation was to its success. Stressing the importance of participation and giving
respondents an opportunity to share their views on a matter in which they have expertise
(in this case, their own political views and their critiques of presidential candidates) has
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been found to make surveys more salient (Groves et al., 2000), which helps increase the
response rate.
The final two paragraphs provided my contact information and mentioned that I
would be contacting them in person or by phone within two weeks. It also mentioned a
two-dollar token of appreciation that I enclosed with the letter. Such small tokens have
been found to increase response rates and two-dollar tokens are more cost effective than
larger incentives in that they provide “more bang for the buck” in terms of increase in
response rate per dollar spent (Singer & Ye, 2013).
The envelope featured a University of Nebraska-Lincoln logo and the letter was
printed on University of Nebraska letterhead. University sponsorship has been found to
help increase response rates (King et al. 2001, Dillman et al. 2014). University
sponsorship can be especially effective when the research area is relatively close to the
university (Ladik et al. 2007). Although Fremont County is in Iowa, it is much closer to
Lincoln, Nebraska, than it is to either Iowa City (home of the University of Iowa) or
Ames (home of Iowa State University). Fremont County is also in the Omaha, Nebraska,
media market; most research respondents get their news from Omaha-based sources. A
zip code-based study of college football team support by the New York Time’s “The
Upshot” blog revealed that the Nebraska Huskers are the most popular team in Fremont
County (Giratikanon, 2014), a finding supported by the number of Husker flags and signs
on area buildings and vehicles.
Letters were mailed roughly once every 5-6 days from the first week of July
through the first week of August. The first batch went to those in the sample frame who
lived in the Sidney precinct, the second set of mailings to those in the Washington-
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Hamburg precinct, the third to the Riverton precinct, the fourth to Farragut precinct, and
the fifth to Green precinct and the western portion of Sidney precinct. Letter mailings
were staggered so follow up contacts could be made within ten days of delivery.
Most of the voter information obtained from the Fremont County Auditor’s office
included phones numbers. Although I had always planned to do some participant
recruiting in-person, I also planned to recruit participants via phone as well. That plan
was abandoned after initial recruitment via phone proved to be disappointing, with only
two of ten people contacted agreeing to be interviewed (with one person being especially
emphatic in his refusal). Although in-person recruiting can be more expensive (not an
issue for me because I was doing all my own recruiting) and is much more time
consuming, it tends to produce a higher response rate than phone recruiting (Dutwin et al.
2014).
To make recruitment as efficient as possible, I made “walk lists” for each day in
the field. Each walk list included the names and addresses of people to be contacted that
day and a map, created with Google Maps, of the most efficient route to take to reach
those addresses. For potential participants who lived in a town, I walked from house to
house. For those in rural areas, the walk list was actually a “drive list.” The list for each
geographic area was divided into “day” and “evening” components based on potential
participant age, with those 65 and older on the day list and those under 65 on the evening
list, although I varied the times at which I visited each home if my initial attempts of
contacting them were not successful. I made five attempts to contact potential
participants before marking them as not contacted.
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During the recruitment process, I continued to emphasize my affiliation with the
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, and wore knit shirts with the UNL “N” on them every
day I was in the field, as I did whenever I attend Republican Party central committee
meetings and other events.
In addition to a higher response rate than phone recruiting, another advantage of
using in-person recruiting is that it allowed for on-the-spot interviewing. Most of the
people who participated in the study completed their first interview during my
recruitment visit at their homes.
In addition to being able to gather longitudinal data, starting the research eight
months before the caucus may have improved the response rate. Several participants
noted in the months immediately preceding the caucus that they had stopped opening
mail from unknown sources and would not have picked up the phone had they not
already had my phone number on their contacts list.
It is difficult to gage the difference between study participants and nonparticipants
because a full list of caucus voters is not available. A couple of limited comparisons are
available from voter file information. They are similar in mean age: 62.5 years at the time
of the caucus for participants and 60.8 years old for non-participants. There was some
geographic variation between participants and nonparticipants on the contact list;
Farragut precinct had 22 participants and 12 nonparticipants, Green precinct had 21
participants and 33 nonparticipants, Hamburg/Washington precinct had 17 participants
and 15 nonparticipants, Riverton precinct had 7 participants and 19 non participants, and
Sidney precinct had 32 participants and 19 nonparticipants. Geographically, participants
were more representative of 2016 Republican caucus voters than were nonparticipants,
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with participants having an average variation from caucus voters of 3.3 percentage points
and nonparticipants having an average variation from caucus voters of 6.7 percentage
points (see Table 2.1).
Precinct
Participants
Nonparticipants
Caucus Voters
12.2%
Farragut
22.2%
19.3%
33.7%
Green
21.2%
27.8%
15.3%
Hamburg/Washington
17.2%
17.2%
19.4%
Riverton
7.1%
8.7%
19.4%
Sidney
32.3%
27.1%
Table 2.1: Proportion of study participants, nonparticipants and caucus
voters by precinct
The final vote choice of the 80 participants who answered the question on for
whom they voted for on caucus night is generally close to the caucus results. The top five
finishers are in the same order and most have a similar percentage of the vote. The
exception is Senator Ted Cruz; 30.4% of caucus participants reported voting for Cruz
while only 20.5% of all caucus voters in Fremont County voted for him (see Table 2.2).
Actual Fremont County
Study Participant Votes
Candidate
Votes
(80 total)
(426 total)*
Donald Trump
182 (42.7%)
32 (40.0%)
Ted Cruz
87 (20.4%)
25 (31.3%)
Marco Rubio
77 (18.1%)
12 (15.0%)
Ben Carson
40 (9.4%)
6 (7.5%)
Rand Paul
11 (2.6%)
1 (1.3%)
Jeb Bush
10 (2.3%)
0
John Kasich
6 (1.4%)
2 (2.5%)
Chris Christie
5 (1.2%)
2 (2.5%)
Rick Santorum
5 (1.2%)
0
Mike Huckabee
2 (0.5%)
0
Carley Fiorina
0
0
Table 2.2: Comparison of countywide and participant caucus votes.
*There was one countywide write-in vote for a candidate not on the ballot.
The initial interviews were conducted in-person between early June and early
August, 2015. Ninety-eight people participated in those interviews. Most were conducted
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in the participants’ homes although some were conducted in their places of business, in
restaurants or in the Sidney public library. The first question was open-ended and
primarily designed to get participants talking: “Could you tell me about yourself and why
you became politically active?” Having an innocuous and easily answered question at the
beginning of an interview has been found to increase the likelihood that the interview will
be completed (Dillman 2014). Other open-ended questions in the interview instrument
consisted of open ended questions on participants’ views of candidate electability and
viability, litmus test issues, and organizations to which the participant belonged. They
were also asked which presidential candidate they supported and why.
To measure political discussion networks, participants were asked “who have you
talked about politics with over the past month?” making it clear that I was asking for
names. For each person named, participants were then asked how they knew that person,
how well they knew that person (acquaintance, close, or very close) and whom that
person supported for president. Those follow-up questions were asked after the list of
political discussion partners was completed in order to reduce the possibility of
satisficing in the form of giving fewer names of political discussion partners in order to
reduce the number of follow up questions the participant has to answer (Krosnick, 1999).
To measure ideology, both self-reported and the assessed ideology of the
presidential candidates, I used a standard seven-point Likert scale with response options
of “very conservative,” “conservative,” “slightly conservative,” “moderate,” “slightly
liberal,” “liberal,” and “very liberal.” This question were used to measure ideological
crowding. One problem that arose is that Donald Trump was not included in the first
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several interviews of the first round. His name was added and included in most of the
first round of interviews and in a latter round of interviews.
In addition, a battery of modified Wilson-Patterson questions using a 0-100 point
scale were used to gain an objective measure of participant views. The scale is similar to
the “feeling thermometers” used in the American National Election Studies surveys
(ANES). Such scales have been shown to be reliable and allow respondents to express the
strength of their feelings or a neutral position (Everett, 2013) and can provide a reliable
and valid measure of ideology (Henningham, 1996) as a comparison to self-reported
ideology as well as provide information about which issues voters feeling most strongly
about. One variation in my scale from the ANES version is I only label the end points
(where 0 represents very negative and 100 represents very positive) while that ANES
version labels nine points (100 = very warm or favorable feeling; 85 = good, warm, or
favorable feeling; 70 = fairly warm or favorable feeling; 60 = a bit more warm or
favorable than cold feeling; 50 = no feeling at all; 40 = a bit more cold or unfavorable
feeling; 30 = fairly cold or unfavorable feeling; 15 = quite cold or unfavorable feeling; 0
= very cold or unfavorable feeling.). When presented with a choice including nine labeled
points, over 95% of respondents tend to choose one of the labeled points, effectively
making it a nine-point scale (Alwin, 1997). I did inform participants that 50 represents a
neutral point.
To directly measure campaign effects, participants were asked if they had been
contacted by presidential campaigns (other than junk mail or robo calls) and if they had
personally met any of the candidates or been to a campaign event.
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Many participants chose to elaborate on the closed-ended questions, providing
greater context for their answers. Ninety-seven interviews were completed, most of
which were recorded. In addition to other information, participants were asked for their
phone numbers and permission to be called for follow-up interviews. Ninety-six of 97
participants agreed.
Three rounds of follow up interviews were conducted between the initial
interviews and the presidential caucus on February 1, 2016. Participants were contacted
by phone with their permission. All three of the follow up interviews took about ten
minutes each.
The follow up interviews were designed to measure changes in candidate support
and political discussion networks. Questions on presidential candidate preference and
political discussion partners were repeated in each round. If the participant supported a
different candidate than in the previous round, I asked why there had been a change in
preference. Additionally, participants were asked each round if they had been contacted
by a presidential campaign (other than junk mail or robo calls) or had personally seen or
met a presidential candidate since the last interview (expressed in terms of time such as
“in the past six weeks”).
For questions on political discussion partners, I used a dependent data collection
method. In dependent data collection of political discussion partners, I mentioned the
names of the people listed in prior rounds and asking participants if they had talked to
those people over the past month or two (depending on how long it had been since the
last interview). Such dependent data collection methods tend to increase the validity of
the data collected in comparison to independent data collection in panel studies,
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especially on “noisy” variables (Hill, 1994) as I expected the political discussion partner
question to be. In addition, I saw using dependent data collection questions as a way of
addressing concerns over satisficing if the participant remembered from the previous
survey that there would be follow up questions for each person on their list. Once the list
of prior political discussion partners had been exhausted, I asked participants about new
discussion partners, being careful to ask “who else have you talked politics with” rather
than “is there anyone else you talked politics with” to establish an expectation that there
would be additional names. As in the initial round of interviews, follow up question about
discussion partners were only asked after the list of discussion partners had been
exhausted. Each round of interviews also included questions that were only asked that
round to provide more data on the participants. Those unique questions are detailed
below.
The second round (first follow up round) of interviews was conducted in
September and October of 2015. The standard repeated questions were asked: candidate
preference, political discussion partners, contacts from presidential campaigns, and
seeing presidential candidates. Additionally several unique questions were asked in this
round. The first, meant as a warm-up question, was “Are you happy with the current field
of Republican presidential candidates or is there someone else you would like to see enter
the race?” If they said they would like someone else to enter the race, they were asked to
name that person. They were asked if they had seen any of the presidential debates. If
they answered “yes”, they were asked which candidate they believed had performed the
best in them. Finally, they were asked about their education level.
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One issue that arose during the second round was due to flooding in the spring of
2015. That flooding led to a late harvest, which made it difficult to reach some
participants as they were doing extra work that fall. Seventy-three interviews were
completed and some of those who were missed in this round answered the unique
questions from this round in subsequent rounds.
The third round was mostly conducted in November and December of 2015,
although a handful of interviews were conducted in the first week of January. The
standard repeated questions were asked: candidate preference, political discussion
partners, contacts from presidential campaigns, and seeing presidential candidates. The
warm-up question for this round was “Do you think it is good to have plenty of time to
evaluate the presidential candidates, or do you think presidential election campaigns
should be shorter?” Additionally, I asked questions regarding electability (can the
candidate win in the fall) and viability (can the candidate win the Republican
nomination). For each candidate, they were asked "Regardless of whom you support, do
you believe [candidate name] has a strong chance to win the Republican presidential
nomination, somewhat of a chance, or no chance?” and “If [candidate name] were the
Republican presidential nominee, would he (she) be more likely to win or lose in the
general election in November?” They were also asked if they considered a candidate’s
standing in Iowa or national polls when considering for whom to vote. Seventy
interviews were completed in this round and some of those who were missed in this
round answered the unique questions from this round in subsequent rounds.
The fourth round of interviews was conducted from mid-January through the
morning of February 1 (the day of the caucus). The standard repeated questions were
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asked: candidate preference, political discussion partners, contacts from presidential
campaigns, and seeing presidential candidates. The warm-up question for this round was
“Do you think Iowa should change to a primary system for the presidential nominating
contest?” I also revisited a question from the initial round of interviews on participants’
assessment of candidate ideology on a seven-point Likert scale (from very liberal to very
conservative). This was done for two reasons. The first was to see if the participants’
view of any candidate’s ideology had changed over the course of the campaign. The
second was to get a base measure for their view of Donald Trump’s ideology, for a
handful of participants who were interviewed before Trump announced his candidacy.
Seventy-three interviews were completed in this round and some of those who
were missed in this round answered all the questions from this round in the post-caucus
interview. If a participant missed a round of interviews, the unique questions from that
round were added to the interview questions for the next round. For example, if a
participant missed the second round, during which participants were asked about their
news consumption habits, I asked the participant those questions during the third round
interview. Repeated questions from a missed interview were treated as missing data.
A final round of interviews was conducted in the weeks immediately following
the caucus and the only questions asked were for whom the participant voted and who the
participant talked with about politics during the last few days before the caucus or at the
caucus site. For the purpose of measuring political discussion networks over the seven
months before the presidential caucus, the results of the four rounds and the post-caucus
round were combined. Eighty interviews were completed in this round. Those eighty

35
people were the only participants from whom the primary dependent variable (vote
choice in the presidential caucus) were collected.
Although observing participants in natural settings can help provide local context
for other data (Walsh, 2009), it was not a priority for this project. There are regular coffee
klatches throughout Fremont County, such as at Stoner Drugs in Hamburg and Tabor, the
Farragut Tavern in Farragut, and Penn Drug in Sidney. Penn Drug hosts two such
informal gatherings, one in the morning that is mostly female and another in the
afternoon that is mostly male. Although observing those gatherings could provide indepth information on social identity and political discussion, it was outside the scope of
this investigation to cover them with enough depth for the whole county.
However, there were three types of events that I was able to observe that helped
me better understand what Walsh (2004) saw as the way people use discussion to make
sense of politics. The most in-depth observations made were of the monthly Fremont
County Republican Party central committee meetings. I was also able to observe political
events in and near Fremont County. Finally, I was able to observe (in person or through
video with the assistance of colleagues) three of the four Republican caucus meetings
held in Fremont County.
The Freemont County Republican Party central committee held monthly
organizational meetings during the study period. The meetings took place in Freedom
Corner, a two-story brick building in Farragut that once hosted city hall on the first floor
and a masonic lodge on the second floor. One of the current owners of the building was a
member of the central committee. Meetings usually took place on Wednesday evenings
until the encroaching evening darkness and poor weather of winter caused a move to
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Saturday mornings. All the meetings opened with a prayer and the Pledge of Allegiance.
They usually began with a formal agenda, although they often veered into side
conversations.
Central committee meetings were often an opportunity for presidential campaign
staffers to speak to party activists in an attempt to recruit local supporters. A
representative for Rick Perry (who later joined the Trump campaign after Perry dropped
out) came to the central committee meeting in June. The July meeting had a
representative from the Jeb Bush campaign. In August, representatives from the Carly
Fiorina and Lindsey Graham campaigns visited. Representative from the Marco Rubio
campaign came in September, along with new representatives from the Bush and Fiorina
campaigns. Most of those representatives were young people from out of state who were
field workers for the campaign. The exception was the Perry/Trump representative, who
was a middle-aged male from southwestern Iowa.
Perhaps the most momentous central committee meeting was on January ninth,
2016, the last meeting before the caucus. Although the bulk of the meeting was devoted
to planning the caucus meetings, this was the only meeting at which central committee
members spoke directly about their presidential candidate preferences. Party chair
Freddie Krewson announced that he was supporting Trump despite some reservations
about him. Krewson believed that Trump would appeal to Democrats, who would switch
parties to vote for him in the caucus. Treasurer Tammy Johnson responded that she was
impressed with Senator Ted Cruz when he visited Penn Drug in Sidney in October.
Several other members noted their approval of Cruz as well. Carly Fiorina and Marco
Rubio were also mentioned positively but nobody said that they would vote for them.
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Being a small county in the southwestern corner of Iowa, Fremont County was
not visited by many candidates. Those candidates who did visit the county were those
who had committed to going the “full Grassley”, visiting all of Iowa’s 99 counties. This
phrase is named after Iowa Republican Senator Chuck Grassley, who has regularly
visited every county in Iowa during his six terms in the US Senate. Four candidates
visited Fremont County during the course of the campaign, all in 2015. Former
Pennsylvania Senator and 2012 caucus winner Rick Santorum spoke at Penn Drug in
Sidney in March. Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker, who dropped out of the race before
the caucus, did a meet and greet (just working a room without a prepared speech) at Penn
Drug in August. Texas Senator Ted Cruz did a meet and greet at Penn Drug in October.
Also in October, former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee, the 2008 caucus winner,
visited Sidney High School. Each of these events involved the candidate meeting a few
dozen people (perhaps just one dozen in the case of Santorum).
I was only able to attend one of those events, the Walker meet and greet in
October (the Santorum event was before I began my field work and conference
commitments prevented me from attending the other two events), although I was able to
speak with people who attended the Cruz and Huckabee events. Although there was some
self-selection of attendees at these events (i.e., Cruz fans coming to the Cruz event), some
of those who met the candidates were regular Penn Drug customers or people who came
to see the candidate out of curiosity.
I encountered one potential problem with maintaining the confidentiality of
participant participation at the Walker event, and at a town hall meeting with Senator
Chuck Grassley in the fall of 2015 at the Tabor community center. At both events, I met
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participants and was socially obliged to greet and speak with them. Inevitably, I would
see and speak with other participants. Because many of those participants also knew each
other, we would eventually form a group of 3 to 5 people talking about the presidential
campaign and other topics. Although I was careful not to talk about my research at those
events, it could be surmised by some participants who other participants were based on
their knowing me.
With the help of colleagues Julia Riley and Cary Wolbers, I was able to video and
observe three caucuses covering four of Fremont County’s five precincts. Observing the
caucuses gave a better understanding of the casual nature of the proceedings where
attendees know most of the other participants at least in passing. Although there was a
formal structure to the proceedings, with a three-minute limit on speakers for candidates,
rules and order were generally not strictly enforced. The caucus in Sidney had to be
moved from the public library to a nearby church because of an over-capacity crowd.
In addition to providing a better understanding of how caucuses work in practice,
they provided a final data point for campaign effects: speakers at the caucus. Cruz and
Trump were the only candidates who had people speak for them at each of the three
meetings (four caucuses) covered. The Sidney caucus also had speakers for Ben Carson,
John Kasich, and Marco Rubio. There were speakers for Carson, Kasich and Rand Paul
in the Green precinct caucus in Tabor. In the meeting in Farragut where the Farragut and
Riverton caucuses were held, there were speakers for Cruz, Trump, Paul, Rubio, and Jeb
Bush. The caucus in Hamburg was not covered and it was not possible to determine
which candidates had speakers there.

39
Conclusion
This chapter provides an overview of case selection criteria used to select
Fremont County, Iowa for the study, background on Fremont County, and a detailed
description of the methods used to gather data for this study. The purpose of this
information is to provide context for the data and analysis presented in later chapters of
this dissertation in order to help place the findings of this study within the broader
literature. An understanding of that context will also aid in making comparisons with
other case studies and in understanding the applications and limits of this research.
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CHAPTER 3: DYADIC NETWORK ANALYSIS AND THE CORRECTNESS OF
PERCEPTIONS OF DISCUSSION PARTNER VIEWS
The perceived candidate preference of political discussion partners’ is sufficient
for understanding the effects of political discussion networks on voting behavior.
However, an understanding of the accuracy of the predictions of discussion partners’
candidate preferences can help differentiate social influence based on the actual opinions
of political discussion partners versus those based on participants’ perception of the
opinions of those partners. In this chapter, I will assess how accurate individuals are in
identifying which candidates those in their political discussion networks support, how
that accuracy changes over time, and whether participants falsely predict that their
discussion partners support the same candidate as they do.
I will start with a broad explanation of network analysis, reviewing dyadic,
egocentric, and complete networks. The first will be the form of analysis used in this
chapter while the latter two will be used in chapter four. I will then review prior findings
related to the exchange of information and the perceptions of agreement in political
discussion networks, leading to several hypotheses regarding how accurate people are in
predicting which candidates those in their political discussion networks support and how
frequently people falsely believe partners are in agreement with them. Finally, I will test
those hypotheses using dyadic analysis of the political discussion networks in the
Fremont County data set and draw conclusions from that analysis.
Levels of Network Analysis
Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to give a full treatment of social
network theory, a brief preview of concepts and terms is needed as a reference for readers
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of this chapter. This is especially true because there are several commonly used
alternatives for many of the terms used in this chapter. Unless otherwise noted, I will use
terms suggested and defined in the second edition of Knoke and Yang’s Social Network
Analysis (2008) as they apply to this research.
The simplest level of network analysis is the egocentric network, which consists
of a single participant or actor (ego) and all other actors (alters) with whom the
participant has discussed politics. Each reported political discussion partnership is a tie
(line) with each pair of actors connected through a tie being a dyad. In this study,
egocentric analysis includes the nature of the relationship between the participant and
each of the alters (e.g. spouse, coworker) and measures of how each participant perceives
the strength of the relationships with each of their alters and which candidate each alter
supports. Without follow-up interviews with alters, there is no way of confirming if ego
reports of alter views are accurate. Egocentric analysis will be the focus of chapter four.
The next level of analysis is the dyad or dyadic network. It consists of pairs of
actors in which at least one of the actors reports a relationship, in this case a report of
having discussed politics. As noted by Knoke and Yang (2008), conversing is
“nondirected” (p. 7), meaning that a dyadic political discussion tie is considered to exist
in this study if one participant reports having had a political discussion with another
participant, even if that other participant does not note a tie. It is through the study of
these dyads that I can measure the accuracy of perceived candidate support among
political discussion partners as I have reports of both the ego’s perceived candidate
preference of their alters and the actual candidate preferences of those alters. A common
claim against dyadic analysis is that it cannot be assumed that the replies made by the two
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members of a dyad are independent (Kenny, 1996). However, concerns over the nonindependence of dyadic measurements have not precluded the use of dyadic analysis in
political science research (for example, see Huckfeldt, 2007 and Pietryka et al., 2017) and
dyadic analysis often performs better than other forms of network analysis (Mizruchi and
Marquis, 2006).
There were 90 reported dyads between participants in the first round, 77 reported
dyads in the second round, 54 reported dyads in the third round, and 98 reported dyads in
the fourth round. The final, post-caucus round, which includes the fourth round of
interviews covering most of the final month before the caucus and a report of political
discussions during the last few days before the caucus, included a total of 121 reported
dyads. The increased number of dyads in the post-caucus round is reflective of both an
increase in the size of political discussion networks as the presidential caucus approached
and the higher response rate in the post-caucus round of interviews. Of those 121 dyads
in the final round, 81 included an ego predicting the caucus vote of an alter. The forty
missing cases are primarily from egos who did not venture a prediction of the vote choice
of alters. The high number of missing cases is likely due, at least in part, to participants
not being given a follow-up prompt asking them to make their best guess about alters’
vote choice if they initially stated that they did not know.
The final level of analysis is the complete network (or whole network), a measure
of the relations between all actors in a network to “explain an entire network’s structural
relations” (Knoke and Yang 2008, p 14). Because analysis at the complete network level
requires the participation of a large proportion of the network, it will not be used in this
study.
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Knowing the Political Preferences of Discussion Partners
When people discuss politics, it is unlikely that they are sharing a great deal of
political knowledge. Individuals are unlikely to know who their representatives are,
understand the positions of candidates on various issues or locate candidates on an
ideological spectrum (Campbell et al. 1960, Converse 1964). Instead, they are likely
“talking about politics in the context of constructing a social and political identity”
(Sinclair 2012 p. 2). That is, they are placing themselves politically within a larger social
framework. This does not necessarily mean conformity, although it could be for the sake
of maintaining social norms or simply to maintain social peace. Political discussion
networks that are homogeneous in demographic and socioeconomic terms and also tend
to be homogeneous politically in most social circumstances (Knoke, 1990; however see
Mutz and Mondak, 2006 on cross-cutting political discussion networks at work).
If political discussion partners disagree on candidate preference, there are several
ways that such disagreement can remain undiscovered (MacKuen, 1990). First,
preferences can go unreported, with partners not sharing their preference, or partners may
misrepresent their preferences. People may also misperceive the preferences of their
discussion partners. Another way to avoid potential disagreement on candidate preference
is to keep conversations on safer topics. That was the case in all the Fremont County
Republican Party executive committee meetings I observed (with the exception of the last
meeting before the presidential caucuses), during which remarkably little discussion on
the Republican presidential candidates took place outside of visiting campaign
representatives making pitches for their own candidates. Instead, committee members
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generally stuck to technical matters, like organizing events and the caucus, and why
Republicans needed to win in 2016.
When individuals do discover a difference between their candidate preference and
the preferences of others with whom they interact socially, those individuals are
“presented with the compelling possibility that [they have] made a wrong calculation
with respect to politics” (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995, p. 49), a discovery made possible
through social interaction. Although such a discovery does not necessarily mean that
individuals will change their mind on their preferred candidate, it does foster a
reassessment based on the new information. It is through this awareness of political
disagreement that changes in political opinion are made possible (Huckfeldt et al., 2005;
McPhee et al., 1963). The salience of that information will vary by the source and context
by which that knowledge was gained. Although discovering disagreement with someone
who is perceived to be an “other” may reinforce the previously held view, disagreement
with someone seen as socially or ideologically similar is likely to at least temporarily
weaken support for their preferred candidate because it is through interaction with people
with similar self-identification, political or otherwise, that individuals form a social “us”
with which individuals identify (Walsh, 2004).
People pay attention to and value the opinions of those around them (Huckfeldt
and Sprague, 1995; Mutz and Mondak, 1997) and, even though most political
information is exchanged in the context of informal personal discussion rather than
explicit political debate (Conover et al., 2002; Huckfeldt et al., 2004), that information
can influence people’s political perceptions. Although the question of the influence of
political discussion networks’ influence on voting behavior will be addressed in the next
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chapter, a reasonable precursor to the question of the influence of the political opinions of
others is the awareness of the political opinions of others. The question of whether egos’
perceptions of the political views of their alters are based on the alters’ actual views or on
projections of the egos’ own opinions onto those alters has a direct bearing on the validity
of the question of social influences on voting. Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) found that
individuals tended to be accurate when predicting which candidates their political
discussion partners supported, although that was during a general election, when the party
ID of discussion partners could give some clue on candidate support. Despite the lack of
party ID as a clue in nomination contests, I expect that egos will be able to correctly
predict the candidate preferences of their alters. Given that political discussion was
ongoing during the research period, providing more opportunities to exchange
information in a matter noted above, and that political communication is associated with
increased levels of information (Huckfeldt, 2001), I also expect that the accuracy of those
predictions will increase over time. This leads to two hypotheses:
H1:

A person is more likely to correctly predict the candidate preference of
political discussion partners than would be expected by chance.

H2:

A person is more likely to successfully predict the candidate preference of
political discussion partners when the prediction is made close to an
election than when it is made well before an election.

Perceptions of Homophily in Intra-party Political Discussion Networks
The tendency for “birds of a feather to flock together”, that is, for people to
connect based on shared beliefs and moral views as well as similarity in demographic,
cultural, behavioral, and psychological characteristics, has long been noted. Both
Aristotle and Plato noted that friendship ties are more likely to form when people share
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similarities (McPherson et al., 2001), in other words, people connect at a higher rate with
those who are similar than with those who are different. Connections are also more stable
when there is a sufficient level of homogeneity with a group (Baccara and Yariv, 2013).
As with other aspects of research on social influences on political behavior, most
research on homophily has used measurements based on party preference. That is natural
because research findings have long indicated that party (Democratic-Republican) and
broad ideological (liberal-conservative) identities form early and are remarkably stable,
causing some scholars to argue that they function more like ethnic or tribal identities than
like simple collections of opinions on issues (Campbell et al., 1960). In their canonical
text on voting behavior in the 1948 presidential election, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and
McPhee (1954) focused on the general election, as did Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) in
their study of the 1984 presidential election. Studies on topics ranging from political
tolerance (Mutz, 2002a) to mate selection (Alford et al., 2011) have further supported the
strength of homophily in party ID and broad ideology.
But is there further sorting within political subspecies? Within the context of a
presidential nomination contest, will Republicans sort themselves based on candidate
support within their party? Baccara and Yariv (2013) found that the most stable groups
are those in which there is relatively more “similarity among extremists than among
moderate individuals” (p. 69). Although factionalism within a party can be strong enough
to lead to a conflict that results in a splintering of party members (Boucek, 2009), I
observed no sign of factionalism among Republicans in Fremont County that approached
that level. The countervailing force of identity reinforcement is stronger when there is the
presence of an “other” to remind group members of their relative similarities (Walsh,
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2004). The concurrent Democratic nomination contest in Iowa was a constant reminder to
Republicans that, whatever the differences were between candidates like Donald Trump
and Ted Cruz, those differences were relatively inconsequential when compared to the
differences between them and a Democratic candidate like Hillary Clinton or Bernie
Sanders.
Despite that relative ideological unanimity, there may still be at least some
pressure for intra-party political discussion partners to gloss over political differences,
giving egos at least some misperception of the candidate preferences of their alters. Egos
may also selectively misinterpret signals from their alters, further muddying the waters
(Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987). So, although I expect egos to be able to correctly predict
the candidate preferences of their alters, per hypotheses H1 and H2, I also expect that
when egos do err in their predictions, those errors will not be random but in favor of the
egos’ own candidate preferences:
H3:

When someone incorrectly predicts the candidate preference of political
discussion partners, that person is more likely to predict that the partner
prefers the same candidate as the predictor than would be expected by
chance.

Dyadic Analysis of the Results from the Fremont County Study
Questions regarding political discussion partners were asked in each of the five
rounds of interviews in the study. As is standard in network research, this study generated
the lists of participants’ political discussion partners through a name generator question.
In each round a participant was asked “Who have you talked about politics with over the
past two months?” (The time frame of the question varied in the follow up interviews
depending on the amount of time that had passed since the previous interview.) In the
first round, 79 participants reported 418 ties. In the second round 67 participants reported
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319 ties. In the third round 64 participants reported 322 ties. The fourth and fifth rounds
were combined into a single “final round” for some analysis because the fifth round only
covered the last few days before the caucus and the fourth and fifth rounds collectively
were shorter (about 1 month) than any of the other rounds (which covered 2-3 months
each). Counting those rounds separately would have made it appear that political
discussion suddenly dropped just before the caucus. In the final round 79 participants
reported 458 ties.
Part of the variation in reported ties is due to the larger number of participants in
the first and final interview rounds; all 80 participants completed the interviews for those
rounds while 67 of those 80 participants completed the second round interview and 64 of
those 80 completed the third round interview. The number of participants reporting ties
are fewer than the total number of participants in each round because some participants
reported not discussing politics with anyone in some rounds. One participant diligently
participated in each round of the study but just as diligently refused to divulge the names
of any alters. That participant was kept in the study because several other participants
listed that participant as an alter, contributing to dyadic analysis.
The Accuracy of Prediction of Discussion Partners’ Vote Choice
When we guess the candidate preferences of our discussion partners, how
accurate are we? To see if there is evidence to support the hypothesis that people are
more likely to correctly predict the candidate preference of political discussion partners
than would be expected by chance, I examine the correlation between egos’ predicted
vote choice of their alters and those alters’ actual vote choice. Of the 120 dyads in this
study in which the alter stated a caucus vote choice in the post-caucus interview, there are
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81 ego predictions of the alter’s vote choice. Of those 81 predictions, 60 (74.1%) were
accurate.
A Pearson Chi-Square test would not be valid for a data set that included all the
Republican presidential candidates because the expected vote count for most of the
sixteen candidates included in the survey is below the generally acceptable level of five.
However, a valid Chi-Square test can be run by recalculating the variables into three
values with all the candidates other than Ted Cruz and Donald Trump coded as “other”.
A chi-square test of independence was performed on the modified data set with
the caucus vote variable transformed to a measure of “Cruz”, “Trump”, and “other” to
examine the relationship between egos’ reports of alters’ vote choice and the alters’
actual vote choice. Egos correctly predicted alters’ votes for Cruz, Trump or another
candidate at a greater rate than would be expected by chance. The expected count of
correct predictions of a vote for Cruz was 9.7 while the actual count of successful
predictions of a vote for Cruz was 22. The expected count of correct predictions of a vote
for Trump was 16.4 while the actual count of successful predictions of a vote for Trump
was 29. The expected count of correct predictions of a vote for another candidate was 3.4
while the actual count of correct predictions of a vote for another candidate was 10. A
count of predictions of candidate support within the “other” category also indicated that
predictions tended to be reasonably accurate with ten predictions within that category
being accurate compared to six that were inaccurate. The relation between these variables
was significant, X2 (4, N = 81) = 58.709, p <.01. A Cramer’s V measure of .602 indicates
that the effect size of the relationship is large (Cohen, 1988), supporting the hypothesis
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(H1) that participants were more likely to correctly predict the candidate preference of
their political discussion partners than would be expected by chance.
Is the accuracy of egos’ predictions of alters’ candidate preference related to the
relationships between egos and alters? A variable measuring vote choice prediction
accuracy was formed by subtracting the value of the alter’s caucus vote choice in the
post-caucus interview from the ego’s prediction of the alter’s vote choice and then
recoding each zero (meaning that the prediction was correct) to one and all other values
to zero. Chi-square tests of independence were performed using that variable and several
measures of the relationship between the egos and alters in each dyad.
Belief that a political discussion partner was politically knowledgeable was not
related to accurately predicting which candidate that discussion partner supported, X2 (1,
N = 81) = .000, p =.985. Similarly, closeness of relationship was not related to accurately
predicting which candidate that discussion partner supported. The relationship between
accuracy of ego predictions of alter candidate support and ego reports of the closeness of
the relationship with those alters was not significant. In fact, it was a perfect non
relationship, X2 (1, N = 81) = .000, p =1.000.
Spouses tended to be more accurate than non-spouses when predicting discussion
partners’ candidate support. The relationship between accuracy of ego prediction of alter
candidate support and reported spousal or non-spousal relationship between the ego and
alter was significant at the more lenient .10 level, X2 (1, N = 81) = 3.344, p =.067.
Interestingly, there was variation between the sexes on that question, with males being
more accurate when predicting spouses’ candidate support than when predicting nonspouses’ candidate support but with females having no statistically significant difference
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when predicting spouses’ candidate support than when predicting non-spouses’ candidate
support. Among male participants, the relationship between accuracy of ego prediction of
alter candidate support and reported relationship between the ego and alter (spouse or
non-spouse) was significant, X2 (1, N = 41) = 4.377, p =.036. Among female participants,
the relationship between accuracy of ego prediction of alter candidate support and
reported relationship between the ego and alter (spouse or non-spouse) was not
significant, X2 (1, N = 40) = .476, p =.490. The difference between males and females in
the variation of prediction accuracy of spouses and non-spouses is due to males being
more accurate in predicting the candidate support of their spouses rather than females
being more accurate in predicting the candidate support of non-spouses. Among all
dyads, there was not a significant difference between the sexes in predicting candidate
support of political discussion partners, X2 (1, N = 81) = .683, p = .409.
Increasing Prediction Accuracy Preference over Time
Do predictions of alters’ candidate support improve as we get closer to an
election? The rate of successful ego prediction of alter candidate preference over time
was measured in each of the four pre-caucus panel interviews. A variable measuring vote
choice prediction accuracy was formed in each round by subtracting the value of the
alter’s candidate preference in the post-caucus interview from the ego’s prediction of the
alters’ candidate preference (including “I don’t know”) and then recoding each zero to
one (meaning that the prediction was correct) and all other values to zero. The mean
accuracy of ego predictions in each of the rounds was compared with the mean accuracy
of the subsequent round using paired samples t-tests. Because the pairings varied from
round to round, in part due to changes in political discussion network composition and in
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part due to interviews not being completed with some participants in the second and third
rounds, the mean accuracy of ego predictions of alters’ candidate support varies based on
the round to which it is being compared. For example, if ego A made candidate
preference predictions for alters B, C, and D in round one, C, D, and F in round two, and
D, F, and E in round three, the A-C and A-D pairings would be included when comparing
rounds 1 and 2 while the A-D and A-F pairings would be included when comparing
rounds 2 and 3.
As seen in figure 3.1, the mean rate of ego predictions of alter candidate
preference increased between each of the rounds of panel interviews with a mean success
rate of 0.20 (N=83) in the first round, 0.26 (N=82) in the second round, 0.41 (N=64) in
the third round and 0.59 (N=97) in the fourth round.

Figure 3.1: Mean successful prediction rate of alters’ candidate
preference in each of the four pre-caucus panel interviews.
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A paired-samples t-test indicated that predictions were not significantly more
accurate in the second round (M = 0.25, SD = .438) than in the first round (M = 0.20, SD
= .401), t(70) = 1.070, p = .288, d = 0.12. However, predictions were significantly more
accurate in the third round (M = 0.42, SD = .497) than in the second round (M = 0.17, SD
= .379), t(52) = 4.111, p < .001, d = 0.57. Predictions were also significantly more
accurate in the fourth round (M = 0.56, SD = .501) than in the third round (M = 0.41, SD
= .496), t(60) = 2.255, p = .028, d = 0.30. Naturally, predictions were significantly more
accurate in the fourth round (M = 0.59, SD = .495) than in the first round (M = 0.19, SD
= .396), t(72) = 5.944, p < .001, d = 0.89. Those findings support the hypothesis (3.2) that
participants will more accurately predict the candidate preferences of their political
discussion partners closer to caucus day than they will earlier before the caucus
Egos were willing to guess alters’ candidate preference in 22 of 83 dyads in the
first round, 30 of 82 dyads in the second round, 34 of 64 dyads in the third round, and 68
of 97 dyads in the fourth round. Despite that increase in the number of predictions egos
were willing to make regarding the candidate preference of their alters, the accuracy of
remained consistent at 68% in round one, 70% in round two, 76% in round three, and
74% in round four. That increase in successfully predicting the candidate preference of
larger share of political discussion partners over time suggests that information regarding
presidential preferences is being exchanged between participants as the caucus nears.
Increased information flow of presidential preferences as the caucus neared was
typified by the last meeting of the Fremont County Republican Party Central Committee
before the February 1 caucus. During each of the previous meetings I had attended
(starting in June of 2015) presidential candidates were only mentioned when campaign
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representatives came to make pitches to committee members. The meetings themselves
dealt with party events, such as fund raisers and planning for caucus logistics. That
changed at the January 9 meeting when county chair Freddie Krewson opened the floor to
discussion of candidates and laid out several reasons why he was supporting Donald
Trump. That kicked off twenty minutes of discussion among the nine members in
attendance about their views of the various candidates, although a few members did not
express their candidate preference. Although that meeting may have been an extreme
example, as the presidential caucus looms larger, it is logical for it to become the natural
topic of discussion in political discussion networks
It is worth sounding a couple notes of caution when considering the accuracy or
inaccuracy of ego predictions of alter candidate support. Many participants expressed
varying levels of indecision when asked about candidate preference during their
interviews. It is possible that there were some cases of alters providing evidence that they
supported one candidate when speaking with egos and stating that they supported a
different candidate when speaking with me a few days later. It is also possible in some
cases that the act of participating in a study in which participants were asked about the
candidate preference of those with whom they discussed politics stimulated inquiries
between participants on that question. That concern is tempered somewhat by the time
frame between question rounds (4-10 weeks, except between the 4th round and the postcaucus interview), giving participants time to forget what was talked about a month or
two previously and for their alters to change their candidate preference in the next round
of interviews (an average of 24 of the 80 participants changed their candidate preference
between interview rounds.
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Is Candidate Preference Homophily at Least Partially Imagined?
When I investigate homophily of candidate support in egocentric networks in the
next chapter, we will not have the means of knowing how much of that homophily is
based on real agreement between egos and alters and how much is based on egos
projecting their own candidate preferences onto alters.
The number of egos who incorrectly predicted alters’ candidate preferences was
low in each of the pre-caucus rounds of interviews. There were seven inaccurate
predictions in the first round, nine in the second round, eight in the third round and
eighteen in the fourth round. Although there were only a slightly larger number of
inaccurate predictions of alter candidate vote choice in the post-caucus interviews than in
the fourth round of pre-caucus interviews (21 compared to 18), the post-caucus
interviews did not have a “don’t know” option for alters’ vote choice, meaning that all 21
cases were comparisons of egos’ predictions of alters’ vote and those alters’ actual (rather
than projected) vote. In 13 of those 21 cases, the egos incorrectly predicted that their
alters agreed with them on candidate vote choice.
Due to the low number of cases being tested, I sought to conduct a Chi square test
on a 2x2 table. The candidate preference variables were condensed to “Trump” and
“other” because twelve of the 21 egos being tested reported having voted for Trump.
Although a great deal of information is lost in such a conversion, it does allow for
statistical testing. The expected count in two of the four cells were still below the
minimum acceptable value of five for a Chi square test to be used, necessitating the use
of Fisher’s exact test.
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As expected in Hypothesis H3, the actual count was higher than the expected
count for those cells in which the alters’ predicted vote choice matched the egos’ reported
vote choice. The actual count for predicted alter votes for Trump by Trump voters was
seven compared to an expected count of 4.6. The actual count for predicted alter votes for
other candidates by those who voted for other candidates was eight compared to an
expected count of 5.6. The relationship between egos voting for Trump or another
candidate and their prediction of alters voting the same way was significant at the .1
level, (95% CI, p =.067).

Figure 3.2: Proportion of participants’ alters for whom participants
accurately predicted candidate preference, inaccurately predicted
preference and believed the alters supported the same candidate as the
participant, inaccurately predicted preference and believed the alters
supported a different candidate than did the participant, and did not
predict candidate preference
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Figure 3.2 incorporates the findings of this chapter (and adds a time element to
hypotheses H1 and H3). The first finding is that, when participants are willing to predict
which candidates their discussion partners support, they tend to be accurate even without
the aid of party ID to guide them. Second, as the election campaign progresses,
participants become willing to predict the candidate preference of more of their political
discussion partners without losing accuracy. Third, that when participants are inaccurate
in their predictions of which candidates their political discussion partners support, there is
a nontrivial tendency for participants to erroneously believe that their discussion partners
support the same candidate that they do.
Discussion
If you ask people whom they believe their friends and family will vote for in a
nomination contest that will take place several months in the future, it is probable that
few people would be willing to make a guess for most of the people they know and they
would likely be wildly inaccurate in those predictions that they would be willing to make.
Despite the early attention paid to Iowa in the presidential nomination contest, the same
applies to the participants in the Fremont County study. When asked in the summer of
2015, participants were only able to successfully predict whom their discussion partners
would vote for in the February 1, 2016, caucus about a fifth of the time.
However, consistent with prior findings on the exchange of information in
political discussion, participants’ successful predictions of discussion partners’ candidate
preferences increased in each subsequent round of interviews as the caucus approached
and the predictions that were made were more likely to be accurate than would be
expected by chance. Somewhat surprisingly, the accuracy of participant predictions of
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discussion partners’ candidate preferences was not affected by several measures of the
relationship, with neither participant perception of their partners’ political knowledge (as
would be expected if individuals seek to get information from those they see as expert
information providers per Downs (1957)) nor the reported strength of the relationship
between the participants and their partners having an impact on prediction accuracy. The
only partial exception to that trend was with marriage; men were more accurate when
predicting their wives’ candidate preference than when predicting others’ candidate
preference, but women were no more accurate in predicting whom their husbands
supported than in predicting whom others supported. However, although participants
were generally accurate when predicting candidate support of their discussion partners,
when they were wrong there was a tendency towards incorrectly believing that their
discussion partners supported the same candidates that they did.
These findings help in our understanding of three things as we examine egocentric
data in chapter four. First, whatever influence participants’ political discussion network
has on them on caucus day is based upon a reasonably accurate assessment of the real
opinions of their discussion partners’ actual preferences. Second, their assessment of the
candidate preferences of those in their political discussion networks becomes more
complete as caucus day approaches. Third, when they are inaccurate in their assessment
of their discussion partners’ candidate preferences, there is a slight tendency to
systematically err in favor of their own preferences. Although this third finding does
inject a note of caution, the overall findings mean that reported information on the
preferences of those in their political discussion network during nomination campaigns
(when party ID offers no clue on candidate preference) is based on the real opinions of
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their discussion partners and are a reasonably reliable measure when conducting
egocentric measures of political discussion networks during nomination campaigns,
especially later in the campaign.
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CHAPTER 4: CAMPAIGN EFFECTS AND IDEOLOGY
Because of Iowa’s importance, presidential campaigns spend a great deal of
resources contacting likely Iowa caucus-goers. In the 2008 caucus, the vast majority of
caucus-goers reported having been contacted by one or more of the presidential
campaigns through phone banks, robo calls, mail, or some combination of those
(Redlawsk et al., 2011). Caucuses tend to have lower turnout than primaries, which gives
greater power to those who do bother to sit through the long caucus process and rewards
campaigns that invest in strong grassroots organizations to find and reach those voters
(Mayer, 1996). As its boosters claim, Iowa rewards practitioners of retail politics over
those who rely primarily on media ads: “Iowa appears to be the one place where oldstyle, in-person, social capital-driven politics is still practiced and rewarded at the
presidential level” (Hull, 2008, p. 98).
The previous chapter dealt with questions of how well participants understood the
candidate preferences of those with whom they discussed politics. The next chapter will
deal with measures of how the political discussion networks in which participants are
embedded influences vote choice and moderates campaign effects and ideological
crowding. The primary foci of this chapter are direct measures of campaign effects and
ideological vote share. This chapter will also address participant perceptions of candidate
ideology. This chapter begins with a review of literature on campaign effects and
ideological crowding, leading to two hypotheses related to each of those concepts. The
results section will open with a comparison of participant voting in the presidential
caucus with the actual county-wide caucus vote and an examination of how participants’
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presidential candidate preference shifted during the several months before the caucus. It
will then examine two measures of campaign effects, the first being person-to-person
contacts from presidential campaigns and the second being either meeting or seeing
candidates personally. The next section will deal with two questions of ideology. The
first is the relationship between ideological vote share, the proportion of votes a candidate
would receive if every participant voted for the candidate that they perceived to be the
closest to themselves ideologically, and the actual vote share candidate received from
study participants at the presidential caucus. The second is a test of how participant
perceptions of candidate ideology changes over the course of a campaign. The chapter
will close with a discussion of the implications of the findings. Some of the findings of
this chapter will be revisited in chapter five, which will include measures of how political
discussion networks may moderate campaign effects.
Because many voters do not have the time or knowledge base to gain the
information they need to make correct voting decisions, they seek sources of information
they believe share a similar orientation regarding the preferred state of society. Choosing
sources that match a citizen’s preferences is a process of trial and error by which citizens
eventually find information sources which, “provide them with versions of events that
closely approximate the version they would formulate themselves were they expert onthe-spot witnesses” (Downs, 1957, p. 213). Campaigns themselves can provide
information to help individuals vote correctly when higher levels of campaign intensity
provide them with more information (Bergbower, 2014). When people do not have the
information they need to make political evaluations, they use information shortcuts that
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are easily obtained to help them make choices on the basis of “gut rationality” (Popkin,
1991), keeping a running tally of such shortcuts to update their assessment of candidates.
Lodge and Taber take that a step further, saying that “affect tallies” influence
every part of the evaluation process, including how we recall memories (Lodge and
Taber, 2013, pp.58-59). In fact, those with greater political sophistication are more likely
to disregard information that contradicts their previously held views than are relative
political neophytes. Those high in political sophistication are more resistant to
communications from incumbents while voters of midrange awareness “pay enough
attention to be exposed to the blandishments of the incumbent but lack the resources to
resist” (Zaller, 1992, p. 19) and those low in political sophistication are not exposed to
enough information to give them cause to modify their opinions.
There are numerous short cuts that people can draw on as a substitute or
supplement for their own information analysis, a very partial list including party
identification (Downs, 1957), interest group support (Lupia, 1994), and media content
(Mondak, 1995; although see Hull, 2008). Voters also use information from electoral
campaigns to help them in making voting decisions (Lodge et al, 1995; Hansen &
Pedersen, 2014).
The influence of campaign effects and ideology on vote choice
The conventional wisdom in political science is that, although campaigns can
marginally influence elections, most votes are determined by “fundamentals” like party
identification and the state of the economy (Noel, 2010). However, in the context of a
party nomination contest, neither party identification nor a retrospective vote based on
the state of the economy is salient. This potentially leaves more of an opening for
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campaigns to have an impact on vote choice in nominating contests. Most Iowa caucusgoers, even first-time caucus-goers, reported having been contacted directly by at least
one campaign, either by live phone call, recorded phone message, mail, email, or in
person (Redlawsk et al., 2011). Hull (2008) found that a combination of candidate visits
to Iowa and direct contacts by campaigns is the “tactic that rules the caucus” (p. 98).
Although Hull did not find an independent effect for direct contacts by campaigns, the
findings of this study may provide an answer to when direct contact is effective and when
it is not:
H1

H2

Partisans who report being directly contacted by a candidate’s campaign
are more likely to vote for that candidate than partisans who do not report
being directly contacted by a candidate’s campaign.
Partisans who report meeting a candidate or attending a candidate’s
campaign event are more likely to vote for that candidate than partisans
who do not report meeting a candidate or attending a candidate’s
campaign event.

Constituencies within parties tend to pull candidates towards relatively extreme
and narrow ideological positions despite the expected moderating effects of the general
election (Gershtenson, 2007). In ideological terms, that means that successful candidates
in nomination contests will tend to be bound by the relatively narrow ideological confines
of their parties’ base voters. However, in a crowded field of candidates, many are likely
to be seen as ideologically similar to their competitors. In simple terms, ideological
crowding is the idea that the presence of several candidates of a similar ideological stripe
will lead to “splitting the vote of specific faction of primary voters” (sic) (Norrander and
Stephens, 2012, p. 5). Assuming that voters will most often choose candidates who are
the closest to themselves ideologically, candidates who are perceived to be similar
ideologically will tend to divide voters of similar ideology between them.
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Ideological proximity is the distance between a voter’s ideological selfidentification and his or her perceived ideology of a candidate. There has been longstanding disagreement over the utility of using ideological proximity. Miller et al. (1976)
found that the perceived closeness of a candidate’s issue positions with voter’s own
position predicted vote choice. However, in a response to Miller et al., RePass (1976)
found in an analysis of longitudinal data that voters in the 1972 general election projected
closer ideological proximity to their preferred candidate rather than pick a preferred
candidate based on ideological proximity. Further complicating matters, although voters
are successful in identifying policy differences between candidates with starkly differing
positions, they are (perhaps understandably, considerably less successful in
differentiating candidates with more nuanced positions from each other. For example,
although voters in the 1968 presidential election correctly considered George Wallace to
be a hard-liner on Vietnam and Eugene McCarthy to be opposed to the war effort, they
could not identify the comparatively small distance between the positions of Richard
Nixon and Hubert Humphrey (Page and Brody, 1972).
Hull (2008) expresses ideological proximity as IPA = |IA - IR| with IR being the
voter’s ideological self-identification and IA being the voter’s perceived ideology of
candidate A. For example if participant R self-identified as slightly conservative (scored
as 5 on a standard Likert scale of ideology), perceived candidate A as very conservative
(a score of 7) and candidate B as conservative (a score of 6), candidate A would have an
ideological proximity of two with the participant although candidate B would have an
ideological proximity of one. In the two-candidate example above, candidate B would be
awarded the ideological vote of participant R. Ideological vote share in this study is the
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number of participants who had the smallest ideological proximity score with the
candidate, with ties being equally proportioned to candidates with the smallest score. For
example, if three candidates each have an IP of 0 for a participant, they would each be
awarded a third of a vote. Ideological vote share can be expressed as IVSA =
(Σ(SIPA/CSIP))/V with SIP being each voter with the smallest ideological placement
score for candidate A, CSIP being the total number of candidates with the smallest
ideological placement score for that voter and V being the total number of voters
surveyed. Ideological crowding is simply the proportion of votes not captured by a
candidate’s ideological vote share, that is, the proportion of the votes that are
ideologically closer to other candidates. This can be used to measure how hemmed in a
candidate is in a crowded primary. Ideological crowding is significantly and negatively
correlated with a candidate’s share of the actual vote in the caucus (Hull, 2008),
inversely, candidates with a higher ideological vote share should have a larger portion of
the actual caucus vote:
H3

Candidates with higher ideological vote share scores are more likely to
get a higher share of the vote than are candidates with lower ideological
vote share scores.
How does the perception of candidate ideology change over the course of the
campaign? Electoral campaigns are “information-rich events” educating voters on,
among other things, the candidates’ “policy and ideological bearings” (Iyengar and
Simon, 2000, p. 156). Those educating effects of campaigns increase during the last few
weeks of an election (Arceneaux, 2006). If campaigns are educating voters over the
course of a campaign, then it is reasonable to expect that those voters should begin to
draw more similar conclusions about the ideology of candidates:
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H4

There will be less variance in voter perception of candidate ideology later
in the campaign period than early in the campaign period.

Results from the Fremont County Study
The dependent variable used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 in this chapter is
participants’ vote choice in the 2016 caucus, asked within a couple of weeks of that vote.
Candidate support in the four pre-caucus rounds of interviews were also measured, along
with other variables mentioned later in this chapter. The leading candidates among study
participants during the first round (summer of 2015) were Ben Carson and Scott Walker;
Donald Trump had the third highest level of support and may have been higher, but was
not included in the survey until he had officially announced his candidacy on June 16.
Walker had dropped out by the time of the second interview round (September-October)
while Carson was still the leading candidate, joined by Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and
Trump. Trump and Cruz broke away as the leading candidates in the third (Decemberearly January) and fourth (late January) rounds followed by Rubio, a pattern that held
through the caucus. A fuller listing of candidate preferences in each round can be seen in
Table 4.1.
The high number of missing values in round three is somewhat worrisome. The
timing of those interviews, mostly in late December and early January, made completing
contacts more difficult. Making an educated guess about who the missing participants
supported in that round is not possible because only one of the 17 not interviewed in
round three supported the same candidate in rounds two and four.
Participants’ candidate support varied greatly over the course of the study. Of the
eighty participants who completed the study, only three (one Cruz supporter, one Trump
supporter, and one Carson supporter) supported the same candidate in each of the rounds
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in which they participated. Among the 12 participants who supported Scott Walker in
round one, four voted for Trump in the caucus, four voted for Rubio, three voted for
Cruz, and one voted for Carson. Among the 14 participants who were undecided in the
first round, seven voted for Trump, three voted for Cruz, two voted for Rubio, one voted
for Chris Christie and one voted for John Kasich. Of the 17 participants who supported
Ben Carson in round one, seven voted for Trump, five voted for Cruz, four voted for
Carson (although only one stuck with Carson in every round of the study), and one voted
for Christie.
Candidate

Round 1

Round 2

Round 3

Round 4

Caucus
Vote
32 (40.0%)
25 (31.3%)
12 (15.0%)
6 (7.5%)
2 (2.5%)
2 (2.5%)
1 (1.3%)
0
0

Donald Trump 9 (11.3%)
11 (13.8%) 18 (22.5%) 24 (30.0%)
Ted Cruz
3 (3.8%)
11 (13.8%) 18 (22.5%) 20 (25.0%)
Marco Rubio
5 (6.3%)
7 (8.8%)
11 (13.8%)
13 (16.3%)
Ben Carson
3 (3.8%)
5 (6.3%)
17 (21.3%)
16 (20%)
John Kasich
1 (1.3%)
0
0
1 (1.3%)
Chris Christie
0
0
1 (1.3%)
2 (2.5%)
Rand Paul
2 (2.5%)
1 (1.3%)
1 (1.3%)
1 (1.3%)
Jeb Bush
4 (5.0%)
2 (2.5%)
1 (1.3%)
1 (1.3%)
Carley Fiorina
2 (2.5%)
3 (3.8%)
0
0
Mike
4 (5.0%)
0
2 (2.5%)
3 (3.8%)
0
Huckabee
Rick
2 (2.5%)
3 (3.8%)
1 (1.3%)
0
0
Santorum
Bobby Jindal
1 (1.3%)
0
Rick Perry
4 (5.0%)
Scott Walker 12 (15.0%)
Don’t know
14 (17.5%)
7 (8.8%)
11 (13.8%)
5 (6.3%)
0
Missing
0
12 (15.0%) 17 (21.3%)
7(8.8%)
0
Table 4.1: Candidate support during each of the four pre-caucus interview
rounds and reported vote at the caucus. Only candidates who received
support from at least one participant at some point during the study are
included. Candidates who had dropped out are indicated with a dash. The
numbers of the two leading candidates in each round are bold.

In rounds two through four, participants who supported a different candidate in
the previous round where asked an open-ended question about why they changed. The
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answers of those who could articulate a reason for changing their candidate support were
coded. The results from each round are recorded in Table 4.2.
Reason for change
Rounds 1-2 Rounds 2-3 Rounds 3-4 Rounds 4-5
Prior choice had
14
0
0
0
dropped out
Dissatisfaction with
12
7
8
1
prior choice
Prior choice cannot
6
7
2
6
win
Preferred new choice
3
4
1
1
over prior choice
Table 4.2: Reasons participants gave for changing candidate support
between rounds.
Negative evaluations of prior supported candidates (either dissatisfaction with
them as candidates or belief that they cannot win) greatly exceeded positive evaluations
of new choices in every round. Across all rounds, the “victims” of having prior
supporters switch because of dissatisfaction with them were Carson (7 participants gave
this as the primary reason to stop supporting him), Trump (5), Rubio (3), Cruz (2),
Santorum (2), Kasich (2), Paul (1), and Bush (1). The reasons participants gave for their
dissatisfaction varied widely from believing that the candidate was too mild to win (a
common reason given for changing from Carson), to dissatisfaction on particular issues
(immigration for Rubio, opposition to government support of ethanol for Cruz), to
reacting against statements by the candidate (Trump). The candidates that suffered the
most from the belief that they could not win were Huckabee (6), Carson (5), Bush (3),
and Santorum (2), with Paul, Jindal, Fiorina, and Kasich each losing one vote because a
participant believed that they could not win the nomination. Among participants who
expressed a positive preference for a different candidate over their previous choice, the
beneficiaries were Trump (5), Cruz (2), Paul (1), and Rubio (1).
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In addition to shifting support between candidates, there was also a trend towards
greater consolidation of support for a few leading candidates. In both of the first two
rounds, 36.3% of surveyed participants supported the top two candidates. In the third and
fourth rounds, roughly 45% of participants supported two leading candidates. In the postcaucus interview, 71.3% of participants reported voting for either Donald Trump or Ted
Cruz. The next sections will deal with several accounts of why voters supported the
candidates they did.
Participants noted a wide range of reasons for voting the way they did on caucus
night. Only one participant admitted to being influenced by someone they met at the
caucus and another said that they were impressed with the candidate upon meeting him.
Some of the more common answers were variations on candidate experience or qualities,
electability, ideology or issue agreement, or a desire for change. The distribution of those
reasons among voters for the top four candidates (with the rest collapsed into an “other”
category) is shown in Table 4.3.
Candidate

Candidate
Electability
qualities

Ideology,
issues

“Change”

Donald
11
2
4
9
Trump
Ted
3
1
11
0
Cruz
Marco
4
5
3
0
Rubio
Ben
5
0
0
0
Carson
Table 4.3: Distributions of reasons participants gave for voting for the top
four candidate on caucus night
As can be seen in the table, the reasons participants gave for their votes were not
evenly distributed among the four leading candidates. Participants who supported Ted
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Cruz were most likely to cite ideology as the reason for their vote while supporters of
Marco Rubio were most likely to cite a belief that he was the most electable candidate
Supporters of Ben Carson and Donald Trump like the personal qualities of those
candidates (with terms such as “leadership”, “business experience”, and “honesty” often
being mentioned). Trump was additional helped by the view that he was an agent of
change. How did participants get the information on which those assessments were
based? Perhaps it came from the campaigns themselves. The impact of campaign efforts
to reach voters is addressed in the next section.
The Impact of Campaign Effects
Assessing campaign effects on any election can be difficult. That is particularly so
for the presidential caucus in Iowa. Campaigns become nearly ubiquitous on both paid
and earned media in the months before the caucus. In addition, Republican presidential
campaigns (unlike political scientist graduate students, I discovered to my chagrin) were
allowed to purchase lists of previous caucus voters from the Iowa Republican Party.
People on those lists were inundated with contacts in the form of mailers, emails and
automated (robo) calls. Robo calls are especially popular with less-well-financed
campaigns because they are cheaper and easier to implement than live calls from
volunteers or paid telemarketers (Miller, 2009).
Tet multitude of contacts was magnified by the number of candidates in the
running. During the early phase of this study in the summer of 2015, there were 16 major
candidates running for the Republican nomination. By the date of the caucus, there were
still eleven major candidates in the running. Most of those campaigns, their supporting
super PACs, and other supporting organizations were working the likely voter lists hard
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during the last few months of the campaign. For many likely voters, it would have been
easier to list the campaigns that didn’t contact them than those that did.
To deal with that problem, I limit my independent variables measuring campaign
effects to two items, both of which required a commitment to a “ground game” in Iowa.
The first is person-to-person contacts by people on behalf of the candidate, either inperson or by phone. That contact could have been from either the candidate’s campaign, a
supporting super PAC, or a local activist; study participants were not asked to
differentiate the nature of the contacts beyond the candidate they were supporting
because participants might not be able differentiate sources other than which candidate
they were calling. It is also possible that participants would not have been able to
successfully differentiate the sources of the contact if asked to do so. The second is
meeting a candidate or attending a campaign event.
Short of personally meeting a candidate or attending a candidate event, campaigns
can add a human touch to their voter contact efforts by having staffers or volunteers
speak with likely voters. Such grassroots efforts are a tried-and-true campaign technique
that has been proven to be effective in a variety of political settings (Andre and Depauw,
2016). The first hypothesis of this chapter is an assessment of the impact of such
grassroots campaigning on the vote choice of study participants. To measure direct
contacts by campaigns, participants were asked about such contacts in each of the four
pre-caucus rounds of interviews. The questions were along the lines of “Have any
presidential campaigns contacted you in the past (4-8 weeks), not including junk mail,
spam email, or robo calls?” In the first round of interviews, I asked about the previous
two months. In subsequent rounds, the time period varied depending on the amount of
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time between the previous and current interviews. If the participant said “yes”, I followed
up by asking which campaigns had contacted them. Although asking about contacts from
each campaign in each round (e.g. “Did someone from the Ted Cruz campaign speak
with you in the past eight weeks”) might have increased the number of reported contacts,
I elected not to do so because running through each campaign would have lengthened the
time of each interview considerably and increased the likelihood of participant fatigue,
lower quality data for questions later in the survey, and participants dropping out of the
study (Ben-Nun, 2008).
One coding issue that emerged was that, although participants could recall being
contacted by campaigns, they often could not remember which campaigns had contacted
them. Going through the list of candidates with them usually did not help jar their
memories. In such cases, I coded based on the adjective participants use to describe how
many campaigns contacted them. For example, if a participant said that they were
contacted by “some” or “a few” campaigns, but could not identify any of them, I coded it
as no contacts from any campaigns. If a participant said that they had been contacted by
“a lot” or “all” of the campaigns, I coded as contacts from all campaigns. Although not
ideal, it is probably more accurate than coding as no contact from any campaign
whenever a participant could not remember which campaign contacted them. The
disadvantage of this choice is that it may slightly overstate the number of contacts from
resource-poor campaigns and slightly understate the number of contacts from campaigns
that committed their resources towards person-to-person contacts.
I summed the reported contacts from each of the eleven campaigns that were on
the ballot at the caucuses. The possible number of total contacts was from zero to four,
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based on the number of rounds in which participants recall being contacted at least once
by the campaign. I then calculated the mean number of contacts per participant. Those
totals are reported with each candidate’s vote share among participants in Table 4.4.
Mean Number of
Participant Caucus
Campaign Contact Periods
Vote Share
Across Four Rounds
Donald Trump
.33
32 (40.0%)
Ted Cruz
.69
25 (31.3%)
Marco Rubio
.40
12 (15.0%)
Ben Carson
.35
6 (7.5%)
John Kasich
.16
2 (2.5%)
Chris Christie
.20
2 (2.5%)
Rand Paul
.27
1 (1.3%)
Jeb Bush
.40
0
Carley Fiorina
.22
0
Mike Huckabee
.36
0
Rick Santorum
.21
0
Table 4.4: Mean number of periods in which participants received
campaign direct contacts on behalf of candidates and candidate vote
share among participants.
Candidate

Those means in Table 4.4 appear low, which no campaign having been able to
contact every participant at least once. There are a couple of possible reasons for that.
First, Fremont is a small county in a corner of the state, so campaigns may have given
likely caucus voters less attention. Also, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, participants
may have underreported attempts by campaigns to make person-to-person contact with
them. That is especially true because many participants told me that they had stopped
accepting calls from unfamiliar phone numbers in response to the numerous robo calls
they were receiving during the last several weeks of the campaign (something that also
made my job harder because many participants had not saved my number on their
phones).
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A linear regression was calculated to test if the mean number of contacts per
participant by campaigns predicted candidate vote share among the eight candidates. A
significant relationship was found, F(1,9) = 4.601, p = .061, with an adjusted R2 of .265.
Looking at data with individual participants as the unit of analysis, a multinomial logistic
regression was performed to model the relationship between the total number of contacts
from campaigns and candidate support. Due to the low number of participant votes for
most candidates, the dependent variable (caucus vote) was collapsed into three
categories: Trump (32 votes), Cruz (25), and other (23). A multinomial logistic
regression was run to find the impact of contacts from the Cruz and Trump campaigns on
participant vote choice in the presidential caucus. The addition of person-to-person
contacts from the Trump and Cruz campaigns to a model that contained only the intercept
did not significantly improve the fit between model and data, X2 (df = 4) = 5.922,
Nagelkerke R2 = .080, p = .205.
Binary logistic regressions were also used with the dependent variable collapsed
into “Trump” and “not Trump” for the first test and “Cruz” and “not Cruz” for the second
test. The addition of person-to-person contacts from the Trump campaign to a model that
contained only the intercept significantly improved the fit between model and data, X2 (df
= 1) = 3.211, Nagelkerke R2 = .053, p = .073. However, person-to-person contacts from
the Cruz campaign to a model that contained only the intercept did not significantly
improve the fit between model and data, X2 (df = 1) = 1.178, Nagelkerke R2 = .021, p
= .278. Although the Cruz campaign made more person-to-person contacts with
participants than the Trump campaign did, those contacts were less effective. Of the 20
participants who reported being contacted by the Trump campaign at least once before
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the caucus, 12 voted for Trump. However, only 11 of the 31 participants who were
contacted by the Cruz campaign at least once before the caucus voted for Cruz. In that
regard the Cruz campaign was like a sower casting seeds widely only to have most of
them fall on rocky soil.
If the results of data on hearing from supporters of a candidate are mixed, then
what about hearing from the candidates themselves? The idea that personal contacts from
candidates can influence voters is a truism in political campaigns, as is the idea that the
retail politics of candidates meeting prospective voters in living rooms and at coffee
klatches is especially effective in gaining votes in the Iowa presidential caucus (Hull,
2008).
Sitting in the southwestern corner of Iowa, Fremont County is not on the beaten
path for presidential candidates. It was only visited by candidates committed to doing the
“full Grassley” of campaigning in all or nearly all of Iowa’s 99 counties in an attempt to
have the candidate meet as many voters as possible. Only three candidates who were on
the February caucus ballot made it to Fremont County: Senator Ted Cruz, Governor Mike
Huckabee, and Senator Rick Santorum. Governor Scott Walker, who dropped out well
before the 2016 caucus, also campaigned in Freemont County. Santorum, who came
within 1 vote of winning Fremont County in 2012, visited Penn Drug in Sidney in March
of 2015. Scott had a meet-and-greet at Penn Drug in July, but dropped out of the race a
few weeks later. It was Cruz’s turn to meet voters at Penn Drug in October. Huckabee,
who won in Fremont County in 2008, shook things up a bit by having a town hall event at
Sidney High School in late November. In addition, Santorum visited the Depot Deli in
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Shenandoah, just across the county line in Page County, for lunch on the same day in
March he spoke to the coffee klatch in Sidney.
Unsurprisingly, more participants reported personally seeing or meeting Cruz,
Huckabee, or Santorum than any other candidates. Seventeen participants reported
meeting Santorum or going to a Santorum event at least once before or during the 2016
presidential race compared to fifteen for Cruz and nine for Huckabee. Between zero and
five participants reported such contacts with all other candidates.
The evidence suggests that there is no relationship between personally seeing
candidates and voting for those candidates. Although Cruz came in second place in the
countywide vote and among participants, both Huckabee and Santorum did poorly on
caucus night in Fremont County and no participants reported voting for either of them.
Statistical analysis bears out that observation. In each of the four pre-caucus interviews,
participants were asked, “have you personally seen, met, or been to an event of any
presidential candidates in the past (4-10 weeks)?” If the participant said “yes”, I then
followed up by asking which candidates they met or events they attended. In a linear
regression, the mean number of periods in which participants met a candidate or attended
a candidate event did not predict voting for that candidate, F(1,9) = 0.748, p = .410, with
an adjusted R2 of -.026.
Examining participant-centered data told a similar story. In a binary logistic
model of voting “Cruz” or “not Cruz”, adding reported attendance at a Cruz campaign
event or meeting Cruz to a model that contained only the intercept did not significantly
improve the fit between model and data, X2 (df = 1) = 2.494, Nagelkerke R2 = .043, p
< .114. Likewise, in a model of voting “Trump” or “not Trump”, adding reported
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attendance at a Trump campaign event or meeting Trump to a model that contained only
the intercept did not significantly improve the fit between model and data, X2 (df = 1) =
1.398, Nagelkerke R2 = .023, p < .237. Those nonsignificant results came from different
causes. For Trump, the problem was too few contacts; only five participants reported
meeting Trump or going to a Trump event at least once, with four of those voting for
Trump. The closest Trump came to Fremont County was a rally in Council Bluffs, a little
over an hour to the north. For Cruz, the problem was converting the meeting of the
candidate into votes; of the 15 participants who reported meeting Cruz or attending a
Cruz event, only seven voted for him.
Ideology, Issues, and the Caucus Vote
Do issues and ideology make a difference in candidate support? If elections,
including nomination contests, are battles of ideas, then voter ideology and perceptions of
candidate ideology should be reflected in the voting on caucus day.
Most prior caucuses seemed to fit the expectation of relatively moderate frontrunners challenged by seemingly more ideologically extreme challengers. For example,
in 2012 relative moderate Mitt Romney and conservative Rick Santorum finished in a
virtual tie in Iowa. In 2008, conservative Mike Huckabee won Iowa with Romney
coming in second (moderate front runner John McCain did not actively compete in Iowa).
In the summer of 2015, it appeared that the 2016 caucus would be similar with
Jeb Bush and Marco Rubio competing to be the moderate front-runner and a host of
candidates, led by Ben Carson and Ted Cruz, competing to be the main challenger on the
right. The entry of Donald Trump appeared to disrupt that typical pattern. In this section,
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I will examine the relationship between ideological vote share (and, by extension,
ideological crowding) and actual vote share.
The first step towards measuring ideological vote share is noting the ideological
proximity of each candidate for each voter. That is found by subtracting each
participant’s ideological self-placement on a 1-7 Likert scale (with 7 being the most
conservative) from the participant’s ideological placement for each candidate, expressed
as IPA = |IA - IR| with IR being the voter’s ideological self-identification and IA being the
voter’s perceived ideology of candidate A. When two or more candidates have the
smallest score, that participant’s vote is divided equally between them. Considering the
relatively small number of participants in this study, ideological vote share is expressed
as number of votes rather than percentage as is done in other studies. Ideological vote
share for a candidate (A) can be expressed as IVSA = Σ(SIPA/TSIP) with SIP being each
voter for whom candidate A is at least tied for the smallest ideological placement score,
and TSIP being the total number of candidates with the smallest ideological placement
score for that voter. Ideological crowding, the proportion of votes not captured by a
candidate’s ideological vote share can be expressed as 1- (IVSA/V) with V being the total
number of participants in the study.
During the first round of interviews, conducted in the summer of 2015,
participants were asked to rate themselves on ideology using a standard Likert scale
ranging from “extremely liberal” (1) to “extremely conservative” (7). Twenty-six
participants rated themselves as “very conservative”. The most common self-rating was
“conservative” by 35 participants. Twelve participants rated themselves as “slightly
conservative” while five rated themselves as “moderate”. Few participants were willing
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to identify themselves as liberal with only one rating of “slightly liberal” and one of
“liberal” among the 80 participants. The mean self-rating of the participants was 5.96,
making the group about as conservative as one would expect from a pool of Republican
caucus voters in Iowa.
The range of the means of ideological ratings participants gave the candidates was
narrow, between 4.48 and 6.18. The most conservative candidates, according to
participants, were Rick Santorum with a mean rating of 6.18 on the Likert scale, followed
by Ben Carson at 6.03, Mike Huckabee at 5.9, and Ted Cruz at 5.82. Chris Christie was
rated the most moderate of the candidates at 4.48, followed by Jeb Bush at 4.63, Donald
Trump at 4.7, and John Kasich at 4.88. Only 49 participants were willing and able to
place Kasich on the scale, indicating that he was not successful in letting caucus voters
know about him. Those placed in the relative ideological middle included Rand Paul at
5.54, Carly Fiorina at 5.42, and Marco Rubio at 5.27.
Calculating ideological vote share based on individual ratings of candidates
produced a vote share of 11.5 for Cruz, 9.18 for Huckabee, 8.41 for Carson, 8.28 for
Rubio, 7.62 for Santorum, 6.91 for Paul, 6.64 for Trump, 6.37 for Fiorina, 5.11 for
Christie, 4.71 for Bush and 3.07 for Kasich. So, if participants voted solely on which
candidate they believed was the closest to them ideologically, Cruz would have won
among the study participants while Trump would have finished seventh rather than first.
As can be seen on Table 4.5, there is little relationship between ideological vote share
and the actual vote on caucus night.
A linear regression did not reveal a relationship between candidates’ ideological
vote share and their actual vote share among participants, (R2=.08, F(1,9)=1.848,

80
p=.207). Nor was there a relationship between ideological self-placement of participants
and vote choice, F(6,73)=1.391, p=.230. Among the candidates with the highest vote
share among participants, Trump had by far the largest gap between his mean ideological
placement and the ideological self-placement of his voters with a gap of 1.24 points on
the Likert scale, compared to a gap of 0.4 for Rubio and 0.26 for Cruz.
Candidate

Ideological
Vote Share

Actual Vote
Share

Mean
ideological
placement of
candidates
(4th round)

Mean
ideological
selfplacement of
candidate’s
voters
Cruz
11.5
25
5.82
6.08
Huckabee
9.18
0
5.90
Carson
8.41
6
6.03
6.50
Rubio
8.28
12
5.27
5.67
Santorum
7.62
0
6.18
Paul
6.91
1
5.54
7.00
Trump
6.64
32
4.70
5.94
Fiorina
6.37
0
5.42
Christie
5.11
2
4.48
6.00
Bush
4.71
0
4.63
Kasich
3.07
2
4.88
4.50
Table 4.5: Candidate ideological vote share and actual caucus vote
among research participants.
Looking at the voting patterns of participants based on their self-reported
ideology, as seen in Table 4.5, also indicated a lack of ideologically-based voting. Ted
Cruz won the votes of both the participants who reported themselves to be left-of-center.
Otherwise, no candidate dominated in any ideological category, although Trump won a
plurality of votes among moderates, those who are slightly conservative and
conservatives. Cruz won among very conservative participants.
Participants were also asked to rate how much they agreed with statements on 14
issues on a scale of 0 to 100. About half of the results were reverse-coded so that 100 was
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the most conservative position for all items. A mean conservatism score for all 14 items
was calculated for each participant. As with ideological self-placement, there was not a
statistically significant relationship between the conservatism scale and caucus vote; a
multinomial logistic regression did not reveal a relationship between the aggregated
conservatism score and vote choice, X2(6,N=80) = 3.238, Nagelkerke R2 = .04, p =.778.

Ted Cruz
Rand Paul
Marco Rubio
Ben Carson
Chris Christie
John Kasich
Donald Trump
TOTAL

Very liberal
/ liberal

Slightly
liberal

Moderate

Slightly
conservative

Conservative

Very
conservative

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

1
0
1
0
0
1
2
5

1
0
3
1
0
1
6
12

9
0
7
1
2
0
16
35

12
1
1
4
0
0
8
26

Table 4.6: Distribution of participant caucus votes by self-reported
ideology. The top vote-getter among each ideological category is in bold.
Several aggregations of subsets of the conservatism scores were also tested. Two
of the subsets were not significantly related to vote choice: economic and fiscal
conservatism (based on support for cutting government regulations, cutting the federal
budget, and limited government, and opposition to raising taxes and increasing welfare
spending), X2(6,N=80) = 5.95, Nagelkerke R2 = .076, p =.429; social conservatism (based
on opposition to abortion, same-sex marriage, a pathway to citizenship for those who
entered the country illegally, gun control, and support for school prayer), X2(6,N=80) =
9.299, Nagelkerke R2 = .116, p =.157. One item, “support for ‘Biblical truth’”, was not
include in any of the subcategories because many participants seemed to struggle with
answering it. Including it in the social conservatism scale did not affect that scale’s
relationship with participant vote choice.
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One conservatism scale, foreign policy and defense conservatism (based on
support for increase military spending and drone strikes against suspected terrorists
overseas, and opposition to increased foreign aid), was found to be significantly related to
vote choice, X2(6,N=80) = 14.027, Nagelkerke R2 = .171, p =.029. However, the
statistical program used to run that analysis warned that there was a problem with the
Hessian matrix for that particular multinomial logistic regression, indicating that some of
the categories should be merged. Collapsing vote choice into three categories of “Cruz”,
“Trump”, and “other” and rerunning the multivariate logistic regression produced similar
results, X2(2,N=80) = 5.355, Nagelkerke R2 = .073, p =.069. Although an examination of
the parameter estimates did not reveal a significant difference between Cruz and the other
Republicans, there was a significant and positive difference between Trump and the other
Republicans (p=.048).
A binary logistic regressions, with vote choice collapsed into “Trump and “other”
confirmed that there was one difference between Trump supporters and supporters of the
rest of the Republican field. The addition of defense and foreign policy conservatism to a
model that contained only the intercept significantly improved the fit between model and
data, X2 (df = 1) = 5.252, Nagelkerke R2 = .086, B = .045, p < .022. Although the effect
was not especially large, it suggests that Trump’s success among participants was due to
an appeal to nationalism in the form of military strength and foreign policy toughness.
Adding a scale based on an immigration question to the foreign and defense policy
conservatism scale did not improve the performance of the model, although it was still
significant, X2 (df = 1) = 2.87, Nagelkerke R2 = .048, p < .09. The findings suggest that
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Trump’s main appeal was to nationalism rather than ideological conservatism, and is
worth further study.
There were three individual issues that had significant relationships with vote
choice (p < .10) between Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, and other candidates. Cruz voters
were more supportive of the idea of “Biblical truth” than were Trump voters or voters for
other candidates. Both Cruz voters and Trump voters were more supportive of drone
strikes against terrorism suspects than were those who voted for other candidates. Finally,
Cruz voters were less likely to oppose “aid to the world’s needy” than were Trump voters
or those who voted for other candidates.
The participant ratings of Donald Trump’s ideology deserve more attention at this
point. Trump won on caucus night, both in Fremont County as a whole and among the
study participants, followed by Ted Cruz (who won statewide). However, Trump’s rating
varied much more than that of any other candidate; the variance in ideology in the fourth
round ranged from .849 to 1.886 for the other ten candidates but was 2.547 for Trump.
Almost unique among the candidates, Trump had a trimodal distribution on his ideology
rating with 21 participants rating him as “conservative”, 18 rating him as “moderate”, and
7 rating him as “liberal”. That distribution can be at least partially explained by observing
the difference between Trump voters and non-Trump voters in an independent-samples
T-test. In a one-way ANOVA, Trump’s ideology rating was significantly more
conservative among Trump voters (M=5.2, SD=1.186) than among non-Trump voters
(M=4.35, SD=1.758), t(71)=2.308, p=.024. When Trump first entered the race, many
participants did not know what to think of him, as exemplified by a statement from one
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participant in the summer of 2015. When asked to place Trump ideologically, the
participant laughed and said:
I don’t know if he is conservative, wishes he was conservative, plays at
being conservative, or is trying to fool everybody. I would put him down
as very conservative but I don’t trust the son-of-a-bitch. I like what he says
but I don’t trust him to do what he says.
Six months later, that participant voted for Trump.
In a sense, Trump, who had no political background and who had supported
Democrats in the past, was a graft on the body politic of Republicans. Those who
accepted that graft saw him as conservative while those who rejected it saw him as
moderate if not liberal. This suggests that Donald Trump was an ideological Rorschach
test in whom voters saw what they wanted to see, and who’s presence in the race may
have disrupted the role played by ideology that has been found in other studies. This
finding also lends support to RePass’ (1976) contention that candidate preference predicts
ideological assessments of candidates rather than the other way around.
Are those perceptions of candidate ideology based on facts or fancy? If participant
ratings of candidate ideology are factually-based, then it is reasonable to expect that there
will be less randomness in those ratings over time as participants are exposed to more
information about the candidates through the course of a campaign.
Participants were asked to rate candidate ideology in the first round of interviews
conducted in the summer of 2015, and again in the fourth round of interviews conducted
in late January, just a few days before the caucus. The mean ideological rating for each
candidate in both rounds is reported in Table 4.7, along with the variance for each round.
Change in the variance of candidate ideology ratings was in the expected direction of
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decreasing over time for eight of the eleven candidates. However, the direction of change
was not random; the three candidates for whom the variance of their ideology ratings
increased were the three leading candidates. Those candidates also had the most variance
in their fourth round ideology ratings. Following Nordstokke and Zumbo (2010),
nonparametric Levene’s tests were conducted to find if the difference in variance
between the first and fourth round candidate ideology ratings was statistically significant.
Only the difference in variance between the ratings for Jeb Bush (p=.038) and Ted Cruz
(P=.093) were found to be significant at the .10 level.
Candidate

Round 1
Mean
Ideology

Round 1
Variance

Round 4
Mean
Ideology

Round 4
Variance

Change
Significance
in
level of
Variance nonparmetric
over
Livene’s test
Time
(R4 – R1)
Trump
5.10
2.124
4.70
2.547
+0.423
.877
Cruz
6.10
.797
5.82
1.886
+1.089
.093*
Rubio
5.46
1.409
5.54
1.864
+0.455
.871
Carson
6.13
1.016
6.03
0.849
-0.167
.633
Paul
5.40
1.850
5.27
1.174
-0.676
.266
Bush
4.33
1.766
4.63
1.125
-0.641
.038*
Kasich
5.45
1.117
4.88
1.026
-0.091
.311
Christie
3.99
1.865
4.48
1.167
-0.698
.799
Santorum
6.06
1.412
6.18
0.902
-0.510
.559
Huckabee
5.78
1.883
5.90
1.376
-0.507
.824
Fiorina
5.30
1.645
5.42
1.329
-0.316
.546
Table 4.7: Comparison of mean ideology ratings and the variance of those
ratings for Republican caucus candidates in the first and fourth interview
rounds. * = significant at the 0.1 level.
Ted Cruz had by far the largest increase in variance from round one to round four.

A comparison of the variance in ideology ratings for Cruz between Cruz voters and Cruz
nonvoters was conducted to see if there was a difference in the change of variation for
Cruz’s ideology rating between the groups. Somewhat surprisingly, Cruz voters displayed
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a larger increase in the variance of their ideology rating of Cruz than did Cruz nonvoters.
Cruz nonvoters went from a mean ideology rating of Cruz of 5.91 with a variance of
0.925 in the first round to a mean ideology rating of 5.78 with a variance of 1.573 in the
fourth round. Cruz voters reported a mean ideology rating of 6.56 for Cruz with a
variance of 0.379 in the first round to a mean ideology rating of 5.88 with a variance of
2.610 in the fourth round. If anything Cruz voters were collectively less sure of his
ideology than were those who did not vote for him.
The findings of this section indicated that participant assessments of similarities
with candidate ideology, whether based on a self-assessment of ideology or based on
issue-based measures, had little impact on voting. In addition, there is evidence that
campaigns did not help participants narrow the gap in how they rated the three leading
candidates (Trump, Cruz, and Rubio) ideologically, fitting with Redlawsk’s (2004)
finding that increased exposure to information may contribute to greater ambivalence
when evaluating candidates. I certainly noticed more negative comments directed at
Trump, Cruz and Rubio than at other candidates during my observations in Freemont
County, and front runners are traditionally subject to more negative attacks. That negative
information directed at front runners may have be the source of the increased
ambivalence observed regarding their ideological ratings. That likely limited the role of
ideological voting among participants.
Discussion
There was no evidence to support the idea of an “ideological vote”, with
candidate’s ideological vote share looking nothing like their actual vote share among
study participants. There was also no relationship between conservatism based on
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participant self-placement on a battery of questions on 14 issues and caucus vote.
Examining subscales of the conservatism battery revealed that Trump supporters were
more conservative on a battery of foreign policy issues (supporter of a strong military,
opposition to foreign aid, and support of drone strikes against suspected terrorists),
although there was no significant difference on social or fiscal issues, suggesting that part
of Trump’s support was due to nationalism. Interestingly, there was little variation on the
question of allowing those in the country illegally to have a pathway to citizenship among
supporters of the various candidates, despite the emphasis that Trump placed on
immigration during the campaign.
There is limited evidence that participants could even come to a rough consensus
on candidate ideology. There was some convergence on the ideological placement of
most of the eleven candidates on the caucus ballot over the six-month course of the study
(although only one such convergence, that of Jeb Bush, was statistically significant).
Participants were further apart in their ideological ratings of the three leading candidates
(Trump, Cruz, and Rubio) near the end of the campaign period than at the beginning,
although the difference for only one of the three (Cruz) was statistically significant.
Although it is outside of the scope of this study, it is possible that the leading candidates
were the ones most subjected to negative messages, which in turn increased ambivalence
about the ideology of those candidates.
The analysis of the impact of campaign effects on vote choice produced mixed
results. Although there was some evidence supporting the hypothesis that person-toperson contacts from campaigns increase the vote share of that campaign’s candidate,
there was no evidence to indicate that meeting a candidate or attending a campaign event
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moved votes, although Cruz, with his visit to Sidney several months before the caucus,
came close.
Although the case for campaign effects having an impact on caucus voting is
weak, and the case for ideological vote share having an impact on caucus voting is
nonexistent, evidence for the former is strong enough to believe that it could be an
important factor under the right conditions. One such condition, candidate preference of
those with whom participants discuss politics, will be examined in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5: POLITICAL DISCUSSION NETWORKS AND VOTE CHOICE
In the previous chapter, I found some evidence of the influence of campaign
effects on vote choice and no evidence supporting the influence of perceptions of
candidate ideology on vote choice. As discovered in the dyadic analyses presented in
chapter three, individuals become better informed about the candidate preferences of their
political discussion partners over time. This allows for greater confidence in the
egocentric data presented in this chapter, which I will use to investigate the impact of
participants’ political discussion networks on their candidate support and any possible
moderation effects that political discussion networks have on campaign effects.
I begin the chapter with a review of the literature on social identity and political
discussion, and how political discussion networks influence vote choice. This review will
lead to four hypotheses regarding the impact of political discussion networks on vote
choice, homophily over the course of a campaign, and political discussion networks
moderating campaign effects. Finally, I will test those hypotheses, draw conclusions
based on those tests, and present some emergent findings.
Social Identity, Political Discussion, and Voting
Social identities, the attachments that people make with groups within their
environment, provide citizens with a perspective at the intersection of their identities,
values, and interests (Walsh, 2004). Unlike Campbell et al. (1960) and those who built
upon their work, who saw groups functioning as proxies for self-interest, Walsh finds that
group identity influences decisions about which information is relevant and how it is
perceived. Identity plays the important role of mediating values and interest: “Identities
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function as links between one’s social location and one’s view of the world” (Walsh,
2004, p. 31) with identities at least in part formed through social interactions.
Social Cues and Voting
The impact of cues received during the course of an election campaign are muted
or reinforced by the social interactions in which those cues or information are exchanged.
Voters receive messages from campaigns and political elites through the media but “until
these messages have been checked with others and validated, their full effects are not
felt” (Popkin, 1995, p. 20). Similarly, campaigns enjoy little success in getting people to
change their minds. Although elites may activate “issues frames” through the media (or
campaigns), the frames themselves are formed by citizens based on their self-identities,
which in turn are formed through values, interests and interactions within groups with
which those citizens identify (Walsh, 2004).
Family and friends are a major influence on vote choice (Berelson et al., 1954).
The citizens most likely to change their minds on vote-choice are those who face “crosspressure” from those in their immediate social circles (Berelson et al., 1954; Sinclair,
2012). In fact, although citizens assess candidates based on past performance (Fiorina,
1981; Conover, 1986), they often choose to disregard much of the information about
candidates that is available to them, instead substituting the observations of others they
know (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998)
Citizens often circumvent elite framing of issues by interpreting the news through
the lens of their social identities and their perception of what “people like us” feel about
the information presented by elite sources such as the media or election campaigns
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(Walsh, 2004). For example rural voters may be less likely to support government aid for
the poor because they see government as a tool for urban interests and welfare programs
and as undercutting traditional rural values of hard work and thrift (Walsh, 2012).
Citizens’ social identities are formed through interaction in their own social
networks (Walsh, 2004). When their social identity is salient “their sense of self shifts
from the personal to the collective”, which can influence individual behavior (TheissMorse, 2009, p. 8). There are two factors to consider when looking at the political
influence of social networks on their members: selection and influence (Bello & Rolfe,
2014). Selection is the choosing of partners with whom to have political discussions. That
selection may be indirect (who we chose to socialize with) and direct (who we choose to
talk politics with). Workplace networks often have the highest levels of political
heterogeneity of any social networks (Mutz, 2002b). However, there is some evidence for
direct selection in choosing not to talk politics with some people in one’s social network
(Bello & Rolfe, 2014), especially if there is known political disagreement within the
network (Cowan and Baldassarri, 2018). Also, networks that are homogeneous in
demographic and socioeconomic terms, which many voluntary networks are, also tend to
be homogeneous politically (Knoke, 1990), a finding that extends even to our choice of
marriage partners (Alford et al., 2011).
Influence is the changing of someone’s mind as the result of “new information,
social pressure, imitation of peers or some other psychological mechanism associated
with making conditional choices” (Bello & Rolfe, 2014, p. 136). Social networks can
exert a strong influence on vote choice and those with politically diverse discussion
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networks are more likely to change their vote choice than those with more homogeneous
networks (Berelson et al., 1954; Bello & Rolfe, 2014).
Having relative political experts (those with more information than other network
members) within a social network enhances political participation among network
members, perhaps because it provides group members with ready access to information
to help them vote correctly (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998). However, having
divergent views among experts in a group can depress participation by making members
ambivalent about election results (McClurg, 2006). Experts within social networks not
only have the power to persuade others through social communication, but also tend to
more often retain their own opinions over time (Huckfeldt et al., 2014).
There may be a more subtle interaction between influence and selection with
socialization taking place through interactions with those who are like-minded
reinforcing the perspective of the in-group among its members. Although social identity
is more about self-identification (in terms of region, class, race, or gender) rather than
group membership, that identification is lived out through interactions with groups of
people with similar self-identification forming a social “us” (Walsh, 2004). Groups that
send unambiguous messages to their members in the form of relative homogeneity of
views aid those members in connecting political preference to vote choice, even in the
absence of overt political expressions (Sokhey and McClurg, 2012). In terms of candidate
support, increasing support for a candidate within a social network becomes a selfreinforcing process; the more people within a group who support a candidate, the more
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likely others in the group will support that candidate (Bello & Rolfe, 2014; Huckfeldt et
al., 2014).
So, social networks provide members with a means of blunting the impact of elite
communications, such as media messages or election campaign contacts. Would that
buffering effect of social networks hold up in an environment of intense campaign
communications? Given the importance of retail politics for the presidential caucuses in
Iowa, a fuller understanding of how social networks influence vote choice would make an
important contribution to our understanding of how individual caucus-goers decide which
candidate to support.
Rather than one large war for a whole state or even county, it may be more
accurate to see statewide elections (including presidential primaries and caucuses) as a
concurrent series of thousands of small battles that take place in every community and
social network throughout the state. The vote count in an election is the result of those
thousands of battles, with one candidate usually dominating within each of those contests.
A close election outcome is not the result of an even division within social networks
across the polity, but rather the result of a relatively even split in the number of (often
lopsided) victories in social networks across the polity. Successful campaigns are those
that can successfully carry more of those groups as a result of their campaign efforts.
Political Discussion Networks and Vote Choice
This chapter focuses on the subset of social networks in which political discussion
takes place. As noted in Chapter 1, I use Ikeda and Boase’s definition of political
discussion network as “discussants (whom) respondents listed as being those with whom
they discuss political matters” (2010, p 12).
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While campaigns are attempting to influence voters from outside the bounds of
political discussion networks, members are also (intentionally or not) influencing those
within their political discussion networks. The tendency for people to be like those with
whom they associate is long-noted (McPherson et al., 2001). There is a tendency towards
greater homophily within discussion networks in general elections (Bello and Rolfe,
2014) but will that also be true in nomination contests or will the multi-candidate nature
of nomination contests allow for greater diversity of candidate support within networks?
The expectation is that the tendency towards homophily will still apply. As individuals
within a network come to support certain candidates, they will influence others in that
network, creating a convergence within the network towards a candidate. Once a
candidate reaches a threshold of support (not firmly established within the literature)
within a political discussion network, there will be a tendency towards greater conformity
in candidate support among members within that network. That tendency towards
conformity will increase over time as the caucus nears as the result of cross-pressures
(Berelson et al., 1954) created from ongoing discussions within the network.
H1

Partisans are more likely to express support for a candidate that has the
support of a significant portion of the members of their political
discussion network than they are to express support for a candidate who
does not have the support of a significant portion of the members of their
political discussion network.

H2

During a nomination contest, there will be greater agreement on
candidate support within a political discussion network later in the
campaign than earlier in the campaign.

Hypothesis two will be measured by the proportion of the participants’ political
discussion network with which the participant agrees regarding presidential candidate
support.
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The presence of supporters of candidates within one’s political discussion
network will also moderate the impact of candidate visits and direct campaign contacts
(by phone, mail, email or in-person by campaign staff or volunteers) on vote choice
through the role that discussion partners play in helping individuals interpret information
they receive from elite sources (Walsh, 2004), such as campaigns.
H3

Partisans who report being directly contacted by a candidate’s campaign
are not more likely to vote for that candidate than partisans who do not
report being directly contacted by a candidate’s campaign if a plurality of
the people in that partisan’s political discussion network support a
different candidate.

Results from the Fremont County Study
As in the previous chapter, the dependent variable used to test most of the
hypotheses in this chapter is participants’ vote choice in the 2016 caucus. Candidate
support in the four pre-caucus rounds of interviews were also measured, along with other
variables mentioned later in this chapter. After a brief overview of the political discussion
networks of study participants, the direct relationship between political discussion
networks and vote choice is investigated, followed by an examination of possible
interactions between campaign effects and political discussion network influences.
The mean political discussion network size for 79 of the 80 participants for the
entirety of the study (that is, the network size based on the number of unique discussion
partners across all five rounds of interviews) was 8.25. The size of those networks varied
across participants from a low of one to a high of 21, with a standard deviation of 3.86.
One participant said that he discussed politics with several people but steadfastly refused
to provide their names or any other information about them. That participant was initially
kept in the study in the hope that he could be later persuaded to reveal the names of his
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discussion partners. Although he never divulged those names, he was later kept in the
study because he was listed in the political discussion networks of other participants,
making his information useful in the dyadic analysis in chapter 3.
As seen in Figure 5.1, mean political discussion network size varied across each
of the rounds of the study. The mean self-reported political discussion network size in the
first round, when participants noted with whom they discussed politics in the previous
two months, was 5.32. It dipped down to 4.78 in round two, which covered two to three
months between the first and second round interviews. Mean political discussion network
size recovered somewhat in round three, which covered about two months, to 5.13.
Unique partners in political discussion networks in the fourth round, which covered most
of the month of January, and the fifth round, which covered a few days (and in some
cases a few hours) between the time of fourth interview and the caucus vote, were
combined into a single measure covering the last three to four weeks before the caucus.
The mean network size for those rounds was 6.25.
A one-way within subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare mean political
discussion network size between rounds. There was a significant effect across all rounds,
Wilks’ Lambda = .609, F (3,53) = 11.346, p < .001. Three paired samples t-tests were
used to make post hoc comparisons between rounds. A first paired samples t-test
indicated that there was a significant difference in the decline in political discussion
network size between the first round (M=5.31, SD=2.664) and the second round
(M=4.78, SD=2.52); t(66)=2.061, p = .043. There was not a significant difference in the
means for the second round (M=4.68, SD=2.54) and third round (M=4.93, SD=2.83);
t(55)=-0.898, p = .373. There was a significant difference in the increased means from
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the third round (M=5.13, SD=3.01) to the final rounds (M=6.44, SD=3.28); t(63)=-4.482,
p < .001. The means for the second and third rounds were different in different paired ttests because missing cases in those rounds meant that some participants who were
included in one comparison for those rounds were not included in the other.

Figure 5.1: Change in mean political discussion network size over the
course of the study (from the summer of 2015 to February 1, 2016).
The increase in the size of political discussion networks near the caucus date
makes intuitive sense; with the presidential caucus nearing, it is expected that people
would discuss politics more. The decline from the first round to the second round is a
little more puzzling. Based on my discussions with participants and observations of
Fremont County, one possible explanation is that summer is the peak time for socializing
with community picnics, pancake breakfasts and other events drawing members of the
community together. Once the county fair and Sydney Rodeo in August are finished,
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community events decline somewhat and decline further as the cold of late fall sets in. An
additional factor is that roughly a fifth of the participants in the study work directly or
indirectly in agriculture and the fall harvest season left them too busy to have enough
time for the significant social interactions that are a prerequisite for political talk. In an
extreme example of that, one participant specifically requested during an interview in
August not to be called for an interview in the month of October because he was going to
be too busy with the harvest to be bothered with a 10-minute phone interview.
Political Discussion Networks and Vote Choice
The previous chapter covered questions regarding the impact of campaign effects
and ideological vote share on voting in the 2016 Iowa Republican presidential caucus by
participants. There was limited evidence supporting the former and none supporting the
later. What about the influence of political network discussion partners on vote choice?
Seventy-two participants predicted a candidate preference for at least one
discussion partner in the final, post-caucus interview. For each of those participants, the
stated candidate preference for each discussion partner (or alter) was recorded. Due to the
low number of participants and alters backing most of the candidates in the caucus,
analysis was limited to voters supporting Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, and an “other”
category for all other candidates. The number of alters supporting each of those was
divided by the total number of alters for whom a presidential candidate preference was
stated by the participant (the “known political discussion network”) to form ratios of
alters supporting Trump, Cruz, or other candidates. For example, if a participant guessed
the candidate preference of five alters, three of whom supported Trump, one of whom
support Cruz, and one of whom supported Marco Rubio, the ratio of the known political
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discussion network supporting Trump would be .6 comparted to .2 for Cruz and .2 for
“other”. Alters supporting Democrats were excluded from the calculation.
To test the first hypotheses, dummy variables were calculated for 1/3 of known
political discussion network supporting Cruz, 1/2 of known political discussion network
supporting Cruz, 1/3 of known political discussion network support Trump and 1/2 of
known political discussion network supporting Trump. Of the 72 participants who
reported the presidential candidate preference of at least one member of their known
political discussion network in the post-caucus interviews, 42 reported that at least a third
of their known political discussion network supported Trump and 34 reported that at least
half supported Trump. Twenty-seven participants reported that at least a third of their
known political discussion network supported Cruz and 16 reported that at least half did
so. Clearly, those are not mutually exclusive categories. For example, two participants
reported that half of their known political discussion network supported Trump and the
other half supported Cruz. Perhaps unsurprisingly, one of those participants voted for
Trump and the other voted for Cruz. At the other extreme, four participants reported that
no one in their known political discussion network supported either Trump or Cruz.
Again perhaps unsurprisingly, none of those four participants voted for either candidate.
Of the nine participants for whom at least a third of their network supported Trump and at
least a third supported Cruz, 4 voted for Trump, 4 voted for Cruz, and 1 voted for Rubio.
Of the 42 participants who reported that at least a third of their known political
discussion network supported Trump, 26 (61.9%) voted for Trump, 11 voted for Cruz,
and 5 voted for another candidate. Of the 27 who reported that at least a third supported
Cruz, 13 (48.1%) voted for Cruz, 8 voted for Trump, and 6 voted for another candidate.
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Of the 34 who reported that at least half supported Trump, 23 (67.6%) voted for Trump, 8
voted for Cruz and 3 voted for another candidate. Of the 16 who reported that at least half
supported Cruz, 9 (56.3%) voted for Cruz while 4 voted for Trump and 3 voted for
another candidate. See Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2: The percentage of participants voting for Trump, Cruz or
another candidate when at least 1/3 of known political discussion network
supports Trump, at least 1/2 supports Trump, at least 1/3 supports Cruz
and at least 1/2 supports Cruz.
A chi-square test of independence was performed on the data set with the caucus
vote variable transformed to a measure of “Cruz”, “Trump”, and “other” to comparing
the proportion of a political discussion network supporting a candidate and participants’
vote choice. A significant effect was found when at least half of a participant’s known
political discussion network supported Trump (X2 (2) =20.278, p<.001). Twenty-three of
the twenty-seven participants who reported that at least half of their known political
discussion network supported Trump voted for Trump, compared to an expected count of
14.2. A Cramer’s V measure of .531 indicates that the effect size of the relationship is
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large (Cohen, 1988). A significant effect was also found when at least a third of a
participant’s known political discussion network supported Trump (X2 (2) =20.513,
p<.001). Twenty-six of the forty-two participants who reported that at least a third of
their known political discussion network supported Trump voted for Trump, compared to
an expected count of 17.5. A Cramer’s V measure of .531 indicates that the effect size of
the relationship is also large.
Similar results were found for the proportion of Cruz supporters in a participant’s
known political discussion network. A significant effect was found when at least half of a
participant’s known political discussion network supported Cruz (X2 (2) =7.310, p=.026).
Nine of the sixteen participants who reported that at least half of their known political
discussion network supported Cruz voted for Cruz themselves, compared to an expected
count of 4.7. A Cramer’s V measure of .319 indicates a moderate effect size. (Because
two cells had an expected value of 4.7 [less than the recommended minimum value of 5],
a Fisher’s exact test was also performed, producing similar results with p=.012. The Chi
square results are reported here for the sake of consistency.) A significant effect was also
found when at least a third of a participant’s known political discussion network
supported Cruz (X2 (2) =7.553, p=.023). Thirteen participants who reported that at least a
third of their known political discussion network supported Cruz voted for Cruz,
compared to an expected count of 7.9. A Cramer’s V measure of .531 indicates that the
effect size of the relationship is also moderate.
Looking at the two candidates with a large enough number of supporters to test,
there is evidence supporting hypotheses H1. Having half, or even a third, of the people for
whom participants believe they know which candidate they support is associated with
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greater levels of support for that candidate by participants than would be expected by
chance.
A look at participants’ caucus vote collapsed into “Trump”, “Cruz” and “other”
also revealed how political discussion networks may have framed participant vote choice.
A multinomial logistic regression with vote for “other” as the excluded category found
that the portion of participants’ political discussion networks that supported Trump was
positively and significantly associated with participants voting for Trump rather than for
one of candidates in the “other” category (Marco Rubio, Ben Carson, etc.). Similarly the
portion of participants’ political discussion networks that supported Cruz was positively
and significantly associated with participants voting for Cruz. That is in keeping with the
findings from earlier in this chapter and hardly surprising. What was surprising was that
the portion of participants’ political discussion networks that supported Trump was also
positively and significantly associated with participants voting for Cruz and the portion of
participants’ political discussion networks that supported Cruz was positively and
significantly associated with participants voting for Trump. The addition of proportion of
political discussion networks supporting Trump or Cruz to a model that contained only
the intercept significantly improved the fit between model and data, X2 (df = 4) = 40.888,
Nagelkerke R2 = .489, p < .001.
Switching the excluded category of participant vote choice supported that finding.
With voting for Cruz as the excluded category, the portion of participants’ political
discussion networks that supported Trump was positively associated with participants
voting for Trump and the proportion of political discussion networks that supported Cruz
was negatively associated with participants voting for Trump. However, neither result
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was statistically significant. On the other hand, both the portion of participants’ political
discussion networks that supported Trump and proportion of participants’ political
discussion networks that supported Cruz were negatively and significantly associated
with voting for one of the “other” candidates as opposed to voting for Cruz. The results
were similar with voting for Trump as the excluded category. The findings are
summarized in Table 5.1.
DV

IV
Intercept

Participant
Proportion of network
voting for
supporting Trump
“other”
Proportion of network
supporting Cruz
Intercept
Participant
Proportion of network
voting for
supporting Trump
Trump
Proportion of network
supporting Cruz
Intercept
Participant
Proportion of network
voting for
supporting Trump
Cruz
Proportion of network
supporting Cruz

“Other”
excluded
-3.761
(1.157)*
6.757
(1.665)*
5.009
(1.814)*
-3.344
(1.077)*
4.939
(1.608)*
5.559
(1.721)*

Trump
excluded

Cruz excluded

-6.757
(1.665)*
-5.009
(1.814)*

3.344
(1.077)*
-4.939
(1.608)*
-5.559
(1.721)*

-

-.417 (1.260)

-

1.818 (1.485)

-

-.551 (1.605)

.417 (1.260)

-

-1.818 (1.485)

-

.551 (1.605)

-

3.761 (1.157)*

Model summary: X2 (df = 4) = 40.888, Nagelkerke R2 = .489, p < .001
Table 5.1: Summary of multinomial logistic regressions. Standard errors
are in parentheses. *Significant at the .05 level. None of the other results
were significant at the .10 level.
These results appear perplexing; why would knowing that many of the people
with whom you talk about politics support Donald Trump be associated with voting for
Ted Cruz and vice versa? The most likely explanation is that having a large portion of a
participant’s political discussion network supporting either of those two candidates
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triggered strategic voting. During the final weeks before the February 1 caucus, it was
widely known that Trump and Cruz were the leading candidates2. If, for example, most of
the people with whom a participant discussed politics supported Donald Trump, that
would naturally provide the participant with a reason to also support Trump. If, however,
the participant was opposed to Trump and had evidence of his popular support in the
form of personally knowing Trump supporters, then the participant would vote for the
person most likely to defeat Trump. In that situation a vote for a third candidate would
not serve the purpose of stopping Trump. The same logic would apply if many of a
participant’s political discussion partners supported Ted Cruz. On the other hand, if a
participant’s political discussion network provided countervailing evidence in the form of
discussion partners supporting neither Trump nor Cruz, they would be under less pressure
to strategically vote for whichever of those two candidates the participant opposed less.
So, depending on the nature of their political discussion networks, participants either
found themselves in a world with a Trump-Cruz dichotomy where a vote for one could be
seen as a vote against the other, or a world in which such strategic voting was not
necessary.
Increased Candidate Support Homophily over Time
Having found that having supporters of a particular candidate within a
participant’s political discussion networks just before the caucus is positively associated
with the participant voting for that candidate in the caucus, I next address change in
agreement within political discussion networks over time. To test the hypothesis that

2

For example the final DM Register/Bloomberg poll of likely caucus voters, released a few days before the
caucus, had Trump in front with 28% followed by Cruz with 23%.
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there will be greater agreement on candidate support within a political discussion network
later in the campaign than earlier in the campaign, the level of agreement between
members of participants’ political discussion networks on presidential nomination
preference was measured in each of the four rounds of interviews conducted over the
eight months prior to the February 1, 2016 caucus. For this test, political discussion
partners who were Democrats3 or who were ineligible to vote (for example, underage
children or noncitizens) were excluded from the analysis. Discussion partners for whom
the participant did not know which candidate they supported were included. While that
inclusion increased the number of cases included in the analysis by including those
participants who did not know the preferences of any discussion partners, it lowered
mean agreement scores. Due to missing data in the second and third rounds, direct
comparisons were only possible for 48 participants.
As seen in Figure 5.3, mean agreement within political discussion groups was low
in the first two rounds with a mean of 15.27% in round 1 (conducted in the summer of
2015) and 12.17% in round 2 (October). Mean within-political discussion network
agreement increased to 20.96% in round 3 (December 2015-early January 2015) and
increased again in round 4 (late January) to 35.40%. The within political discussion
network agreement in the post-caucus interviews (36.08%) was virtually identical with
those of round four, indicating that there was not a last-minute convergence just before
voting.

3

There was no difference in candidate vote (divided into votes for Trump, Cruz, or other) between those
who havd Democrats in their political discussion networks and those who did not.

106

Figure 5.3: Mean within-political discussion networks agreement on
presidential nomination preference, including discussion partners for
whom participants did not know who they supported
The data was not normally distributed in the first three rounds, necessitating the
use of a Friedman test to compare the difference in mean agreement on presidential
nomination preference within political discussion networks between rounds. There was a
significant difference for increase of mean agreement across rounds (X2 (4) = 54.302,
p<.001), supporting hypothesis H3. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests indicated that there was
no significant change in mean within network agreement between the first and second
rounds (Z = -.639, p=.523). However there were significant increases in agreement
between rounds two and three (Z = -2.663, P=.008) and between rounds three and four (Z
= -.3.614, p<.001). There was not a significant change in the last few days covered by the
time between rounds four and five (Z = -.421, p=.674).
Although there was not a significant increase in agreement on candidate support
between participants and their political discussion partners between rounds four and five,
having a larger share of a participant’s political discussion network in agreement was
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associated with maintaining support for that candidate. Of the 72 participants who
provided information on their political discussion networks in round four, 61 voted for
the candidate they supported in round four while 11 voted for a different candidate. There
was a significant difference in mean agreement between participants and members of
their political discussion networks between those who voted for a different candidate than
the one they supported in round four (M=.0818, SD=.145) and those who voted for the
same candidate (M=.3552, SD=.264); t(70)=3.33, p=.001. Knowing that many people
around them support that same candidate appeared to reinforce participants’ conviction to
continue supporting that candidate.
Political Discussion Networks and Campaign Effects
So far, this study has found limited support for a relationship between campaign
effects on vote choice and moderate-to-strong evidence of a relationship between the
support of members of a political discussion network and participant support of the same
candidate. This section will investigate the possibility of an interaction between campaign
effects and political discussion network effects. That expectation is based on the role
political discussion partners play in helping interpret information from outside sources
such as campaigns.
As was done for earlier tests, the participants were divided into groups of those
who voted for Ted Cruz and those who did not for one set of binary analysis and divided
into groups of those who voted for Donald Trump and those who did not for another set
of binary analysis. A binary logistic analysis was conducted to predict voting for Ted
Cruz among the study participants using the number of contacts from the Cruz campaign,
the presence or absence of a plurality of participants’ political discussion networks
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supporting Cruz, and an interaction of those two variables. A test of the full model
against a constant only model was statistically significant, indicating that the model
reliably distinguished between participants who voted for Cruz and those who voted for
other candidates, X2 (3) = 11.738, p = .008, Nagelkerke’s R2 = .192. The correct
prediction rate of the model was 75.0% compared to a prediction rate of 68.8% for the
constant-only model. Having a plurality of political discussion partners support Cruz
made a significant contribution to the prediction (p = .008) with having a plurality of
political discussion partners supporting Cruz making participants 7.3 times more likely to
vote for Cruz when contacts from the Cruz campaign are held constant. However, neither
contacts from the Cruz campaign (p = .220) nor the interaction of those variables (p
= .965) was significant.
Examining voting patterns for Donald Trump among study participants told a
similar story. A binary logistic analysis predicting voting for Trump used the number of
contacts from the Trump campaign, the presence or absence of a plurality of participants’
political discussion networks supporting Trump and an interaction of those two variables.
A test of the full model against a constant only model was statistically significant,
indicating that the model reliably distinguished between participants who voted for
Trump and those who voted for other candidates, X2 (3) = 30.906, p < .001, Nagelkerke’s
R2 = .433. The correct prediction rate of the model was 80.0% compared to a prediction
rate of 60.0% for the constant-only model. Neither total contacts form the Trump
campaign nor the interaction between contacts from the Trump campaign and having a
plurality of political discussion partners supporting Trump where significant predictors.
Having a plurality of political discussion partners support Trump made a significant
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contribution to prediction (p < .001) with having a plurality of political discussion
partners supporting Trump making participants 13.4 times more likely to vote for Trump
when contacts from the Trump campaign are held constant.
Discussion
A nomination contest is a much more wide-open affair than a general election,
with partisan identification (usually the strongest predictor of vote choice) not being a
consideration. This leaves voters with a need to find other means of evaluating
candidates. In chapter four, there was evidence supporting the contention that campaign
effects, in the form of person-to-person contacts from campaign representatives,
influenced vote choice. However, seeing candidates in person and having ideological
similarity with candidates did not affect vote choice.
In this chapter it was discovered that the strongest predictor of vote choice found
in this study was having people with whom participants discuss politics supporting a
particular candidate. Having as little as a third of those in a participant’s political
discussion network supporting a particular candidate was associated with the participant
voting for that candidate. Of course, participants were also members of their own
political discussion networks, leaving open the possibility that they were influencing
those in their networks as much as they were being influenced by them. However, the
evidence did indicate that disagreeing with a large portion of their discussion networks
did weaken their resolve to vote for that candidate and that knowing that many people
they discussed politics with supported the same candidate reinforced participants’ prior
stated conviction to vote for that candidate. Whether through conversion or
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reinforcement, there was an increase in homophily in candidate support, with withingroup agreement on candidates more than doubling during the course of the study.
Although there was some evidence of campaign effects in chapter four, they
generally did not make a significant contribution to vote choice when combined in a
model with political discussion network support, either in a main-effects only model or
with an interaction of those variables. Including campaign contacts to a model with
political discussion network support, and with participants as the unit of analysis, did not
improve the model. There was some evidence to support that the mean number of periods
that participants reported being contacted by campaigns had an effect independent of the
mean proportion of political discussion network support for that candidate, but the effect
was absent in a model that included an interaction of the two variables. The evidence
suggests that, although campaigns can influence voters, those voters will listen to their
friends and family first.
An interesting additional finding is that the size of participants’ political
discussion networks did not expand in a linear fashion as the presidential caucus
approached. Rather, there was a dip in network size from the summer to the fall of 2015.
Network size only partially recovered in the last months of 2015 and did not increase
significantly until the last several weeks before the presidential caucus of February 1,
2016. As least part of the reason for the observed dip was a slowdown in the number of
local social events from the summer to the fall. This fits with Walsh’s (2004) observation
that political discussion is nested within broader social interactions; if you have fewer
opportunities to talk with people, you have fewer opportunities to talk politics with
people.
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An additional interesting, and unexpected, finding was that having a portion of
participants’ political discussion networks supporting Donald Trump was associated with
a greater likelihood to vote for Trump and a greater likelihood to vote for Ted Cruz, as
opposed to voting for one of the other candidates. The reverse was also true: having a
portion of participants’ political discussion networks supporting Cruz was associated with
a greater likelihood to vote for both Cruz and Trump. The most likely explanation is that
having evidence of support for either of those leading candidates provided both a reason
to vote for one of them and a reason to cast a strategic vote for the other.
These findings indicate that those with whom we discuss politics can have a
strong influence on how we view candidates and, ultimately, which candidates get our
votes. However, the relationship between the influence of political discussion and vote
choice is more complex than a simple matter of voting with the group.
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CHAPTER 6: SOCIAL CONTEXTS AND THE POLITICAL ACTIVISM OF
LOCAL POLITICAL ELITES
Participant:

“I believe in the political system.”

Interviewer: “What do you mean by that: that you believe in the political
system?”
Participant:

“Well, you’ve got to participate. Otherwise you have no influence
on whatever the decisions are made. I am active politically... I’ve
also been very active in many community organizations.”

How do those who are the most politically active in their communities express
that activism? How are the ways they express that activism related to their political
ideology and the number of people with whom they discuss politics? Are there
meaningful differences between local elected officials and party activists on ideology and
belief in the efficacy of political talk? The purpose of this chapter is to try to answer those
questions and gain some insight into how the social contexts of local political elites shape
local politics.
Social Contexts
The people we encounter on a regular basis are a major influence on vote choice.
The citizens most likely to change their minds on vote choice are those who face “crosspressure” from those in their immediate social circles (Berelson et al., 1954; Sinclair,
2012). Although citizens assess candidates based on past performance (Fiorina, 1981;
Conover et al., 1986), they often choose to disregard much of the information about
candidates that is available to them, instead substituting the observations of others they
know (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998).
Social contexts are groups where social interaction can, but not necessarily must,
occur. They have social and political properties that have the potential to influence those
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within them (McClurg, 2010). Groups which send unambiguous messages to their
members in the form of relative homogeneity of views aid those members in connecting
political preference to vote choice, even in the absence of overt political expressions
(Sokhey and McClurg, 2012).
The central questions for this chapter concern the relationship of the social
contexts of local political elites with the extent of their political discussion networks and
their expressed ideology. For this study, I will use McClurg’s definition of social contexts
as “specific and identifiable social spaces from which citizens can receive politicallyrelevant information” (2010, p 9). It is important to note that a social context does not
imply direct, or even indirect, communication between all its members. Members of the
same civic organization share a social context; they may only be vaguely aware of each
other, if at all, but share that social space. Although each of the three categories of local
political elites are defined by their positions in government or the Republican Party, it is
not just their positions that are related to their behavior and ideology. Occupying different
positions puts individuals in regular contact with different people, potentially putting
differing constraints on political talk. So it is the social contexts of those positions, rather
than the positions themselves, that are of interest.
The “specific and identifiable social space” from which local political elites can
receive politically-relevant information is most easily identifiable for the core central
committee members: the monthly committee meetings and personal conversations
between committee members related to committee work. However, based on observations
of every central committee meeting between June 2015 and the February 2016 caucus, I
found that relatively little direct political discussion takes place at those meetings other
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than when representatives of presidential campaigns make their pitches to committee
members (as happened in most of those meetings). Much more time was spent on
administrative matters such as organizing meeting sites and temporary leaders for the
caucus and preparing for a fund raising event later in the spring. The one exception came
at the January meeting in which several members of the central committee identified their
preferred candidate, with most expressing a preference for either Senator Ted Cruz (the
eventual Iowa Caucus winner) or Donald Trump (the eventual winner in Fremont County
and eventual Republican Party nominee). However, those meetings do provide a venue
for side conversations on politics and supply members with a ready pool of potential
conversation partners with an obvious interest in Republican Party politics.
For public officials, their most obvious context is related to their prominence as
elected officials and the need to at least occasionally talk politics in relations to their own
electoral campaigns. Although that social space does exist it is restrained, given the small
size of Fremont County, by a reluctance of officials to talk politics while conducting their
official duties and the fact that many of their electoral campaigns have been uncontested.
The peripheral committee members may appear to lack any social context
whatsoever related to local politics. However, they were asked to be committee members
because of their status as political leaders in the community in general, and often their
leadership during past Republican caucuses in particular. What sets them apart from the
core members is that they generally did not attend any central committee meetings, or
attended just one meeting during the seven months of observed meetings, even though
they were officially members. That most of them were eventually asked to serve as
caucus leaders again in 2016 and accepted is evidence of a contextual relationship
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between the core leadership of the party and those peripheral central committee members,
with core members trusting peripheral members to reliably conduct party business at the
caucuses despite their lack of participation in regular party business.
The Political Discussion Networks of Local Political Activists
People are more likely to engage in political talk with those with whom they agree
(Wyatt et al., 2000), so the comfort level that local political activists will have with
talking about politics varies with the real or perceived level of agreement with the people
they meet on a common basis. For elected officials, the likelihood that they will meet
those with whom they disagree on politics during the course of doing the jobs for which
they were elected is higher than that of party activists. Even in an area as heavily
Republican as Fremont County, public officials will encounter and be asked to serve the
needs of people with politically divergent views, increasing the chance of encountering
disagreement if politics are discussed. Disagreement in political discussion networks, and
the resulting “cross pressures” that individuals face, has long been found to be associated
with political indecision and demobilization (Berelson et al., 1954; Mutz, 2002b;
however see McClurg, 2006). That possibility will likely decrease the importance that
elected officials place on, and their willingness to engage in, political talk. That
expectation leads to the first two hypotheses:
H1

Core central committee members are more likely to engage in political
talk with more people than elected officials.

H2

Peripheral central committee members are more likely to engage in
political talk with more people than elected officials.

The idea that elected officials would avoid talking about politics with people
seems nonsensical, and would be in the context of their own election campaigns.
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However, the study period was about midway between local elections, meaning that the
political talk in which they would most likely engage would be on topics other than their
own elections.
People who engage in local institutional political activities tend to have a higher
degree of political efficacy than those who do not (McLeod et al., 1999). That higher
degree of efficacy may express itself, among other ways, as a greater willingness to
engage in political talk. Additionally, the number of people with whom someone talks
about politics is dependent on having a "supply of appropriate discussants in the
surrounding social environment" (Bennett and Bennett, 1986, p. 434). Although I directly
observed little in the way of direct talk about issues and politicians at meetings of the
Fremont County Republican Party central committee, active participants in those
meetings had ready access to similarly-minded potential discussants. Considering the
greater engagement that core members have with the party institution (in fact, they are
the local party institution) and the potential for core members to have a greater supply of
potential discussants, I expect that they would engage in political talk with more people:
H3

Core central committee members are more likely to engage in political
talk with more people than peripheral central committee members.

The Ideology of Local Political Activists
The political culture of a community is mediated by groups within that
community (Putnam, 1966). The basic political conservatism that one would expect to
find among rural Republicans in the Midwest will be expressed differently by members
of different Republican groups. There is also the issue of relative mobilization among
activists within the party. The party organization mobilizes for elections and, in turn,
mobilizes political activists, tying those activists with the broader community (Huckfeldt
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and Sprague, 1992). The social influences among local political activists have as strong
an influence on local politics as the formal governing structure and understanding the
“locus of power” in local politics requires “not only an exploration of the formal,
institutional, front regions of local governance, but also of the informal, amorphous, and
restricted back regions of individual interaction” (Woods, 1998, p. 2116). So the nature
of the social influences within different local political institutions will differ with the
kinds of individuals within those institutions.
Being exposed to politically heterogeneous views tends to moderate political
views and preferences (Sinclair, 2012). Based on that finding there are several
expectations regarding the relative ideological extremism of local political elites, First,
elected Republican officials (elected officials), who regularly deal with local people of all
political persuasions and with state government officials, will likely be more moderate
than party activists. In fact, Broockman et al. (2017) found that local party officials tend
to prefer ideologically extreme candidates for public office and often do not see any
trade-off between ideological loyalty and electability because they tend to be
ideologically extreme themselves.
Second, among party activists, those who are active in the Fremont County
Republican Party central committee and regularly meet with other Republicans on party
business (core central committee members), and thus are exposed to individuals with a
wider range of ideology, will likely be more moderate than party activists who are not
regular participants in party business between elections (peripheral central committee
members). That fits with the findings of Broockman et al. (2017), who surmised that,
despite party leaders’ embrace of relatively extreme candidates “it may well be the case
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that the formal leaders of local parties are less enthusiastic about extremists than other
local party activists” (p. 30).
Those expectations yield two hypotheses:
H4

Core central committee members are more likely to express stronger
conservatism than elected officials.

H5

Peripheral central committee members are more likely to express stronger
conservatism than core central committee members.

By implication from those two hypotheses, peripheral central committee members
will express stronger conservatism than will elected officials
These hypotheses do not speak to causation: Does exposure to more
heterogeneous views lead to moderation or is it more likely that relative moderates will
seek positions that expose them to heterogeneous views?
Methods Unique to This Chapter
The research presented in this chapter is the result of an emergent research design
embedded in the larger case study of likely caucus voters in Fremont County detailed in
Chapter Two. Such embedded designs are an effective way to address secondary
questions (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011).
For the purpose of this research, “local political elites” are the equivalent of
Dahl’s “political stratum”, which he characterized as “a small stratum of individuals…
much more highly involved in political thought, discussion, and action than the rest of the
population" (Dahl, 1961, p. 90). Twenty local political elites, defined as either local
elected officials or official members of the Fremont County Republican Party central
committee, were interviewed over the summer of 2015. Those twenty can be further
divided into three groups: eight core Republican central committee members (members
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who attended at least three of the monthly central committee meetings between June and
September of 2015), six peripheral central committee members (those who are committee
members by virtue of being elected caucus officials, but who did not attend central
committee meetings), and six elected officials. The participants in this research represent
all of the core central committee members, a majority of the peripheral central committee
members and a majority of the county-wide elected officials plus one district schoolboard member and one town council member. Although there are undoubtedly others in
Fremont County who would qualify as being highly involved in local political thought,
discussion, and action than the rest of the population, the people included in this analysis
constitute those who were recruited or have sought to serve in either local party or
government leadership (even if only temporarily in the case of central committee
peripheral members). Understanding these local elites has intrinsic value for the larger
case study and can inform research on the motivations of local political elites and their
potential impact on the political process.
Eighteen of the twenty initial interviews with local political elites were recorded,
transcribed, and coded. The other two interviews were not recorded at the request of the
participants, but extensive notes were taken of the interviews and answers to open-ended
questions assigned codes. The coded answers were then analyzed and grouped by
category and further analyzed to develop the themes that helped explain the numeric
findings of this chapter.
The quantitative findings of the research primarily came from several closedended questions asked during the interviews, including self-reported ideology, issue
positions and political discussion network size. Although the small size of this subset of
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participants does not lend itself to statistical analysis, the data are triangulated from the
themes developed from the transcripts and my notes from the interviews. Triangulation
helps establish greater validity of findings by providing corroborating information
(Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011). A further check on validity is derived from the several
months spent with members of the community in their homes and local businesses,
having discussions over meals and after church services, and attending local political
events. This time in the field helped develop a better understanding of the phenomenon
under study (Creswell, 2009). All participants are represented by codes designating their
social context in this study: CC1-8 for core central committee members, CP1-6 for
peripheral central committee members, and EO1-6 for elected officials.
My background aided in gaining access and trust among some of the early
participants in the snowball sampling phase of the research. Specifically, I let it be known
among those I met in the community that I was also a Republican and had worked as the
Iowa coordinator for a minor presidential candidate (Alan Keyes) in 1996. The generally
warm reception I received in the community and the common ground for political
discussion I shared with most participants created the potential for bias in favor of the
research participants. To paraphrase P. J O’Rourke (1993), even a person with the soul of
a political scientist has to like something sometime, and I like Fremont County, Iowa.
Evidence from Fremont County
The findings presented here are only based on the egocentric political discussion
networks of the 20 local political elites studied for this report; the number of partners in
local elites’ political discussion networks were limited to those reported by the elite
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participants. Complete network data in the form of connections reported with elites by
other participants were not included.
Political Discussion and Views on the Efficacy of Political Talk
One core theme that emerged from this part of the research is that central
committee core members expressed a greater enjoyment of, and greater belief in the
efficacy of, political discussion than did elected officials, with central committee
peripheral members not expressing much opinion on the matter. As part of my research, I
collected data on the members of participants’ political discussion networks.
As seen in Table 6.1, the findings did not support all of the hypotheses on political
discussion network size. Analysis of the size of local political elites’ political discussion
networks during the first round of interviews in the summer of 2015 found that central
committee core members had the largest average size of political discussion networks
(5.625), supporting hypotheses H1 and H3. However, elected officials had a larger average
size of political discussion networks (4.5) than did central committee peripheral members
(3.833), disconfirming hypothesis H2. It would appear that the central committee
peripheral members expressed little opinion on political discussion in the summer of
2015 (see below) because they did relatively little of it.
Central Committee Core Members

5.625

Central Committee Peripheral Members

3.833

Elected Officials

4.5

Table 6.1: Mean political discussion network size for local political elites
in the summer of 2015

122
There are also longitudinal data available from several rounds of panel interviews.
Not all participants were interviewed in every round (except for the first and fifth
rounds). Changes in average political discussion network size were not linear for any of
the three groups. While the campaigns were ramping up their efforts in Iowa during the
fall of 2015, flooding in the spring caused a late harvest. As a result, several participants
(who work in agriculture) saw the time they had available for social activities severely
cut, which provided them fewer opportunities to discuss politics. It also reduced the
number of available political discussion partners available for those participants who do
not work directly in agriculture. For that reason, a comparison of the first and final
interview rounds is the most feasible.
As would be expected, political discussion networks grew for all three groups of
political elites (see Figure 6.1). The political discussion networks of core central
committee members grew from 5.625 to 7.25. Those of elected officials grew from 4.5 to
5.5. At the same time, the political discussion networks of peripheral central committee
members grew to the point where it was slightly larger than the average for elected
officials, growing from 3.833 to 5.666. The parity in the size of political discussion
networks between elected officials and peripheral central committee members is mainly
due to the smaller growth in the networks of elected officials, suggesting that the
resistance many of them expressed towards talking about politics may have moderated
the generally tendency towards larger political discussion network sizes as the caucus
approached. For comparison, the size of political discussion networks for all participants
was 5.32 in the first round 6.25 and in the final rounds.
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Figure 6.1: Change in political discussion network size of local political
elites over time.
Despite having achieved their position through electoral politics, most elected
officials did not express enthusiasm for talking politics in the community beyond their
own campaigns. Part of the constraint on their political discussion is based on their
attempts to keep politics out of their official duties. When ask about discussing politics,
EO1, noting that she worked at the county courthouse, said, “working where I work, it
would not be wise [to discuss politics]”. Other elected officials also expressed reluctance
to talk politics among their fellow Republicans or become more active in local politics
despite having achieved their positions through elections:
EO2: There seems to be a consensus around here, so there is not really a need [to
discuss politics among Republicans].
EO4: I guess politics, to me, is more looking at the laws, how laws are constructed, who
makes the laws and things such as that, than it is the social side of it. That is the
part that I really enjoy, the legal side of it.
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EO5: I don’t vote for the party; that’s why I’m not involved in local county politics,
because they are a bunch of raving maniacs sometimes, on both sides, the
political activists… I don’t get involved in county politics, so I’m not on the
Republican central committee for the county or anything like that.
EO6: Running for office made me more careful, more tactful in what I said (about
politics).
EO3 was an exception to the general view expressed by elected officials; for that
participant, running for public office preceded becoming politically active: “I got more
active after I was elected, or ran.” However, that participant had one of the smallest
reported political discussion networks among all local elite participants, so that reported
increase in activity was apparently from a very low baseline.
However, elected officials do not avoid politics beyond their own campaigns
entirely. I observed several elected officials attending events like a Scott Walker meetand-greet at Penn Drug in Sidney and a town hall meeting with Senator Chuck Grassley
in Tabor over the summer of 2015.
Although only one of the elected officials who spoke directly about political
discussion expressed enthusiasm for it, all of the core committee members who directly
talked about political discussion did so. They expressed a belief in the efficacy of “wordof-mouth” (CC2) and the importance of political candidates to “shake a few hands and
talk to folks” (CC1). Most core and peripheral committee members are retired and those
who are not run their own, non-retail, businesses, which minimalizes constraints on
political discussion in their daily lives. For CC6, running her own business has created an
opportunity to have more, rather than less, political discussion:
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CC6: There are an awful lot of folks who like to talk about politics (when they visit the
participant’s business)…. And people (that the participant knows in other states)
know that we are involved because we are in Iowa and because we have been
associated with the party so much. I mean, we put signs on our cars (laughs).
That invites conversation.
Several core central committee members and elected officials expressed
enjoyment of politics. For elected officials, that enjoyment was limited by the previously
noted constraint of their public offices and a wish to avoid unnecessarily alienating
potential supporters. EO1 was “always interested in politics” and found that “political
campaigns are just the most interesting thing I’ve ever done”. EO4 has become “very
active in the political field; it’s enjoyable”. CC5 likes to “get involved” and enjoys
“listening to politics” while CC2 found that “once I had that experience of being involved
[in politics], I loved it”.
That enjoyment of politics translated into greater involvement in the Republican
Party for some central committee core members. CC6 found that the opportunity to meet
candidates from all over the nation through Republican Party events “just makes it more
interesting”. CC2’s interest in politics drove her activism within the party:
CC2: I made a decision that I wanted to stay and be somewhat involved, and my party
choice is the Republican Party, involved in the activities just so I could stay
somewhat informed. Not just totally about the activity part, but I do enjoy that
part, too.
For CC6, candidates, no matter how good their ideas are, need the support and
structure to succeed and “I think either of the parties provide that”. One of the common
discussions I encountered in central committee meetings was how they could support
Republican candidates in the 2016 elections. They sought to raise the party’s profile and

126
support candidates through participation in community events, organizing a county-wide
fundraiser, and recruiting candidates to run for office.
The interviews did not include specific questions about enjoyment of politics or
belief in the efficacy of political talk; those participants who did mention those topics did
so in the context of other questions. None of the peripheral central committee members
volunteered views on either topic.
Conservative Ideology and Strategic Voting.
The other core theme of this chapter is that peripheral central committee members
expressed strong across-the-board conservatism while elected officials expressed more
moderation and core central committee members fell between the other two groups. As
part of my research, I asked participants for their self-rated ideology on a seven-point
Likert scale from 1 for very liberal to 7 for very conservative.
I also asked participants to rate their views on 14 political issues on a scale from 0
to 100 with 100 representing the most conservative position on about half of the
questions and 0 representing the most conservative position on the other half. The latter
set of answers were reverse coded so that 100 represented the most conservative position
on all questions. An issue-conservatism scale was formed by calculating the mean scores
for each participant across all 14 issues. The issues asked about ranged widely, from
fiscal issues (e.g. taxes and federal spending) to hot-button issues like abortion, same-sex
marriage, and immigration. A social conservatism scale was created using a subset of
social issues (abortion, same-sex marriage, a path to citizenship for illegal immigration,
gun control, and school prayer).
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Group

Selfplacement

Issue
scores

Social issue
scores

Central Committee Peripheral Members

6.50

80.05

84.00

Central Committee Core Members

6.43

75.69

75.81

Elected Officials

5.67

64.48

59.86

Table 6.2: Measures of political conservatism of local political elites. Selfplacement is on a 1-7 scale, with 7 being extremely conservative. Issues
scores on a 0-100 scale with 100 being the most conservative position.
The numbers expressed are averages among several issues.
The findings are presented in Table 6.2. The mean self-rated ideology score for
elected officials was 5.67, well on the conservative side but considerably more moderate
than the other local elites. The mean self-rated ideology of peripheral central committee
members (6.5) was only slightly more conservative than the mean self-rated ideology of
the core central committee members (6.43). The differing levels of conservatism among
local elites was clearer. Central committee peripheral members had a conservatism score
of 80.05 compared to a score of 75.69 for central committee core members. Elected
officials were again the most moderate with a mean conservatism score of 64.48. The
difference in conservatism scores is more pronounced when only considering social
issues. The social issue conservatism scores were 84.00 for central committee peripheral
members, 75.81 for central committee core members, and 59.86 for elected officials.
Although the size of the differences between the three groups of local political elites on
conservatism varied depending on how ideology was measured, all were in the same
direction and supported both hypotheses H4 and H5.
Although all the elites interviewed were on the conservative side of the political
spectrum, and self-rated themselves as such, there were differing degrees to which they
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embraced it in their interviews, with peripheral central committee members expressing
the strongest enthusiasm for conservatism, elected officials more likely to express
moderation, and core central committee members falling in between.
Most members of all three groups identified strongly with conservatism. For CC7,
conservatism “is the makeup of me as a person” while CP1 describes himself as a “right
wing fanatic.” EO1 sees it as “my lifestyle”, adding “I agree with what they
(conservatives) agree with… and with liberals not at all”. That element of opposition to
liberalism as part of one’s conservative identity was evident in the views expressed by
other local elites, saying that they are “pretty much the opposite of liberal” (CC4) and
that they “fit more on the conservative scale” (EO4). In perhaps the most entertaining
interview conducted during this research, CC3 strongly expressed that oppositional
disposition when asked why he considered himself a conservative:
CC3: Because I disagree with everything. I disagree with everything the government
does. Everything! Everything since Theodore Roosevelt.
However, there were also expressions in support of moderation among elected
officials and core central committee members. For EO2, social conservatism is a
distraction from more important issues: “it is an easy thing to get on the radio and say
‘I’m against abortion and gay marriage’ but at the end of the day what does that do for the
country”? While CC6 expressed some common cause with libertarians’ ideas on freedom,
she believed that “they take it to the point where that it wouldn’t be controlled in a
government like ours”. Some participants who did not consider themselves on the
extreme right did so, not because of their issue positions, but because they believed in
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finding common ground or governing from the middle, both for themselves and
candidates for the presidency:
EO5: I want a presidential candidate I’m convince will govern from the middle: a
moderate candidate who is willing to compromise with Congress on whatever
Congress has decreed.
EO6: I’m not on the far right. I think you get into some… For instance, with different
leadership positions you have to consider both sides; there are points to both
sides of an issue. I’m a moderate. There’s always two sides to a story and both
sides have merit.
CC5: They need to be able to listen. I mean, not only have their views (but how they)
come across with their views. I would like to have a candidate that would listen to
everybody. Say if somebody is getting out of hand, just stop them a little bit; calm
them down a little bit… They have to deal with so many individuals. It is not just
me. It is not just your views. It’s everybody’s views. They have got to be able to
hash out everybody’s views to do what is right for everybody in the United States.
It is not clear if the preference for moderation on the part of elected officials and,
to a somewhat lesser degree, core central committee members, is based on selection (with
relative moderates gravitating towards community or party leadership) or if the demands
of their positions influence them towards more moderation.
A similar pattern emerges when looking at individual issues. Members of all three
groups expressed broad support for conservative positions on fiscal, economic, and
foreign policy issues, but elected officials generally took a more moderate stance on
social issues. There was near unanimity on expressed support for increasing defense
spending, reforming welfare programs, shrinking the size of the federal government, and
gun rights. On abortion and immigration, the elected officials generally expressed less
conservative positions than either the core central committee members or the peripheral
committee members. As would be expected, there was some disconfirming evidence as
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well, such as EO1 considering a pledge to secure the border to be a litmus test for
presidential candidates and CC6 stating that gay marriage and abortion are “social issues
and not the government’s business”.
Those differences on issues are reflected at least somewhat in the first answer they
gave to the question “are there any issues that a candidate must agree with you on before
you would vote for him or her?” Of the five elected officials who said that they had such
a litmus test, two answered that candidates must agree with them on social issues, but not
in the way that one would expect. One of them said that candidates must be in favor of
same-sex marriage or at least not be in favor of any federal action prohibiting it (this was
soon after the Supreme Court legalized same sex marriage throughout the United States
with the Obergefell v. Hodges decision). Another elected official said that the closest
thing to a litmus test was that he would not vote for someone who “mixes religion and
politics”. Other issues mentioned were immigration (“securing the borders”), maintaining
a strong defense, and fiscal conservatism.
The core central committee members expressed a more traditional set of litmus
test issues, including getting more confrontational with Iran, opposing Common Core,
getting rid of Obamacare, enforcing immigration laws, and opposition to abortion. Only
two of the central committee peripheral members said that they had a litmus test issue
and for both is was opposition to legal abortion.
There was also some variation on views towards strategic voting. Each participant
was asked “How important is it that a candidate has a strong chance to win the general
election in November?” The views expressed toward electability (the perceived ability of
a candidate to win in the general election) when deciding which candidate to support

131
were about evenly divided between those who thought it was important and those who
thought it was not. However, there was a divide among local elites on electability, with
most central committee core members placing greater emphasis on electability, most
central committee peripheral members discounting it, and elected officials being evenly
divided.
Most central committee core members were emphatic on the importance of
electability (the perceived ability of a candidate to eventually win the in the general
election) to the point of supporting a candidate based on that rather than the person’s
preferred candidate:
CC1: I’m going to be very candid with you, Andy. It is critically important that that
person have the potential to win in the general election. So that brings you back
to, is there going to have to be a consensus? I think there is going to have to be.
(In the) primaries, it is going to have to be someone who leans to the right. But
isn’t that politics? I wish is wasn’t that way. I wish the person could run in the
general election the same as he ran in the primary.
CC6: That’s really important. It’s like they’re all nice and they’re all conservative.
Which one can win?
Other central committee peripheral members expressed similar views, although
there was some disconfirming evidence, with one central committee peripheral member
emphasizing electability and one core member discounting its importance. However that
core central committee member’s discounting of the importance of electability seems to
be based on his belief that any Republican nominee could win against the likely
Democratic standard bearer:
CC3: Anybody could beat Hillary; I could beat Hillary!
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On the other hand, although there was disagreement on electability, most elites
said that they do not consider viability (the perceived ability of a candidate to eventually
win the Republican nomination) important when choosing which candidate to support in
the presidential caucus. The views of many participants on viability are similar to those
expressed by one of the elected officials:
EO3: I’d (vote for) the best person. Even if they don’t stand a chance, if I believe they
are the best person, I’m still going to support that person.
Discussion
Candidates running for office seek the endorsements and active support of local
political elites. In the context of nomination contests, successful campaigns do not seize
the party machinery for their service. Rather, by securing the support of local political
elites, they take advantage of the social interactions that account for the “persistence of
distinctive partisan community traditions” (Putnam 1966).
However, local political elites vary in their ideological fervor and their means of
disseminating information through their personal political discussion networks. The
findings of this research suggest that core members of party central committees occupy a
middle position among local elites ideologically and possess the greatest means among
local elites of sharing their views. The findings further suggest that it is the social
dynamics among local elites (including party leaders), rather than the party organization
itself, that drives retail politics in local communities.
The usual caveat about generalizing from a single case applies here but these
findings have generated several testable theories about local political elites. Future
research should be conducted in larger and more diverse communities to see how having
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multiple centers of party activism changes participant views towards political
communication within parties. This study does not systematically address causality in the
relationship between social contexts of local political elites and their views on ideology
and political talk. For example, does relative moderation and a belief in the efficacy of
political talk cause central committee members to become more active in the workings of
the party, or do core central committee members develop a greater appreciation for
moderation and political talk based on their experience in the party organization?
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
The research conducted in this dissertation sought to test theories regarding the
impact of political discussion networks, campaign effects, and political ideology on vote
choice. The central thesis of this study is that the process of deciding for whom to vote is,
if not completely a social act, one that is heavily influenced by those with whom we
socialize on a regular basis. Broadly, this study sought to illuminate the process by which
social interaction in the form of political discussion influenced vote choice. More
narrowly, the goal of this work is to fill a gap in the literature on the Iowa presidential
caucus, an understudied but important part of presidential elections.
At the beginning of the research process, my main focus was on finding how
political discussion moderated campaign effects and ideological vote share. Although
both of the latter concepts are well-supported in the literature, in this study support for
campaign effects was relatively weak and support for ideological vote share (and its
inverse, ideological crowding) was nonexistent. However, as will be seen in the next
section, there were several interesting findings on the impact of contacts from candidate
campaigns on voting, voter perceptions of candidate ideology, and the differing ideology
and size of political discussion networks of local political elites. In addition, the findings
regarding the influence of political discussion on voting behavior were robust, providing
empirical support for theories of social influences on voting, especially in the context of
nomination contests.
Overview of Research Methods and Results
Because the empirical foundation of this dissertation is based on a unique dataset
created through a case study, an explanation of the process and methods used is required
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and, in Chapter 2, I detailed the case selection criteria and other considerations that led to
my choosing as my case Republicans in Fremont County, Iowa, who were likely
presidential caucus voters. Those criteria included accessibility throughout the eightmonth study period, sufficient distance from large population centers so that most
participants would work and socialize within the county, and a small enough number of
likely voters that a sufficiently large proportion of them could be regularly interviewed
by a single researcher. The study was limited to Republicans because it was likely that
there would be greater variation on the primary dependent variable (caucus vote choice).
For various reasons a list of prior Republican caucus voters was not available, but a
contact list of 199 likely Republican caucus voters was cobbled together from various
lists available from the Fremont County Auditor’s office and some limited snowball
sampling. The first half of the chapter closed with a description of Fremont County in
order to provide a context for the data gathered during the field work and panel
interviews.
Chapter 2 also included a detailed description of the process employed to gather
the data used in this study, beginning with a de facto pilot study in Nemaha County,
Nebraska, in the summer of 2014 that helped develop skills strategies later used in the
study. After some attrition over the course of the study, the final number of participants
was 80 for a participation rate of 40%. Participants were asked many of the usual
questions regarding ideology, issues, and candidate support. They were also asked in
each round of interviews about with whom they discussed politics. The data from those
interviews was supported by observations of Fremont County Republican central
committee meetings, a candidate visit to Sidney, some other local events, and (with the
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help of two colleagues) three of the four Republican caucus meetings that took place in
the county.
One advantage of the methods used in this case study was that it allowed for the
dyadic network analysis presented in Chapter 3 to be based on data collected from
discussion partners recruited independently; much of the dyadic analysis that has been
used in electoral studies, such as Huckfeldt and Sprague’s (1995) canonical work on
social communications and voting behavior, has been based on snowball sampling with
the initial respondent. That independent data collection allowed the study of non-mutual
dyads (increasing the number of pairs available for analysis) while negating the need to
do follow-up interviews with non-participants named as discussion partners by the
participants. An important feature of dyadic analysis is that it allows for the verification
of participant predictions of which candidates their discussion partners supported. The
analysis in Chapter 3 demonstrated that when participants were willing to predict the
candidate preferences of their discussion partners, they were more accurate than would be
predicted by chance (despite there being no help provided by party ID). As the date of the
presidential caucus approached and the nomination contest became more salient,
participants ventured predictions for more of their discussion partners without a drop in
accuracy. Although there was a tendency for participants who made incorrect predictions
to mistakenly believe that their discussion partners supported the same candidate as they
did, the general finding is that participants were reasonably accurate in predicting which
candidates their discussion partners supported. The findings on the accuracy of
predictions of discussion partner candidate support provide greater confidence about the
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influence of political discussion partners on participant vote choice when examining
egocentric data in later chapters.
I analyzed the impact of campaign effects and ideological vote share in Chapter 4.
The findings regarding campaign effects were modest. There was some evidence that
being contacted by a candidate’s campaign was related to voting for that candidate, but
the findings were not strong. In addition, there was no relationship between either
meeting a candidate personally or attending a candidate’s event and voting for that
candidate. If the findings regarding campaign effects were weak, the findings regarding
ideology were nonexistent. Ideological vote share (the proportion of the vote a candidate
would get if every participant had voted for the candidate that they placed closest to
themselves ideologically) was not significantly related to the actual vote share on caucus
night. There was also no relationship between participant conservatism scores, based on a
battery of 14 questions on political views, and caucus vote. In addition, there was no
relationship between either social conservatism or economic conservatism (based on
subsets of the ideology questions) and vote choice. However, Trump supporters were
found to be more conservative than the supporters of other candidates on a subset of
foreign and defense policy conservatism, suggesting that Trump’s appeal may have been
to nationalism rather than ideological conservatism.
There were two other interesting findings regarding ideology. The first concerns
participants’ perceptions of Donald Trump’s ideology. Unique among all candidates,
Trump had a bimodal distribution on his ideology rating on a seven-point scale, with
peaks at “conservative” and “moderate”. Relatedly, Trump had by far the greatest
variance in ideological ratings from participants. A source for that wide variance was that
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Trump supporters were significantly more likely to place Trump to the right politically
than were those who did not support Trump. A look at changes in the variance of
participant ratings of candidate ideology from the summer of 2015 to January of 2016
revealed another interesting finding. Variance in the ideological ratings of most
candidates decreased over the course of the presidential campaign (although only Jeb
Bush’s decrease was statistically significant). That was in line with the expectation that
information about candidates over the course of the campaign would generate a greater
consensus about where candidates stood ideologically. However, the variance in
participant perceptions of the ideology of the three leading candidates (Donald Trump,
Ted Cruz, and Marco Rubio) actually increased, although only Cruz’s increase was
statically significant. It is likely that negative information directed at the leading
candidates from the campaigns and supporters of each other and the other candidates in
the field made voters less sure of where those candidates stood.
In Chapter 5, I found that knowing people who support a particular candidate was
a much stronger predictor of voting for that candidate than being contacted by a
candidate’s campaign. In a model combining the campaign effects found in Chapter 4
with political discussion network support, campaign effects diminished as a significant
factor in vote choice. In addition, when adding an interaction term of campaign effects
and political discussion network support to the model, neither campaign effects nor the
interaction term were significant.
Perhaps as a natural result of the strength of interpersonal discussion regarding
candidate support, there was increased consensus on which candidate to support within
discussion networks; within-discussion-group homophily on candidate support more than
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doubled over the course of the study. In addition, individuals who agreed with most of
their political discussion network regarding candidate support were more likely to
maintain support for that candidate on caucus night than were those who disagreed with
most of their political discussion network, suggesting that homophily plays a role both in
increasing support for a candidate and in maintaining support for that candidate. There is
also evidence that candidate support within political discussion networks plays a role in
the likelihood of engaging in strategic voting. While the proportion of participants’
political discussion networks supporting Donald Trump was significantly related to
voting for Trump, it was also significantly related to voting for Ted Cruz (with voting for
other candidates the excluded category). The reverse was also true. This suggests that, for
example, when a participant found that most of the Republicans she knew supported
Trump and she could not bring herself to support him, she would settle on the leading
non-Trump candidate. However, if the bulk of her political discussion network supported
a different candidate or divided its support among several candidates, there was less of a
reason to see a need to vote for Cruz as the only real alternative to Trump. These findings
indicate that, although homophily on candidate support strongly influences voting for that
candidate, its impact is more complex than a matter of simply voting with one’s group.
In Chapter 6, I present emergent findings regarding local political elites derived
from data from the Fremont County study. Core party central committee members were
more likely to engage in political talk, and express greater enthusiasm for political talk,
than were either peripheral central committee members or local elected officials.
Peripheral central committee members had the smallest political discussion networks in
the summer of 2015. Although the size of the political discussion networks of all three
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groups increased as the caucus neared, the size of elected officials networks increased
relatively slowly while those of peripheral central committee members grew the fastest.
This reflected both the relative reluctance of elected officials to discuss politics outside
the context of their own elections (none were running that year) and the fact that
peripheral central committee members tended only to be politically active during election
periods. In addition, core central committee members occupied an ideological middle
position between the relative moderation of elected officials and the relative conservatism
of peripheral central committee members. Together, those findings indicate that core
central committee members, by virtue of their central ideological placement and greater
means of disseminating political information, are likely the most influential of local
political elites.
Discussion
The evidence from this study suggests two related features of social influences on
voting behavior in nomination contests: the influence of social influences on voting
behavior in nomination contests and the influence of information from political
discussion networks on strategic voting. These findings provide insight on voting
behavior in nomination contests in general and on the voting behavior of Iowa
presidential caucus voters in particular, providing important information on the contests
that shape the choice voters have in general elections.
From the findings, it appears that the impact of social influences, in the form of
political discussion networks, on voting behavior in nomination contests is strong. Much
of the previous work on social influences on voting behavior (e. g. Berelson et al., 1954;
Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Levine, 2005; Sinclair, 2012) has been on general
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elections, when the known party affiliation of political discussion partners can act as a
cue about how fellow party members are voting. Despite the absence of that powerful
heuristic, this study presents evidence that the tendency towards vote choice homophily
found in general elections can also be found in nomination contests. Relatedly, voters
who found themselves in disagreement with much of their political discussion networks
during the last few days of the race were more likely to vote for a different candidate on
caucus night than the candidate they had planned on voting for than were those who
agreed with a large portion of their political discussion network.
Although there is a strong tendency towards homophily within political discussion
networks, the full picture of social influences on voting behavior is more complex. When
a large portion of a voter’s political discussion network supports one of the two leading
candidates in a nomination contest (e.g., Ted Cruz), the voter is more likely to support
that candidate than one of the candidates further back in the pack. However, there is also
a significantly greater likelihood that the voter will vote for the main opponent of the
network’s preferred candidate (e.g. Donald Trump) rather than one of the candidates
further back in the pack. How do we explain this latter phenomenon? The most likely
explanation is that, when confronted with first-hand evidence that many people are
supporting a candidate that a voter cannot support, that voter will strategically support the
candidate most likely to defeat the network preferred candidate. Trump and Cruz were
the two leading candidates during the last two months of the campaign, according to most
public polling; upon discovering, for example, that Cruz was dominant within their own
political discussion network, participants tended to see the choice as voting for Cruz or
voting for the candidate most likely to beat Cruz, in this case Donald Trump. In contrast,
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when a large portion of a voter’s political discussion network divided its support among
many candidates or supported one of the candidates not leading in the polls, there was
both less social pressure to support one of the leading candidates and less of a perceived
need to vote strategically against a disliked leading candidate.
Information from political discussion networks is important in this assessment
because individuals tend to use conversations with those whom they know to verify
information from the media. People are likely to reject information from the media “if a
perspective conveyed by the mass media clashes with the group members’ perspective”
(Walsh, 2004, p. 53). In other words, if the media tells you that Trump and Cruz are the
leading candidates, but most of the Republicans with whom you talk about politics plan
to vote for Ben Carson, you are likely to discount the information you get from the media
when deciding for which candidate to vote. This is not to suggest that information from
the media is not important. Rather, it suggests that there is an interplay between
information from the media and information from personal discussions.
While the data in this study showed that candidate support within political
discussion networks had a much stronger relationship with vote choice than did campaign
effects, I would not advise campaigns to discontinue their efforts. As noted in Chapter 5,
it may be most accurate to see an election (both general elections and nomination
contests) as a concurrent series of thousands of small battles that take place in every
community and social network throughout the district or state. The vote count in an
election is the result of those thousands of battles, with one candidate usually dominating
within each of those contests. This study found that efforts from campaigns had a small
but real effect on vote choice. Reaching a few members of a political discussion network,
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or even one member, can introduce information that with affect political conversations
within that network. While there is certainly no guarantee that the efforts of a campaign
in winning those thousands of battles will be successful, leaving the field uncontested is a
sure path to failure.
Strengths and Limitations
The use of a case study method to answer questions regarding the influence of
political talk on vote choice allowed for a single researcher to collect extensive
longitudinal data from a single unit (Republican caucus voters in Fremont County, Iowa)
to help understand a larger set of units (voters generally, and voters in nomination
contests in particular). The data from this case study helped in the study of the questions
in this dissertation, providing greater understanding of the sometimes complex ways that
social influences affect voting behavior. Those findings support some theories of voting
behavior (e.g. the effect of political discussion on behavior, the tendency towards
homophily within political discussion networks) while challenging others (e.g.
ideological vote share and ideological crowding). The case study method employed in
this research also provided the flexibility to allow for emergent findings initially based on
fieldwork observations and interviews.
However, as case studies in political science tend to occupy a middle ground
between the thick description of ethnographies and the statistical power of large-n
studies, they can suffer the limitations of being methodologically lukewarm compared to
those other methods. Such was sometimes the case with this study. Although the data
gathered from the interviews and observations in this study were useful in providing data
for conducting statistical analysis, the small sample size imposed some limits on analysis.
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For example, in several statistical tests, the dependent variable (participant vote choice)
had to be collapsed into three categories of “Trump”, “Cruz”, and “other”. A larger
sample could have produced fuller or more nuanced analysis by analyzing more
categories. A survey of several hundred likely voters could have answered some of the
questions dealt with in this study with a lot less time and effort and at only a little more
cost.
Likewise, this study could have benefited in places from the detailed description
provided by ethnographies. That is most apparent in the study of local political elites
presented in Chapter 6. The initial in-person interviews were relatively long (lasting, on
average, a little over 30 minutes each) and contain enough open-ended questions to allow
the qualitative analysis of transcripts, and were backed up by verification through
observations and numeric data. However, the four rounds of panel interviews tended to
be shorter (5-10 minutes) and limited to closed-ended questions. In addition, I was still
taking classes during part of the research period, which limited the time available for
field work in the fall of 2015. More descriptive data would have helped investigate
causality regarding the phenomena investigated in this study. For example, more detailed
interviews with fewer participants could have helped pen down exactly when participants
began supporting particular candidates, helping better understand the direction of
causality within political discussion networks.
Future Research
When considering the limitations of this study, the temptation is to seek to address
them in future studies by calling for more detailed descriptions, more time in the field,
and more statistical power. There are few problems in political science research that
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cannot be solved with a five-year paid sabbatical, a crack staff of a dozen well-trained
research assistants, and a couple MacArthur Foundation “genius” grants. Short of that,
there are several specific areas for future research suggested by the findings of this study.
The lack of evidence for ideological vote share (or ideological crowding) was
unexpected, given the findings of Hull (2008). The plethora of major Republican
candidates may have been a factor in minimizing the role of ideology. For example, there
were three candidates whom participants collectively rated to the right of six on a sevenpoint Likert ideology scale in the summer of 2015 (Ted Cruz, Ben Carson, and Rick
Santorum). The only statistically significant difference between the candidates on
ideology was that supporters of Donald Trump were more conservative than supporters of
the rest of the Republican field on defense and foreign policy issues. Further research
could address the extent to which large fields of candidates in nomination contests
“crowd out” ideological crowding and how campaigns seek to differentiate their
candidates when the field is crowded. In addition, more work should be done on the role
of information contributing to increased collective confusion on the perceived ideology
of candidates.
Further work on the possible interaction of campaign effects and political
discussion network influences on voting behavior is needed. The relative weakness of the
findings on campaign effects prevented them from making a statistically significant
contribution in an interaction model with political discussion networks. It is possible that
the null finding was a result of weaknesses of this particular study and that larger studies
may find a significant interaction.
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The complexity of the relationship between candidate support in political
discussion networks and voting behavior should be investigated in more depth, especially
within the context of nomination contests. Although the finding that knowing many
people who support a particular candidate increased the likelihood of voting for that
candidate is not novel, the finding that it also increased the likelihood of voting for that
candidate’s principal opponent (as opposed to less competitive opponents) is interesting
and warrants further study.
The findings on local political elites bear further study as well. Future research
should be conducted in larger and more diverse communities to see how having multiple
centers of party activism changes participant views towards political communication
within parties. This study does not systematically address causality in the relationship
between social contexts of local political elites and their views on ideology and political
talk. For example, does relative moderation and a belief in the efficacy of political talk
cause central committee members to become more active in the workings of the party, or
do core central committee members develop a greater appreciation for moderation and
political talk based on their experience in the party organization? As noted in the second
chapter of this dissertation, case studies can be a useful tool for refining generalizations
and forming “naturalistic generalizations” that can be applied to other studies (Stake,
1995).
This study helps address an understudied yet important part of the American
political system. The findings (and some of the non-findings) of this study provide a
useful starting point for further inquiries. It refines generalizations developed in the study
of general elections to nomination contests. Among those findings are individuals can
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predict the candidate preferences of those with whom they discuss politics with
reasonable accuracy in nomination contests, despite not having discussion partner party
ID as a guide. Political discussion networks are more strongly related to vote choice than
are communications from campaigns, supporting prior findings on the role that people
with whom we discuss politics play in validating information from outside sources.
Those findings strengthen those theories by demonstrating that they are not limited
general elections and expand our understanding of social influences in nomination
contests. While the finding of increased homophily on candidate preference over time is
not new, the related finding that homophily is potentially related to strategic voting
against the leading candidate within a political discussion network is novel, generating
hypotheses about the relationship between network composition and strategic voting that
can be tested in other contexts. Finally, I have found variation in the terms of ideology
and political discussion among local political elites. Those findings, especially regarding
the ideological centrality of party central committee members and their greater belief in
the efficacy of political talk, suggest that it is party leaders rather than local elected
officials whom candidates should primarily court as part of their campaign ground game.
The events of 2016 underscore the importance of nomination contests in general
and the Iowa presidential caucus in particular; Donald Trump could not have been in a
position to defeat Hilary Clinton had he not first won the Republican nomination and
Trump’s strong showing in Iowa was the first tangible demonstration of his viability. The
findings of this dissertation are noted within the context of the Iowa presidential caucus,
an event that plays an oversized role in making or (more often) breaking presidential
aspirations, and provide one of the few scientific studies of caucus attendees.
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APPENDIX A
Recruitment letter (on University of Nebraska letterhead) sent to all prospective
participants
Dear John Doe,

My name is Andy Jackson. I am a doctoral student from the Political Science department
at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. I am writing to invite you to participate in a
research study about voting in presidential nomination contests. You are eligible to be in
this study because you have been identified as a likely participant in the 2016 Iowa
presidential caucuses based on your participation in prior caucuses or your recent voting
history. I obtained your contact information from records kept by office of the Fremont
County Auditor.
If you decide to participate in this study, I will interview you in person about your
political beliefs, your assessment of official or likely presidential candidates, and the
nature of discussions you have about politics. Everything you say in the interview will be
strictly confidential. This project is being funded in part by grants from the Institute for
Humane Studies and the Political Science department at the University of NebraskaLincoln.
As a token of appreciation, I have included a $2 bill in this mailing. Of course, your
participation is completely voluntary and you may withdraw from participation at any
time.
In the coming couple of weeks, I will contact you by phone or in person to ask if you will
participate in this study. If you have any questions, please contact me at
jonathan.jackson@huskers.unl.edu or you may call me at 919-757-5905.
Thank you very much.
Sincerely,

Jonathan A. “Andy” Jackson
517 Oldfather Hall
Department of Political Science
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Lincoln, NE 68588-0328
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APPENDIX B
The next several pages contain samples of the interview protocols for the initial
in-person interviews conducted in the summer of 2015, and the four panel interviews
conducted by phone from September of 2015 to February of 2016. The sample protocols
for the panel interviews include examples of fields that were filled in for each of the
interviews based on responses from previous rounds (in bold and italics); there was a
partial custom-made protocol for each participant in the panel interviews. The page
count of some of the protocols are different than what is seen in this appendix due to
differences in formatting.
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In-Person Interview Protocol
Project: The impact of social networks on the vote choice of Iowa caucus goers
Date:

___________________________

Time:

___________________________

Location:

___________________________

Interviewer:

Jonathan Andrew Jackson

Participant ID number:

_____________

Informed consent signed? ____
Notes to interviewee:
 Thank the interviewee for his or her time.
 Let interviewee know that the “talk” will take about an hour and will be
composed of seven major questions with associated follow-ups and exploration.
 Ask permission to record interview.
 Assure interviewee that the contents of the interview will remain confidential and
that they will only be identified as an “Iowa Democratic/Republican political
activist”. Also that they will only be identified by a random five-digit code in the
data.
 Tell the interviewee that the results of the interview will be part of research to be
presented in conference and be included as part of a dissertation and perhaps a
journal article.
 During interview, record participant phone number if had not already and ask the
best days and times to call for follow up interviews.
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In-Person Interview Questions with Potential Probes and Follow-ups
1. Could you tell me about yourself and why you became politically active?
[Probe: How long have you been politically active? Have you ever volunteered
for a presidential candidate (if so, for whom and when)?]

a. How would you rate yourself ideologically? Do you consider yourself to
be… (read through list)
___ Very liberal
___ Liberal
___ Slightly liberal
___ Middle-of-the-road
___ Slightly conservative
___ Conservative
___ Very conservative
b. Why did you rate yourself the way you did?

161
2. What things do you consider when deciding who to vote for in a presidential
caucus?

a. How important is it that a candidate has a strong chance to win the party
nomination?

b. How important is it that a candidate has a strong chance to win the general
election in November?

c. Are there any issues that a candidate must agree with you on before you
would vote for him or her? (If so, which one(s)?)

3. How would you rate (name of candidate in random order) ideologically? Do you
consider that candidate to be… (read through list for first candidate)
___ Very liberal
___ Liberal
___ Slightly liberal
___ Middle-of-the-road; moderate
___ Slightly conservative
___ Conservative
___ Very conservative
a. How about (next candidate on the list until all candidates are rated)?
[Place answers in list on next page]
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Answers for Question 3: How would you rate (name of candidate in random order)
ideologically? Do you consider that candidate to be…?
(Start at a random point on the list.)
Very
liberal

Ted
Cruz
Rand
Paul
Marco
Rubio
Ben
Carson
Carly
Fiorina
Mike
Huckabee
Rick
Santorum
George
Pataki
Jeb
Bush
Scott
Walker
Chris
Christie
Rick
Perry
Lindsey
Graham
Bobby
Jindal
John
Kasich
Donald
Trump
other volunteered

Liberal

Slightly
liberal

Middleof-theroad;
moderate

Slightly
conservative

Conservative

Very
conservative
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4. Who do you plan to vote for in the caucus? [Do not push for leaners. It participant
says he or she will not vote, probe for the reason not voting?]
________________________
i. Why?

ii. Are you definitely going to vote for that candidate or do
you think you could change your mind? Who would be
your second choice?

5. Now I am going to ask you about some particular topics. I will ask how positive
or negative do you feel about each issue on the scale of 0 to 100, where 0
represents very negative and 100 represents very positive. How do you feel
about…? (each topic in random order – continue to ask until all issues have been
asked).
Issue
Abortion rights (reverse code)
Government regulation of business (reverse code)
Gay marriage (reverse code)
Military spending
Cut the federal budget
Gun rights
A path to citizenship for illegal immigrants (reverse
code)
Limited government
Biblical truth
Increase taxes (reverse code)
Increase welfare spending (reverse code)
Drone strikes against terrorism suspects
Foreign aid to the world’s needy (reverse code
School prayer

0 to 100 scale
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6. What are some local organizations or groups that you belong to?
[For each group mentioned: What kinds of things do you talk about with people in
that group? How often does politics come up in formal or informal discussions
within that group?]

a. What state or national organizations do you belong to?

b. Do you attend church regularly?
i. [If yes] Which church? ___________
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7. Who have you talked about politics with over the past month?
(Try to get up to 10 names. If participant declines to give names, ask for initials.
This data is needed to match with questions in follow up contacts later. Continue
to probe for more names until participant runs out of names.)

a.
b.
c.
d.
Name

Probes for individuals
How do you know _______________? (multiple connects are fine)
Do you consider _______________ to be an acquaintance, close, or very
close?
Who is _______________ supporting for president?
General probe
Of the people you mentioned, which ones do you think are the most
knowledgeable about politics? (Note answers, including “myself”.)
a. How
b. How well
c. Supporting d. Among most
known?
known?
for president
knowledgeable?
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8. Have any presidential campaigns contacted you? (If yes, ask which campaigns
and the nature of the contacts.)

9. Have you personally seen or meet any presidential candidates? (If yes, ask which
candidates and context in which they saw the candidate (Where? When?, etc.)

10. What else do you think I should know?

Closing notes:
 Thank participant again for his or her time.
 For the snowball sample (phase 1 only):
o Ask for name and contact information of other people “you think I should
talk with”.
o Ask for permission to use participant’s name when contacting prospective
new participant.
 Ask the participant about any places in the county were people gather regularly.
 Remind participant that you will contact him or her “a couple of times” by phone
between now and the caucus scheduled for January of 2016 for brief (10 minute)
follow ups. If participant requests that you not contact him or her, check the blank
below and do not contact the participant for follow ups.
___The participant requested not to be contacted again.
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Second Round Interview Protocol
Project: The impact of social networks on the vote choice of Iowa caucus goers
Date:
___________________________
Time:
___________________________
Interviewer:
Jonathan Andrew Jackson
Participant ID number:
16042
Date of first interview:
Aug 2
Notes to interviewer:
 Only those who had previously signed informed consent forms and given
permission to be called will be called.
 Thank the interviewee for his or her time.
 Let interviewee know that the “talk” will take about ten minutes and will be
composed of questions meant to follow up on prior interviews.
 Remind interviewee that the contents of the interview will remain confidential.
 Remind the interviewee that the results of the interview will be part of research to
be presented in conference and be included as part of a dissertation and perhaps
journal article.
1. Are you happy with the current field of Republican presidential candidates or is
there someone else you would like to see enter the race? [If they say “someone
else” ask for who they would like to see enter the race.]
___ Happy with the current
___ Would like someone else: (Who?)___________________________________

2. Have you seen any of the Republican presidential debates or portions of the debates?
a. If no…. go on to question 3
b. If yes…. “Who do you have believe has done the best in the debates so
far?
3. At the moment, who do you plan to vote for in the caucus? [Do not push for
leaners.]
________________________ [First Round Answer: Jane Doe]
i.
What do you like most about _______?
ii.

Are there other candidates you are considering? If so, who?

iii.

[Ask only if answer changed from first round.] You had
previously said that you supported Jane Doe. Why do you no
longer support that candidate?
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4. Who have you talked about politics with over the past two months?
(Try to get up to 10 names. If participant declines to give names, ask for initials
and answer the follow up questions. Continue to probe for more names until
participant runs out of names.) Probes for each individual mentioned (some
information will already be provided if the person was mentioned in the first
interview). If the participant does not mention someone mentioned in the first
round of interviews, do not mention that person.
e. How do you know _______________? (multiple connects are fine)
f. Do you consider _______________ to be an acquaintance, close, or very
close?
g. Who is _______________ supporting for president?
General probe
h. Of the people you mentioned, which ones do you think are the most
knowledgeable about politics? You can name more than one person.
Name
a. How
b. How c. Mentioned
d.
e. Among most
known?
well
this round?
Supporting
knowledgeable
known? Yes
for president ?
No
Tom Jones
Grace Jones
Gene
Simmons
Bill Katten
Jane Smith

Brother-inlaw

C

Sister

VC

Friend

C

Coworker

A

Church

C

5. How do you get most of your information about the presidential candidates? You
can name more than one source. [Open ended question.]
_____ 1. TV

169
(Which stations or shows?)
_____ 2. Radio
Which stations or shows?)
_____ 3. Newspapers
(Which newspaper?)
_____ 4. The Internet
(Which sources?)
_____ 5. People you know
(Who?)
_____ 6. Something else
(What?)

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

6. Which of the following best describes the highest degree or level of education you
have completed?
___ 1. No formal education
___ 2. 8th grade or less
___ 3. Some high school
___ 4. High school graduate or equivalent such as GED
___ 5. Some college
___ 6. Associate or Bachelor’s degree
___ 7. Graduate or professional degree

7. Have any presidential campaigns contacted you, not including junk mail, spam
email, or robo calls? (If yes, ask which campaigns and the nature of the contacts.)

8. Have you personally seen or meet any presidential candidates? (If yes, ask which
candidates and context in which they saw the candidate (Where? When?, etc.)
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Third Round Interview Protocol (To be conducted in early December of 2015)
Project: The impact of social networks on the vote choice of Iowa caucus goers
Date:
Time:
Interviewer:
Participant ID number:
Date of first interview:

___________________________
Jonathan Andrew Jackson
Aug 2

Date of second interview: Oct 26

Notes to interviewer:




Only those who had previously signed informed consent forms and given permission to
be called will be called.
Thank the interviewee for their time and let them know that the “talk” will take about ten
minutes and will be composed of questions meant to follow up on prior interviews.
Remind interviewee that the contents of the interview will remain confidential and that
the results of the interview will be part of research to be presented in conference and be
included as part of a dissertation and perhaps journal article.

9. Do you think it is good to have plenty of time to evaluate the presidential
candidates, or do you think presidential election campaigns should be shorter?
___ Plenty of time
___ Be shorter
10. Have any presidential campaigns contacted you in past (4-8 weeks), not including
junk mail, spam email, or robo calls? (If yes, ask which campaigns and the nature
of the contacts.)

11. Have you personally seen, meet, or been to an event of any presidential
candidates in the past (4-8 weeks)? (If yes, ask which candidates and context in
which they saw the candidate (Where? When?, etc.)
12. At the moment, who do you plan to vote for in the caucus? [Do not push for leaners.]

__________________ [1st round answer: / 2nd round answer: ]
b. What do you like most about _______?
c. Are there other candidates you are considering? If so, who?
d. [Ask only if answer changed from previous rounds.] You had previously
said that you supported Jane Doe. Why do you no longer support that
candidate?
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13. The last two times we talked, you mentioned some people whom you have
discussed politics with. I am going to read that list to you. For each of those
people, please let me know if you have discussed political matters with them in
the past two months. (Go through list, checking the third “mentioned” box if the
respondent says yes.
Thanks. Who else have you discussed politics with over the past two months?
Continue to probe for more names until participant runs out of names.) Some
information will already be provided if the person was mentioned in the first
interview.
Follow ups for newly mentioned political discussion partners:
i. How do you know _______________? (multiple connects are fine)
j. Do you consider _______________ to be an acquaintance, close, or very
close?
Follow up for all political discussion partners:
k. Do you generally agree or disagree when talking politics with _______?
Follow up for all political partners in the 3rd round
l. Who is _______________ supporting for president?
Name
a. How
b. How Mentioned
c. Agree or
d.
known?
well
(check if yes)
disagree (check) Supporting
known 1st 2nd 3rd
for
A
D
president
Tom Jones
Brother-inC
X
X
law
Grace
Sister
VC
X
X
Jones
Gene
Friend
C
X
Simmons
Bill Katten
Coworker
A
X
X
Jane Smith
Nancy
Grace
Ned
Krewson

Church

C

X

Sister

VC

X

Friend, Penn
Drug Coffee

C

X
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14. "Regardless of whom you support, you to believe [candidate name] has a strong
chance to win the Republican presidential nomination, somewhat of a chance, or
no chance?”(Repeat for each candidate.)
15. If [candidate name] were the Republican presidential nominee, would he (she)
be more likely to win or lose in the general election in November?
(Repeat for each candidate.)
Chance to win Republican nomination
(Viability)
Strong
Somewhat
No chance
Chance
of a chance

Likeliness to win general election
(electability)
Likely win

Likely lose

Ted
Cruz
Rand
Paul
Marco
Rubio
Ben
Carson
Carly
Fiorina
Mike
Huckabee
Rick
Santorum
George
Pataki
Jeb
Bush
Chris
Christie
Lindsey
Graham
John
Kasich
Donald
Trump

16. When considering whom to support in the presidential caucus, do you consider a
candidate’s standing in national public opinion polls?
___ Yes ___ No ___ Some (vol.)
17. When considering whom to support in the presidential caucus, do you consider a
candidate’s standing in Iowa public opinion polls?
___ Yes ___ No ___ Some (vol.)
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Third Round Interview Protocol (To be conducted in late January of 2016)
Project: The impact of social networks on the vote choice of Iowa caucus goers
Date:
Time:
Interviewer:
Participant ID number:
Date of 1st interview: 8-2
Notes to interviewer:




___________________________
Jonathan Andrew Jackson
Date of 2nd interview: 10-26 Date of 3rd interview: 12-1

Only those who had previously signed informed consent forms and given permission to
be called will be called.
Thank the interviewee for their time and let them know that the “talk” will take about ten
minutes and will be composed of questions meant to follow up on prior interviews.
Remind interviewee that the contents of the interview will remain confidential and that
the results of the interview will be part of research to be presented in conference and be
included as part of a dissertation and perhaps journal article.

1. Do you think Iowa should change to a primary system for the presidential
nominating contest?
___ Yes
___ No
2. Have any presidential campaigns contacted you in past (4-8 weeks), not including
junk mail, spam email, or robo calls? (If yes, ask which campaigns and the nature
of the contacts.)

3. Have you personally seen, meet, or been to an event of any presidential
candidates in the past (4-8 weeks)? (If yes, ask which candidates and context in
which they saw the candidate (Where? When?, etc.)

4. At the moment, who do you plan to vote for in the caucus? [Do not push for leaners.]
__________________ [1st round: Walker / 2nd round Carson: 3rd round: Carson]

e. What do you like most about _______?
f. Are there other candidates you are considering? If so, who?
g. [Ask only if answer changed from previous rounds.] You had previously
said that you supported Jane Doe. Why do you no longer support that
candidate?
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5. The last three times we talked, you mentioned some people whom you have
discussed politics with. I am going to read that list to you. For each of those
people, please let me know if you have discussed political matters with them in
the past two months. (Go through list, checking the third “mentioned” box if the
respondent says yes.)
Thanks. Who else have you discussed politics with over the past two months?
Continue to probe for more names until participant runs out of names.) Some
information will already be provided if the person was mentioned in the first
interview.
Follow ups for newly mentioned political discussion partners:
m. How do you know _______________? (multiple connects are fine)
n. Do you consider _______________ to be an acquaintance, close, or very
close?
Follow up for all political discussion partners:
o. Do you generally agree or disagree when talking politics with _______?
Follow up for all Republican political partners from all rounds
p. Who is _______________ supporting for president?
Name
a. How
b. How Mentioned (check if
c. Agree d.
known?
well
yes)
or
Supporting
known
disagree for
(check) president
1st
2nd 3rd 4th A
D
Tom Jones
Grace
Jones
Gene
Simmons
Bill Katten
Jane Smith
Nancy
Grace
Ned
Krewson

Brother-inlaw (Dem)

C

X

X

X

Sister

VC

X

X

X

Friend

C

X

Coworker
(Dem)

A

X

Church

C

X

Sister

VC

X

Friend, Penn
Drug Coffee

C

X

X
X

X
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6. Answers for Question 3: How would you rate (name of candidate in random
order) ideologically? Do you consider that candidate to be liberal, moderate, or
conservative?
a. [If answer = liberal] Is he/she very liberal, liberal, or slightly liberal
b. [If answer = conservative] Is he/she slightly conservative, conservative,
or very conservative?
Very
liberal

Liberal

Slightly
liberal

Middleof-theroad;
moderate

Slightly
conservative

Conservative

Very
conservative

Ted
Cruz
Rand
Paul
Marco
Rubio
Ben
Carson
Carly
Fiorina
Mike
Huckabee
Rick
Santorum
Jeb
Bush
Chris
Christie
Lindsey
Graham
John
Kasich
Donald
Trump

7. Do you plan to talk with anybody to anyone about your preferred candidate
between now and the caucus?
___ Yes
___ No
a. [IF YES] Who do you plan on talking with about your preferred
candidates?
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Post Caucus Interview Protocol (To be conducted in early February of 2016)
Project: The impact of social networks on the vote choice of Iowa caucus goers
Date:
Time:
Interviewer:
Participant ID number:
Date of 1st interview: 7-11

___________________________
Jonathan Andrew Jackson
2nd: 10-26

3rd: 12-11

4th: 1-25

Notes to interviewer:
 Only those who had previously signed informed consent forms and given
permission to be called will be called.
 Thank the interviewee for their time and let them know that the “talk” will take
about five minutes and will be composed of questions meant to follow up on prior
interviews. Note that this will be the last interview.
Remind interviewee that the contents of the interview will remain confidential and that
the results of the interview will be part of research to be presented in conference and be
included as part of a dissertation and perhaps journal article.

1. Which candidate did you vote for at the February 1st caucus?
__________________________________________________
[1st round: Walker / 2nd round Carson: 3rd round: Carson / 4th round: Trump]
a. What one thing was the most important in making you decide to vote for _____?

b. [Ask only if answer changed from previous round.] You had previously
said that you supported Jane Doe. Why did you change your support?

2. When did you finally decide for whom to vote in the presidential election?
[READ]
a. _____ At the caucus
b. _____ The day of the caucus (but before attending the caucus)
c. _____ The Sunday before the caucus
d. _____ The week before the caucus
e. _____ Sometime earlier in January
f. _____ Sometime in December
g. _____ Before December
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3. Who are the last five people you discussed politics with before voting in the
caucus?
Continue to probe for more names until participant runs out of names.) Some
information will already be provided if the person was mentioned in the first
interview.
Follow ups for newly mentioned political discussion partners:
q. How do you know _______________? (multiple connects are fine)
r. Do you consider _______________ to be an acquaintance, close, or very
close?
Follow up for all Republican political partners from all rounds
s. Whom do you believe _______________ supported for president in the
caucus?
Name
a. How
b. How Mentioned (check if yes)
c. Supported
known?
well
for president
known
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Tom Jones
Grace Jones
Gene
Simmons
Bill Katten
Jane Smith

Brother-inlaw (Dem)

C

X

X

X

Sister

VC

X

X

X

Friend

C

X

Coworker
(Dem)

A

X

Church

C

X

Nancy Grace Sister
Ned
Krewson
Tom Jones

Friend,
Penn Drug
Coffee
Brother-inlaw (Dem)

X

X
X

X

X

VC

X

C

X

X

X

X

C

X

X
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APPENDIX C
The plot below consists of the political discussion networks of all 80 participants
who completed the study for the seven-month period of the study and their political
discussion partners.

Of the 401 nodes in the plot, ten are core members of the Fremont County
Republican Party Central Committee (red), who were elected to the central committee
and attended at least two of the six committee meetings that took place during the seven-
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month research period. Another seven are peripheral members of the central committee
(pink), who were elected to the committee but do not regularly attend meetings. Eight
nodes are public officials, either Republicans elected to county-wide office, or
Republicans who serve in paid appointed positions at the pleasure of the county board of
supervisors (blue). Node size is based on betweenness centrality (the number of times a
node lies on the shortest path between other nodes), which shows which individuals
function as a bridge between individuals and groups. For example the largest node in
this plot spoke about politics with both members of the party central committee (red
nodes) and members of a local church that included several caucus attendees (yellow
nodes at the bottom of the plot).
Since the participation rate of likely caucus voters in this study was well below
the 80% rule-of-thump for whole network analysis, such analysis was not conducted in
this dissertation.

